Natural monopolies and their regulation. Natural monopolies and methods of their regulation
STATE REGULATION OF NATURAL MONOPOLIES
Tsikhotskiy F.N., student of the faculty "State and municipal management" FGOBU VPO "Financial University under
Government of the Russian Federation "
Telkova M.G., student of the faculty "State and municipal administration" of the Federal State Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education "Financial University at
Government of the Russian Federation "
Krivtsova M.K., student of the faculty "State and municipal administration" of the Federal State Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education "Financial University
under the Government of the Russian Federation "
Objective. Study of theoretical and practical problems of state regulation of natural monopolies, stages of the formation of basic concepts in the field of monopolies, as well as analysis of the current situation and the formation of measures to improve them.
Materials and methods. The theoretical foundations of state regulation of natural monopolies, the concepts of the main economic processes associated with them, the transformation and development of these concepts from the moment of the appearance of such a phenomenon as monopoly to the present day are considered. The analysis of the modern world and the peculiarities of the Russian experience, as well as the main regulatory instruments.
Result. The tasks and basic principles of effective regulation of the activities of natural monopolies in the Russian Federation are determined.
Conclusion. The results of the study can be used by government authorities to analyze the activities of natural monopolies in the context of the economic development of modern Russia.
Key words: regulation, monopoly, national economy.
STATE REGULATION OF NATURAL MONOPOLIES
Tsikhotsky F., student of the State and municipal management faculty, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation Telkova M., student of the State and municipal management faculty, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
Krivtsova M., student of the State and municipal management faculty, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
Purpose of the work. Study of theoretical and practical problems of state regulation of natural monopolies, the stages of formation of the basic concepts in the field of monopolies, as well as analysis of the current situation and the formation of measures to improve them.
Materials and methods. The theoretical basis of state regulation of natural monopolies, basic concepts of economic processes associated with them, the transformation and development of these concepts with the appearance of such a phenomenon, as a monopoly, and the present day. An analysis of the features of the modern world and the Russian experience, as well as the main regulatory instruments.
Result. Determined are the objectives and basic principles of effective regulation of natural monopolies in the Russian Federation.
Conclusion. The results can be used by government authorities to analyze the activities of natural monopolies in the context of economic development in Russia.
Keywords: regulation, natural monopoly, national economy
The topic of monopolies, their role and place in the economy appeared relatively recently - at the beginning of the 19th century. Already by the sixties of the twentieth century, the doctrine of monopolies has become firmly embedded in economic theory, becoming a part of it. The significance of this topic has only increased since then, since the course of economic processes depended on the presence or absence of this type of market structure in the country's economy.
To reveal the essence of the study of this topic, it is necessary to start with the theoretical foundations and the concept of natural monopolies, to consider their functioning and regulation abroad and in Russia, to identify the main world trends in the field of state regulation of the latter.
The problem of natural monopolies has been considered by economists since the 19th century. The first to undertake its analysis were Antoine-Opp-sten Cournot and John Stuart Mill. They looked at the problem from a practical perspective. In the field of theory and practice of state regulation of natural monopoly branches, important scientific results are reflected in the works of L. Walras, C. Menger, J. Robinson, E. Chamberlin, A. Marshall, J. Galbraith, A. Pigou.
From the very inception of economic theory, there was an understanding of the need to form clear concepts for the phenomena, processes of the economy. Thus, the preconditions for the creation of an objective terminological base were formed, the need for which was due to the diverse understanding of the same concepts by economists from different times and from different countries. Gradually, the conceptual apparatus was formed and the formation of the economy as a science took place (XVIII century).
However, the faster the society developed, the faster the economy developed. More and more new processes, phenomena, markets and market structures appeared. Finally, in the 1880s, the first monopolies began to appear in Germany1. Then they spread to European countries, appeared in the United States, and a little later in Russia. This was primarily due to the rapid economic growth, which was based on technological progress. The production grew and expanded. It required a huge
investment in R&D, and small firms simply could not afford it.
The first attitude towards monopolies was as a natural situation inevitable in the market. The state and government did not interfere with their activities, scientists viewed them as a new, little-studied phenomenon, not paying due attention. The First World War did not change the situation too much, on the contrary - economic analysis showed that it was the high degree of monopolization of the economy that helped the countries to carry out production most effectively in wartime conditions. Most often, such companies received government orders for certain socially economically significant goods, as well as for military-industrial complex goods. In such conditions, the enterprise was comfortable to exist as the only producer of goods, it received huge super profits, and the state - mass production without delays, which is so necessary in wartime.
The end of the war led to a reduction in state investment, state defense orders and other goods that are massively purchased from monopolies. As a result, the activity of the monopolies "hindered" the revival of small business and the development of world trade. Possessing huge production capacities, monopolists could not be afraid of competition, and the usual superprofits were received by reducing production and raising prices. There was a shortage in the market. Many experts consider monopolization of the market as one of the reasons for the Great Depression (1929-1933) and the crisis, which then swept across the world2. Thus, from a positive attitude towards monopoly, an extremely negative attitude has developed.
In the process of reforms aimed at combating the crisis in the United States, and then at eliminating the consequences of the world economic crisis of 1929, monopolies were recognized as an obstacle to the normal functioning of the market.
As a result of the reforms carried out by Keynes, special antitrust laws were created to regulate monopolies, however, some monopolies were still recognized even in the United States.
This mainly happened in industries with a high threshold for the transition of a positive effect from the scale of production to a negative one, i.e. in industries where a minimum of long-term average costs was achieved only with large volumes of output, or even with only one firm in the industry (examples of such industries are railways, oil and gas transportation systems, electricity, water supply, and others). Such monopolies have come to be called natural monopolies and it is about them that will be discussed.
Thus, the attitude towards modern natural monopolies remains ambiguous. Most economists agree that natural monopolies have the right to live, since it is simply impossible to replace them with anything else. Take railways, for example, and imagine that each branch between cities is owned by a separate organization. The single economic space will collapse, and the cost of transportation will increase significantly. There will be nothing good in dividing the organization that monopolizes the railways.
Economic theory provides for three main ways of regulating natural monopolies: by prices, by profit, and by volume of production. The institutional approach of regulation is also highlighted.
It should be noted that the regulation of the sale prices of goods by natural monopolies is one of the most common methods of regulation of natural monopolies. There are several ways to set prices:
■ setting a price equal to marginal cost and equal to demand. It is called the Ramsey rule or Ramsey prices.
■ setting maximum prices at the level of average total costs when they are equal to demand.
■ a two-stage tariff, the essence of which is to divide consumer payments into two parts - the first will be a kind of subscription fee (a fixed amount from any consumer), and the second will be a fee for each unit of product (service) in accordance with the price set by the state ...
Methods for regulating profits and production volumes of natural monopoly entities are derived from methods of setting prices. The bottom line is the following - by setting the maximum profit or minimum production, we dictate the price level to the monopolist.
As for the institutional approach to the regulation of natural monopolies, this approach is intended to replace the rather complex system of price selection for a monopolist in accordance with its costs. Its essence is as follows - for the natural monopoly industry, every certain period of time, the state holds a competition (tender) for the possession of the right to monopoly production. This allows you to select the most efficient manufacturer. This method is considered the most promising today, since it allows for a more objective regulation of natural monopoly, and is also designed to create competitive conditions.
With the help of the above, the main theoretical aspects of natural monopoly were identified. Now we should move on to practical ones, namely, to characterize the activities of natural monopolies in the economies of foreign countries and Russia, as well as to identify the main world trends in the field of state regulation and their functioning.
For this, it is necessary to consider and analyze the antitrust and antitrust legislation (USA) of the advanced developed Western countries, which first encountered such a market phenomenon as monopoly. Among these countries: the advanced countries of Europe such as Germany, Great Britain, and the United States of America.
Let us analyze the famous US antitrust laws, which are the first and most practical legislative acts aimed at combating monopoly and regulating market competition, including natural monopolies. What kind of legislation is this? Antitrust legislation - “laws and other government acts that promote
development of competition, aimed at limiting and prohibiting monopolies, preventing the creation of monopoly structures and associations, monopolistic actions. To organize antitrust activities, antitrust (antitrust) committees are created. ”3 The Sherman Act, adopted in 1890, was the first antitrust law in the history of the United States and the world.
In 1914, two new acts were passed that were intended to improve the Sherman Act, so it was deemed rather obscure, since any association could often cause special attention of prosecutors. These laws were the "Federal Trade Commission Act" and the "Act Supplementing Existing Laws Against Illegal Restrictions and Monopolies and Other Purposes." The first regulated the activities of a new body under the US government - the Federal Trade Commission, which was created, among other things, in order to check the mergers and transactions of firms for compliance with market conditions and preserving independence - preventing the creation of trusts. This act still exists and its main purpose is to protect competition. The second act (aka the Clayton Act) provided for a number of amendments and changes to the Sherman Act. It was directed against the merger of the company, that is, against the practice that has become widespread in the United States since the beginning of the 20th century and was used by monopolistic circles, both to strengthen their positions in relation to competitive competitors, and to increase their overall weight in the country's economy. It says that "neither a company engaged in trade will acquire, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, shares or other share capital of another, also involved in the trade of the corporation, if the result of such an acquisition may be a significant weakening of competition between the corporation - that , whose shares are being bought up, and the one that makes a purchase - either restrictions on trade in any part or region of the country or a tendency to establish monopolies in any area of \u200b\u200btrade "
Until the 80s, many other acts were introduced that changed the antitrust legislation, but the main thing remained the same - the state was against monopolies. However, in the 80s of the twentieth century, the so-called Chicago School of Economists was formed. They were very critical of serious government interference in the regulation of competition in terms of preventing monopolies. Their idea was that such intervention creates an imbalance in the US economy, which causes monopolistic distortions. This group of economists suggested a different path - antitrust regulation was to be applied only in cases where the actions of individual firms undermine competition, prevent other firms from entering the market, or use their market opportunities to restrict production. This is how the following rules were formulated:
1. Antitrust regulation should not affect companies that grow intensively using internal resources
2. Mergers should be regulated only if the result of them may be a significant limitation of production (in terms of volume, assortment, etc.) due to an increase in the market share of newly created companies
3. Cartel practice should be pursued most intensively; horizontal price collusion between the leading companies in the same industry, as well as market sharing, etc.
4. Vertical restrictions on competition (ie agreements between manufacturers and dealers on the division of territories, setting prices and terms of delivery) are completely legal and should not be regulated, since they ensure the efficiency of the distribution network
In fact, it was the last point that marked the era of the resolution of the existence of natural monopolies. On the basis of these ideas, a law was created in 1982 - an improved version of the Webb-Pomeren law, which provided for the permission to create an association of producers of goods for export, i.e. allowed a natural monopoly for export industries. Later (1984), a number of decisions were adopted that soften the legislation, they began to allow vertical and conglomerate associations, and then part of horizontal associations. In 1983 was
1 Encyclopedia of world historical names, titles, events // http://www.history-names.rU/m/monopolii.shtml
2 World history of modern times: Part 1 - 1917 - 1945. http://yourlib.net/content/view/1902/33/
3 Academician Dictionary // http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/econ_dict/3026
the Law on Labor Productivity and Innovations was adopted. Its main importance was in resolving natural monopolies in R&D.
A feature of modern US antitrust legislation is the fact that the activities of companies are allowed, which can be interpreted as monopolistic. But it is assessed primarily from the point of view of the impact on the efficiency of the economy. And if it is recognized that such activities contribute to efficiency gains, then they are not subject to antitrust sanctions.
There are two ways to implement legislation. Let the first be judicial and legislative. It is that the Department of Justice and the courts are prosecuted and punished for violating the antitrust law. The plaintiff and the defendant can be any natural or legal person - an individual citizen, a private company or a government organization. If the defendant company is found guilty of violating the antitrust law, it will be subject to criminal or civil penalties. The second way is administrative. Its essence lies in the fact that regulation does not take place in a judicial process, but in an amicable agreement. Administrative Path Tools - Numerous "instructions" and "guidelines" issued by the FTC in addition to antitrust laws. Administrative investigations of antitrust violations by the FTC lead not to punishment, but only to overturning company decisions.
Thus, the regulation of competition in the United States has quite a lot of practical experience, and multiple legislative acts make it possible to fairly successfully regulate the activities of associations of enterprises and natural monopolies. Undoubtedly, this legislation, having passed such a long way of formation, is the most effective, at least in the conditions of the US economy. We will consider the possibility of applying the methods of American law in the context of the Russian economy in the next chapter.4
Natural monopolies in Russia appeared later than the monopolies of the West and America, and were distinguished by a certain originality. An important role in their appearance was often played by foreign companies seeking to seize a promising sales market. The Soviet period also played an important role, which established a command-and-control economy based on giant enterprises, and therefore on natural monopolies. Thus, the conditions in Russia in modern times are very specific - due to the late appearance of monopolies in the economy in comparison with the world, there is no sufficient legal and judicial-practical base, and the period of the USSR created historically determined natural monopolies. One of the first monopoly associations that arose on the territory of Russia, which later grew into a full-fledged monopoly, and then underwent state regulation, was the industrial association in St. Petersburg, created in 1886 with the assistance of German entrepreneurs.5 Six firms that were engaged in manufacturing various metal products, first of all - nails and wire. But this was not a cartel modeled on European countries or a trust modeled on the United States. It was a kind of phenomenon of Russian entrepreneurship under the influence of European capitalism - a syndicate. Syndicates were a transitional form between cartel and trust. A syndicate is an association of enterprises producing similar products, created in the interests of organizing the collective marketing of such products through a single distribution network6 The syndicate creates a kind of general trading partnership, which then enters into a sales agreement with each of the members of the syndicate. (They can also be created by banks, and then the members of the banking syndicate acquire securities issued by any member of the group.) In just seven years, this organization was able to capture more than four-fifths of the total volume of sales of nails, even renaming the syndicate to the name corresponding to its profile, "Nail", becoming , in fact, a monopoly in the production and sale of nails. A similar situation arises in other industries. For example, in 1887, just a year after the first syndicate, a syndicate emerged in the sugar industry, which, in less than five years, was able, thanks to economies of scale, price discrimination and unfair competition, to collect almost all sugar factories ( about ten percent of enterprises remained independent). The largest syn-
dikat appears a little later, in 1902, in an industry that is prone to the formation of a natural monopoly in it due to the high return on economies of scale - the metallurgical industry. There the "Prodamet" organization appeared, which quickly ousted competitors from the market and united trade in output with most of the production of metallurgical plants. Syndicates arose in the copper industry, the roofing industry, railway carriages, oil production, and the textile industry, and the state quickly became aware that at such a rate the economy could stall - all small businesses would be subjected to mergers with syndicates, and those, in turn, , existed only for their own benefit, eating away at the economy from the inside.
The originality of the development also consisted in the direct intervention of state bodies in the creation and operation of monopolies in sectors that meet the needs of the state economy, or that were of particular importance in its system (metallurgy, transport, machine building, oil and sugar industries). This led to the early emergence of state-monopoly tendencies, which then found application, both in the Soviet period and in modern times in the field of regulation of natural monopolies.7
The problem of the rapid development of the syndicates was solved in Russia radically - as a result of the October Revolution. The new government, having come to power, carried out expropriation and nationalization, eventually eliminating such a phenomenon as private enterprise, creating an economy planned from above - command-administrative. Officially, monopolies and syndicates ceased to exist, however, considering the activities of Soviet enterprises, we can draw a completely adequate conclusion - industrial industry giants, in their essence, were a natural monopoly, with the only difference being complete control of the state. Of course, the centralized planning of output did not give such negative effects for the economy, which could be from the existence of only an indirectly regulated monopoly, but such a system did not allow rational use of the advantages from economies of scale, since enterprises, first of all, had to produce not so much as could or they needed for the existence of profit, but as much as the national economy and the State Planning Commission needed. There was absolutely no motivation for earning profits or increasing profitability (and there was no opportunity to do this - not to violate the production plan), so X-inefficiency was gaining terrible momentum. But it was the 70-year Soviet past, the emphasis on a small number of enterprises - industrial giants, that created a greater market predisposition to monopolization in the 90s, which prompted the creation of special legislation and the organization of control and regulation of the activities of natural monopolies in the Russian Federation.
Since 1992, the transition from a planned, command-administrative economy to a market economy began, and it was necessary to transfer state-owned enterprises that act as monopolists to private hands. Special problems were associated with the electric power industry, the gas industry and the railways, since, in view of economic expediency, they had to be organized with a decisive share of the state's capital, since the Russian Federation simply could not allow monopolies in private hands in these industries. The absence of a legislative and regulatory framework, experience and traditions of economic regulation in Russia, the large size and weak "transparency" of sectoral economic structures in these sectors objectively made it difficult to quickly create an appropriate system of state regulation.
State monopoly in the Russian Federation was formed under the influence of the following factors:
1. there was an administrative command system of management: directive management and centralized income of enterprises;
2. a stable and massive deficit, which gave rise to monopoly, and then reproduced by itself, since it is not interested in the full satisfaction of consumer demand;
3. production was concentrated and specialized. The system of natural distribution stood out and spread at one time, which destroyed the market and ensured the all-embracing power of the monopolists.
Finally, in 1995, the well-known law of August 17, 1995 N 147-FZ "On natural monopolies" was adopted. He defined the scope of regulation, the basic concepts associated with natural monopolies, indicated the bodies authorized to regulate natural monopolies, indicated the branches of the national economy in which "the activities of the subjects of natural monopolies are regulated" 8:
■ transportation of oil and oil products via trunk pipelines;
■ transportation of gas through pipelines;
■ rail transportation;
■ services in transport terminals, ports and airports;
■ public telecommunication and public postal services;
■ services for the transmission of electrical energy;
■ services for operational dispatch management in the power industry;
■ heat transmission services;
■ services for the use of inland waterway infrastructure;
■ disposal of radioactive waste.
Sanctions were introduced for violation of the legislation on the protection of competition9, natural monopoly and changes in tariffs indicated by the Federal Tariff Service.
These laws function to this day, regularly replenishing with more and more clarifications both in the main law ("On natural monopolies") and by orders of the Federal Tariff Service. But what is the situation with natural monopolies now? Maybe it is worth abandoning them altogether, disaggregating enterprises by administrative means, or will it be economically ineffective in modern Russian conditions?
So, no matter what we may say about all kinds of methods of regulating natural monopoly and about the history of their existence in Russia, the only question remains relevant for us - what is a natural monopoly for the Russian economy now - good or evil? Perhaps it is high time for the government to exclude the natural monopoly from the list of possible forms of existence of enterprises in our country, or maybe vice versa - it is worth consolidating ineffective industries into one, which, with a powerful enterprise giant, can finally get on the path of making profits, simultaneously restoring and promoting the forgotten the economy is the manufacturing sector. We will deal with this issue in this section.
Russia, as has been noted more than once earlier, is a country that has been subjected to a long-term influence of administrative policy not only in the economic sphere, but even in the sphere of mentality. The spirit of entrepreneurship, initiative is now viewed as something suspicious, illegal, and only in recent years the situation has begun to show positive tendencies towards the "capitalist" mentality so hated by the Soviet regime. At the same time, the question arises - if individuality, enterprise is valued, then why in the country the main budget revenues10 come from tax revenues, and the main taxpayers11 are large companies - natural monopolists: Gazprom and Rosneft? (Of course, we cannot classify Rosneft as a natural monopolist, since the oil industry at the moment does not fully fall within the scope of the law “On natural monopolies.” We have the right to speak only about the sphere of transportation of oil and oil products through trunk pipelines)
But if you look at it, then this statement is exactly half true. As single payers, natural monopolies bring in far more tax revenues to the budget than any
another company (with the exception of particularly important but unprofitable industries - for example, Russian Railways), but in general, the same personal income tax is paid a much larger amount (compare - $ 74.5 billion in 2008 in personal income tax, and $ 22.4 billion - paid by Gazprom) .12 Ie. natural monopolies, as single enterprises, due to their scale and colossal output and volume of services provided, create a larger taxable base than a competitive enterprise. Thus, we have identified one of the factors that tells us that natural monopolies in Russia are effective - a fairly intensive flow of tax revenues to the state budget.
It is also very important that the industries in which natural monopolies operate are the basis for the functioning of the entire economy as a whole. What would the industry do if natural monopolies in the fuel and energy complex were not regulated? Obviously, the results would be dire. But an attempt to destroy natural monopolies would be even worse - new firms would not be able to meet the economy's demand for oil, gas, communications and transport to the extent that the subjects of natural monopolies could afford, having a significant effect on the scale of production. This is another argument for the existence of natural monopolies.
Natural monopolies in Russia, at the moment, are inevitable - based on the Soviet, old giant enterprises, firms simply cannot exist with a low output. So we can observe the domestic machine-building industry, where AvtoVAZ is simply not able to make a profit with such a low demand for their products, precisely because the enterprise was originally built on the principle of “providing the whole country”. But if the demand in this industry is low, then, say, in the gas industry, it is much higher. And to provide it with the current level of depreciation of fixed assets of enterprises is simply impossible for isolated enterprises.
Recently, one more new problem has been added to the "old" problems - accession to the WTO. Of course, we cannot speak of it as an absolute harm to the economy, but we are now talking about natural monopolies. In the context of an increase in imports from the WTO countries, the price and production efficiency may significantly decrease, the demand for the products of natural monopolies may increase, and the inflow of foreign investments will also increase. This, in turn, is capable of generating a poorly controlled situation in the market, which can lead to unpredictable changes in the market, and the state simply must have a support for itself, which natural monopolies are already accustomed to. Moreover, in the context of increasing demand for railroad transportation, transportation of gas and oil to production sites (since production with an influx of investments will gain momentum), operate effectively and fully meet the needs of the economy with the lowest costs for itself, and therefore for the whole the economy as a whole, can only be subjects of natural monopolies.
Therefore, let us summarize the role of natural monopolies in the Russian Federation. First, natural monopolies are the largest taxpayers of the state, which means that a significant part of the budget revenue is formed by them. Second, natural monopolies provide the national economy with the necessary goods and services at minimal costs, although the X-inefficiency factor does not disappear. Third, despite certain negative aspects, the state cannot abandon natural monopolies, the only way out is to reduce their influence by certain sectors, highlighting the possible market ones.
4 Pukhova M.M., Butova E.V., Tolmachev V.P. Topical issues of the development of holding structures in the domestic economy // Economy and management: problems, solutions. No.1 (25) p.81-86
5 Website of Forex financial analytics // http://forexaw.com/TERMs/Economic_terms_and_concepts/ Economic_and_legal_terminologyl389_Monopoly_Monopoly_Monopoly_Monopolist /
6 Borisov A.B. Big Dictionary of Economics. - M .: Knizhnyi mir, 2003 .-- 895 p.
7 Petrova Yu.I., Krivtsova M.K., Belozerova V.A. Lobbying as a form of combining the interests of business and government. // Science and modernity. 2013. No. 24. pp. 283-287
8 Federal Law of 17.08.1995 No. 147-FZ "On Natural Monopolies", Article 4.1.
9 Federal Law of 26.07.2006 No. 135-FZ "On Protection of Competition"
10 Official website of the Ministry of Finance // http://info.minfin.ru/kons_doh.php
11 Vedomosti // http://www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/7637101/rosneft_dobudet_v_2012_g_okolo_122_mln_t_nefti
12 Reference and information portal // http://samogo.net/articles.php?id\u003d318
Having studied the theory and history of natural monopolies, we came to the logical conclusion that such an industry where a single enterprise is more efficient than the rest is quite real and exists in many economies of the world. Like any phenomenon, the existence of a natural monopoly carries both positive and negative consequences. On the positive side, we can include a reduction in production costs, full use of the positive effect of the scale of production, development and implementation of scientific and technical and experimental design research, projects and inventions, providing complete information about the market, the possibility of improving quality and accumulating significant financial resources for further development. However, they are also opposed by negative consequences - a significant underestimation of the volume of products and services provided, the lack of incentive to improve product quality and even a tendency to reduce it to save on costs while maintaining inflated prices, a harsh dictatorship against small competitors, the destruction of the market principles of the economy, slowdown development of interconnected sectors of the national economy.
Literature:
1. Federal Law of 17.08.1995 No. 147-FZ "On Natural Monopolies"
2. Federal Law of 26.07.2006 No. 135-F3 "On Protection of Competition"
3. Microeconomics. Theory and Russian practice / Moscow: 2005, edited by A.G. Gryaznova and A.Yu. Yudanova, KNORUS
4. Managerial Economics / Moscow: 2011 ed. A.G. Gryazno-voy and A.Yu. Yudanova, KNORUS
5. Natural monopolies of Russia / edited by Yu. Z. Sahakyan; Institute for Problems of Natural Monopolies. - M .: IPEM, 2007 .-- 408 p.
6. Trachuk A.V. Reform of natural monopolies. Goals, directions and results of development. - Moscow, 2011.
7. Mechanisms and Socio-Economic Consequences of Reforming Natural Monopolies / Aleksey E.A. - Moscow: 2012.
8. Course of economic theory: textbook - 5th revised, supplemented and revised edition - Kirov: "ASA", 2006
9. Primo U. Direct Infrastructure Competition: The Myth of Natural Monopoly - 1986
10. Borisov A.B. Big Dictionary of Economics. - M .: Knizhny mir, 2003 .-- 895 p.
11. Pukhova M.M., Butova E.V., Tolmachev V.P. Topical issues of the development of holding structures in the domestic economy / / Economy and management: problems, solutions. No.1 (25) p.81-86
12. Petrova Yu.I., Krivtsova M.K., Belozerova V.A. Lobbying as a form of combining the interests of business and government. // Science and modernity. 2013. No. 24. pp. 283-287
CURRENT STATE AND PROSPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYSTEM OF ALL-RUSSIAN CLASSIFIERS OF TECHNICAL-ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL INFORMATION
AA Korovaitsev, General Director of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Russian Scientific and Technical Information Center for Standardization, Metrology and Conformity Assessment” (FSUE “STANDARTINFORM”), Ph.D.
Sakov A.A., Director of the Department of All-Russian Classifiers of Technical, Economic and Social Information of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Russian Scientific and Technical Center for Information on Standardization, Metrology and Conformity Assessment" (FSUE "STANDARTINFORM"), Doctor of Economics, Associate Professor Slepyntseva L.I., Head of the Department of All-Russian Classifiers of Technical, Economic and Social Information, Federal State Unitary Enterprise Russian Scientific and Technical Center for Information on Standardization, Metrology and Conformity Assessment (FSUE STANDARTINFORM)
The article reveals the content of the procedure for the development, maintenance and application of all-Russian classifiers of technical, economic and social information and the main directions of their modernization in the short term.
Key words: all-Russian classifiers; technical and economic information; social information; system.
MODERN STATE AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYSTEM OF ALL-RUSSIA CLASSIFICATORS FOR TECHNICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
Korovayitsev A., General Director at Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Russian Science And Technology Center for Information on Standardization, Metrology and Conformity Assessment" (FSUE "STANDARTINFORM"), candidate degree of physical and mathematical
Sakov A., Head of the Division of All-Russia Classificators of Technical, Economic and Social information at Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Russian Science And Technology Center for Information on Standardization, Metrology and Conformity Assessment" (FSUE
"STANDARTINFORM"), doctorate degree of economic sciences Slepyntseva L., Head of the Department of All-Russia Classificators of Technical, Economic and Social information at Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Russian Science And Technology Center for Information on Standardization, Metrology and Conformity Assessment "(FSUE
"STANDARTINFORM")
The article reveals the contents of the procedure of the development, accounting and application of all-Russia classificators for technical, economic and social information as well as main directions for their modernization in short-term perspective.
Keywords: all-Russia classificators, technical and economic information, social information, system.
The State Program of the Russian Federation "Information Society (2011-2020)", approved by the order of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 20.10.2010 No. 1815-r, provides for the provision of services to citizens and organizations using modern information and telecommunication technologies, the development of technical and technological basis for the formation of the information society. The implementation of these tasks will provide a significant reduction in transactions
costs in the economy due to the standardization of processes, the environment of interaction and the introduction of information and telecommunication technologies, the high quality of the provision of public services in electronic form, the implementation of the vast majority of legally significant actions in electronic form.
The fulfillment of these tasks determines the development of the system of interdepartmental electronic interaction, the implementation of which will require the use of all-Russian classifiers
Natural monopolies are organizations (commercial and non-commercial) that produce (sell) goods (services), the satisfaction of demand for which is effective in the absence of competition due to the technological features of production, and goods that have a stable demand with a significant change in price due to the impossibility of completely replacing them with other goods. Creation of a competitive environment in the market under conditions of natural monopoly is impossible or economically ineffective given the achieved level of development of science and technology. In natural monopolies, the volume of supply and demand is decisively determined by technology, and equipment and other elements of the production cycle are difficult to mass-produce and duplicate. These are energy, a number of types of transport, communications, water supply, etc.
In the absence of regulation, natural monopoly enterprises turn into oligopolies, reduce production volumes, set monopoly prices, which causes prices to rise in related industries as well. Therefore, in natural monopolies, regulatory methods go beyond traditional antitrust laws.
Natural monopolies are obliged to serve all customers without discrimination, to submit to the executive authorities information that is a commercial secret for other enterprises. Tariffs for products (services) are regulated by the state and subsidies from the budget are allowed. Enterprises of natural monopolies cannot be liquidated without the permission of state bodies. The executive branch is responsible for the functioning of the branches of natural monopolies before the representative branch.
The most radical form of regulation of natural monopolies is the transfer of enterprises into state ownership, the creation of special state bodies for the management of natural monopolies that exercise direct control to ensure a balance of interests of producers and consumers.
In Russia, regulation of natural monopolies is carried out primarily by the MAP of Russia and the Federal Energy Commission of the Russian Federation (FEC of Russia). The MAP of Russia controls transport and communications organizations, including 63 federal airports, 27 large and 15 especially large seaports, 39 large river ports, 17 railroad departments, 800 transport terminals, 2700 telecom operators. The regulatory framework is the laws “On Competition and Restriction of Monopolistic Activity in Commodity Markets”, “On Natural Monopolies”, “On Regulation of Tariffs for Electric and Thermal Energy”, “On Federal Railway Transport”, the decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On Certain Regulatory Measures natural monopolies ”(dated February 28, 1995 No. 220). Each type of natural monopoly has its own regulation scheme.
The main object of regulation in natural monopolies is prices and tariffs for their products (services). In world practice, the state either prohibits monopolists from having super profits, or redistributes super profits in its favor, or fixes the contractual level of prices and tariffs in the interests of both producers and consumers.
In the previous system, prices for the products of natural monopolies were calculated on the basis of costing, i.e. costly method, and. deliberately underestimated. After the liberalization of the economy, they quickly began to rise, causing a sharp rise in prices in the manufacturing industries. This led to the unwinding of the spiral of non-payments in the industry, a fall in the competitiveness of products in the domestic market and the expansion of foreign suppliers. Currently, the regulation of prices and tariffs for the products of natural monopolies has acquired national importance.
The Government of the Russian Federation approves the list of goods (services), the prices of which on the domestic market are subject to regulation by federal executive authorities and executive authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. Regulated prices are applied by all enterprises regardless of their organizational and legal forms and forms of ownership.
To neutralize the cost-based pricing mechanism, the costs of enterprises are controlled, a maximum level of prices (tariffs) is introduced with a parallel limitation of individual cost items and a revision of the initial standardized indicators.
MAL of Russia and FEC of Russia set prices (tariffs for products (services) of natural monopoly entities based on reasonable costs of their production, taking into account:
Taxes and other payments;
The cost of fixed assets;
Investment needs for reproduction;
Depreciation deductions;
Projected profit;
Remoteness of consumers from the place of production of products (services);
Compliance of product (service) quality with consumer demand;
State subsidies and other measures of state support for subjects of natural monopolies;
The social significance of the services;
The rate of inflation.
With the participation of interested federal executive authorities, the antimonopoly authorities analyze the economic results of the activities of natural monopoly entities and submit to the Government of the Russian Federation proposals on measures to limit the rise in prices (tariffs) for their products (services). It should not exceed the price index for industrial products.
Organizations that violate the legal norms of state regulation of prices (tariffs) are liable: they are charged the entire amount of excess proceeds and a fine in the same amount, and in case of a repeated violation - a double fine.
Another direction of state regulation of natural monopolies is their restructuring. It provides, in particular, the separation of regulated and unregulated activities. Each monopoly has associated production facilities that are not, in essence, monopolies. For example, gas transportation is a monopoly type of activity, and its production can be organized on a competitive basis.
The interdepartmental commission for the preparation of plans for the structural reform of natural monopolies is studying the functioning of the federal and regional markets for the products (services) of enterprises (interaction of market entities, the formation of tariffs and prices for various consumers, features of contractual relations). The Commission receives the necessary data from federal executive bodies and organizations, regardless of the form of ownership and subordination. The proposals of the Reform Commission, requiring decisions of the Government of the Russian Federation, are submitted in accordance with the established procedure.
The IMF and other financial institutions lending to Russia insist on their recommendations providing for the dismemberment of the leading natural monopolies RAO UES of Russia and OAO Gazprom. In the electric power industry, the state was asked to regulate only transmission networks, and privatize generating power plants and distribution units. This is not in Russia's state interests.
The set of regulatory measures includes determining the composition of consumers subject to mandatory service by one or another natural monopoly entity, monitoring the implementation of investment programs, using stabilization funds, concluding certain types of transactions, stimulating the quality of products and services provided through prices (tariffs), as well as meet the demand for them, accounting for costs separately for monopoly and competitive activities. Subjects of natural monopolies purchase products (services) for their own consumption in accordance with the procedure provided for placing orders for the supply of products for state needs.
The regulatory body has the authority to direct to the natural monopoly entity binding instructions on concluding contracts with consumers, making amendments to them. Effective regulation of natural monopolies is achieved by ensuring maximum independence of the control and regulatory bodies, the absence of lobbying for the interests of monopolists in the government.
FEC of Russia maintains the Register of natural monopoly entities in the fuel and energy complex, in respect of which state regulation and control are carried out (engaged in the provision of services for the transmission of electrical and thermal energy, transportation of gas through pipelines, oil and oil products through main pipelines). The inclusion of a natural monopoly entity in the Register does not depend on its market share. This Register is kept separately from the register provided for by the Law "On Competition and Restriction of Monopolistic Activities in the Commodity Markets", as well as from the register of energy supplying organizations.
Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation
Federal Agency for Education
NOVOSIBIRSK STATE TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
Department of ECONOMIC THEORY
Coursework on economic theory on the topic:
Natural monopolies and their regulation
Faculty: Business
Group: FB-82
Completed by: Todua I.G.
Checked by: Shmakov A.V.
Novosibirsk
INTRODUCTION 3
1. Theoretical aspects 5
1.1 Concept and definition of natural monopoly 5
1.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Monopolies 7
1.3 Ways of regulating natural monopolies 8
2. Natural monopolies in Russia 16
2.1 Impact of natural monopolies on pricing and production in the country 16
2.2 Features of natural monopolies in Russia 19
2.3 Antimonopoly regulation in the Russian Federation 22
CONCLUSION 26
List of sources used 28
APPENDIX A 30
INTRODUCTION
What are the Russian natural monopolies: the driving forces of the economy, capable of leading the country out of a protracted crisis, or clumsy structures that emerged from the planning and administrative system, hindering the development of market relations in Russia? The influence of these industries on the economy is especially great in the context of the economic crisis in Russia. Moreover, their economic influence goes beyond the borders of our country. The issue of state regulation of the activities of natural monopolies has remained acute throughout the years since the beginning of the implementation of economic reforms in Russia.
One of the main problems of the transition period of the Russian economy, which have not been resolved until now, is the formation of competitive markets. To ensure the high efficiency of market relations, it is necessary to form fundamentally new organizational conditions, to revise the methods of management and regulation of the activities of natural monopolies that have developed in a planned economy. The enterprises of natural monopolies, which together form the industrial infrastructure of the state, are the basis for the revitalization and further development of domestic industry, the development of the real sector of the economy.
There are a large number of different market conditions, which allows us to talk about the imperfection of markets, one of such conditions is monopoly. Monopoly is an extreme form of imperfect competition, in which a monopoly firm is the only seller of a product that has no close analogues. Under such conditions, manufacturers can dictate their terms to consumers, and these terms do not correspond to their interests. To avoid the formation of monopolies in a state with a market type of economy, antitrust laws are applied. But at the same time in the law there is such a concept as natural monopoly, this law allows the existence of monopolies in some areas of the country's economy and regulates their activities.
The research object of this course work is one of the types of imperfect competition - monopoly.
The subject of the research is the concept of "natural monopoly" and methods of its regulation.
The purpose of this course work is to study ways to regulate natural monopolies and analyze the current situation in Russia.
1) give a definition of the concept of natural monopoly;
2) structure the possible ways of regulating natural monopolies;
3) determine the impact of natural monopolies on the economy of the Russian Federation;
4) consider ways of regulating natural monopolies in the Russian Federation.
In my work, I used the legislation of the Russian Federation, statistical data, official data from the websites of companies of Russian natural monopolies, articles, books, teaching aids.
1. THEORETICAL ASPECTS
1.1. Concept and definition of natural monopoly
In a number of industries, it is impossible to avoid the formation of monopolies. You cannot have two gas pipelines in an apartment from two competing companies, several heat transmission lines, alternative sources of electricity, etc. In most infrastructure sectors, the formation of monopolies occurs naturally, and the state is forced to implement direct or indirect regulation in relation to them.
Below are several definitions taken from various dictionaries:
a) Modern economic vocabulary: natural monopoly is an officially recognized inevitable monopoly on the production and sale of goods and services, in relation to which monopoly is conditioned either by the natural rights of the monopolist, or by considerations of economic benefits for the entire state and population. Thus, a natural monopoly arises in those areas where copyright is in effect, because the author is a monopoly by law. On the other hand, it is in the interests of the state to have unified pipeline, energy networks and railways. State monopoly also arises in those areas where its existence is due to considerations of public safety;
b) Dictionary of Economics and Mathematics: natural monopoly - a situation in which an industry producing (selling) goods and services effectively meets demand in the absence of competition due to the technological characteristics of production. Its goods (services) have a steady demand regardless of significant price changes, since it turns out to be impossible to replace them with other goods (example: the city's power supply system);
c) Dictionary "Accounting, taxes, commercial law": natural monopoly - the state of the commodity market, in which the satisfaction of demand in this market is more efficient in the absence of competition due to the technological features of production (due to a significant decrease in production costs per unit of goods as volume of production), and the goods produced by the subjects of natural monopoly cannot be replaced in consumption by other goods, and therefore the demand in a given commodity market for goods produced by the subjects of natural monopolies is less dependent on the price change for this product than demand for other types of goods.
In this work, I will start from the definition that is spelled out in federal law No. 147-FZ of August 17, 1995, because we are also talking about potentially hazardous industries, where control is much easier under monopolization, an example is nuclear power ...
According to this law: a natural monopoly is a state of the commodity market in which the satisfaction of demand in this market is more efficient in the absence of competition due to the technological characteristics of production (due to a significant decrease in production costs per unit of goods as the volume of production increases), and the goods produced subjects of natural monopoly, cannot be replaced in consumption by other goods, and therefore the demand in a given commodity market for goods produced by subjects of natural monopolies is less dependent on changes in the price of this product than the demand for other types of goods.
Based on this definition, it turns out that there are cases in the economic system when monopoly becomes more efficient than competition. This case was called natural monopoly, i.e. when one firm can produce enough goods to meet the entire market demand, at a lower cost than two or more firms could. This approach contains a contradiction, the resolution of which is the task of state socio-economic policy. Indeed, on the one hand, the existence of such goods is recognized, the production of which is most efficient in a monopoly market, and, on the other hand, in the absence of competition, a single producer can abuse his position in the market in order to increase his profits. Moreover, as shown in theory, the selling price of products chosen by the monopoly to maximize its profits is always higher than the competitive price, and society as a whole suffers losses. In this situation, the state should regulate the activities of the natural monopoly in such a way as not to allow the monopolist to dictate its terms to consumers, but at the same time give it the opportunity to successfully function and develop.
1.2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Monopolies
At the same time, many arguments against monopolies are not without foundation. Of course, it is “easier for a monopolist to live” than a manufacturer in conditions of perfect competition. Monopoly power over prices is fraught with the danger of taking the "easy path", since there is always a certain margin of safety. Therefore, large firms avoid too frequent and profound modifications of products. Individual inventions are often adhered to and implemented only in combination. “Big business” inevitably has a tendency to bureaucratization, the growth of-inefficiency.
Natural monopoly is an industry in which long-term average costs are minimal only if only one firm serves the entire market.
Natural monopoly can exist as a result of barriers to access by competitors, government privileges, or limited information.
Natural monopoly has large incremental returns to scale, and production costs are much lower than perfect competition or oligopoly.
Natural monopoly is based on features of technology that reflect the natural laws of nature, not on property rights or government licenses. Forced dispersal of production across several firms is ineffective because it would increase production costs.
There are a number of industries (utilities, telecommunications, etc.) in which natural monopolies prevail.
The existence of a natural monopoly is the main reason for the nationalization of industries such as railways.
The situation of natural monopoly is illustrated in Fig. 30.1. In the figure, LAC and LMC are the curves of average and marginal costs in the long run, D is the demand curve, MR is the corresponding marginal revenue curve. The optimal output and price Q1, P1 are determined by the intersection of the LMC and MR curves. The profit of the monopoly firm is equal to the area of \u200b\u200bCP1AB. However, Q1 is "very small" and P1 is "very high". The optimal output for society would be O3 output and P3 price. But the monopolist will not agree to this. Hence, it is most expedient that the state body regulating this monopoly firm would determine the price of its products P3 \u003d LMC (Q3). This price level would not compensate for the production costs, it would be lower than the average costs with the output volume Q3, Р3
Figure: 30.1. Natural monopoly and its regulation
There is another solution to the problem of natural monopoly: the state (or local authorities) take on the responsibility to provide this type of service. In this case, the state (local) company can receive subsidies from the state local budget. The practice of subsidizing is considered to be ineffective because the taxation required to do so distorts the competitive pricing system.
There are several options for state regulation of prices and tariffs of natural monopolies. Let's highlight two options.
The first. In Russia and the United States, special authorities have been set up to regulate electricity tariffs. The level of tariffs is set on the cost plus profit principle.
Second. The authorities initiate market competition where competition within the market is either impossible or costly due to significant economies of scale. In this case, an auction is held and for a certain time the right to serve the market is granted to the enterprise that undertakes to contribute the largest amount to the budget. The greater the number of competing firms for this right, the greater part of the profit can go to the budget.
Since natural monopolies have average costs higher than marginal costs, then marginal cost pricing makes them unprofitable. This necessitates the abandonment of the marginal cost pricing principle, but subject to minimization of the efficiency losses caused by such abandonment.
In addition to those considered, there are other methods of regulating prices and tariffs for products (services) of natural monopolies.
G.C. Bechkanov, G.P. Bechkanova
Other related materials
Introduction …………………………………………………………………… .3
Chapter 1. Natural monopolies. Definitions, concepts ……………… 5
…………5
1.2. Methods for regulating the activities of natural monopolies ... .... 6
1.3. State regulation of natural monopolies ... ... ... ... 11
Chapter 2. Natural Monopolies in Russia …………………………… ... 15
Chapter 3. Prospects for the development of natural monopolies …………… .... 31
Conclusion ………………………………………………………………… 32
Literature ……………………………………………………………… .35
INTRODUCTION
The need to reform the management and the field of activity of the so-called natural monopolies that Russia inherited from the USSR is no longer in doubt.
In the first decade of the post-Soviet period (1990s), during the deep crisis of the Russian economy, natural monopolies that maintained relatively constant tariffs regulated by the Russian government were a guarantor of at least some economic stability. Against the background of the highest inflation, which in some periods assumed a galloping character, the regulated tariffs of the monopolies became practically the only restraining factor; their size acquired social significance for the population (as a result of a sharp drop in living standards). In addition, the federal scale of the structure of giant companies played a significant integration role in the conditions of centrifugal processes that gained momentum.
Nevertheless, the exploitation of the vast technological reserve created back in Soviet times could not be endless. The industries that still form the basis of the country's economy are in dire need of structural reforms and large investments. The economic activity of Russian natural monopolies is largely economically ineffective: due to the extreme non-transparency of the cost part, and often simply the misuse of financial resources, the growth of tariffs of giant companies is already beginning to outstrip the overall rate of inflation. The issue of large-scale investment in the modernization of existing fixed assets, in the implementation of new projects has long been ripe, but natural monopolies do not have sufficient resources of their own for this. Without a global restructuring, investments from the state or the private sector, incl. and from abroad, would hardly be productive enough.
As a rule, only three giant companies are classified as natural monopolies: RAO UES of Russia, RAO Gazprom, and RAO RZD. Meanwhile, the most classic natural monopoly is AK Transneft. (Natural monopolies also include regional enterprises in the housing and utilities sector, in a certain area the company "Rostelecom", etc.).
This paper discusses in sufficient detail the main aspects of reforming the three largest classical monopolies, as well as the role of Transneft, which provides the infrastructure basis for Russian raw material exports.
I tried, to the greatest extent, to independently assess the problems and prospects of reforming natural monopolies, refraining from borrowing in the analytical part. Basically, it is practical rather than theoretical issues that are considered, given the limited volume of the coursework, so that it is possible to draw well-founded conclusions, possibly differing from the official and alternative points of view.
CHAPTER 1. NATURAL MONOPOLIES. DEFINITIONS, CONCEPTS
1.1. Legislative regulation of natural monopolies
Most often, the mechanism and boundaries of regulation are determined by national legislative acts. In particular, the already mentioned Federal Law “On Natural Monopolies” is in force in the Russian Federation, which defines both the industries related to natural monopoly and the methods of its direct state regulation.
It is believed that direct government regulation through the determination of tariffs or the decisive influence of natural monopolists on them is a fairly simple and understandable way to reduce the role of negative factors existing in their activities. In particular, in the Russian legislation this method is given primary attention.
In the Russian Federation, the concept of "natural monopoly" is not just an economic category, it is defined by the Law "On natural monopolies" as a state of the commodity market in which the satisfaction of demand in this market is more efficient in the absence of competition, which occurs due to the technological features of production (a significant reduction in costs production per unit of goods as production increases). The goods produced by the subjects of natural monopoly cannot be replaced in consumption by other goods; therefore, the demand in this market for goods produced by the subjects of natural monopolies is less dependent on price changes than the demand for other types of goods, i.e. it has very low elasticity, at least in the short term. Production of products is more efficient in the absence of competition, which is associated with significant economies of scale of production and high conditionally fixed costs. These areas include, for example, pipeline transport, railways, etc. The costs for the society for the delivery of one ton of cargo or the carriage of one passenger will be the lower, the more cargo or passengers will be transported in this direction. The fixed costs associated with building such structures are so high that building a parallel system that performs those very functions is unlikely to ever pay off.
The subjects of natural monopolies occupy a dominant position in the respective product markets. If the actions of these economic entities lead to restriction of competition or infringement of the interests of counterparties, then the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation (established in March 2004 on the basis of the Ministry of Antimonopoly Policy of the Russian Federation) applies measures to them in accordance with the Law on Competition and Restriction of Monopolistic Activities on commodity markets ".
The main tasks of the FAS RF are:
· Assistance in the formation of market relations based on the development of competition and entrepreneurship;
· Prevention, restriction and suppression of monopolistic activities and unfair competition;
· State control over compliance with antimonopoly legislation.
1.2. Methods for regulating the activities of natural monopolies
Methods for regulating natural monopoly:
Direct government regulation (opportunities and boundaries),
Bidding for a franchise (the possibility of use and effectiveness in various conditions),
Price discrimination (organizational and economic aspects)
The creation of any state body carries the threat of substituting the interests of the ruling groups for public interests, not to mention the corresponding costs of maintaining state officials. If we recall that in the largest Russian enterprises - natural monopolists, the state either owns a controlling stake or is close to it in size, it becomes obvious that one should not expect high social efficiency from such a body.
It can be argued with a fairly high degree of confidence that the second problem is also not resolved in the Russian Federation. It is not difficult to be convinced that it is the enterprises - natural monopolists by the growth of tariffs on their own products that cause inflation of costs in the national economy.
On the other hand, the “wasteful habits” of such enterprises are well known. The ordinary citizen (consumer) ultimately pays for this excessive consumption of enterprises - natural monopolists. The author has already once noted the example of one Karelian enterprise - a natural monopolist, which, with a decrease in production in recent years, increased its staff by about half, while maintaining the terms of payment for personnel. The wages of workers in a given enterprise is an element of fixed costs, that is, it does not depend on the volume of output (!?).
Summing up, we must admit that, despite its obvious simplicity, direct government regulation in our country does not provide an opportunity to regulate natural monopolies in the interests of society. Rather, it is in the interests of the ruling elites.
Another way of regulating natural monopoly is associated with the use of the mechanism of economic organization. This is an auction for a franchise (the right to conduct such activities).
Above, when considering the regulation of natural monopoly, we came to the conclusion that the solution to this issue is limited, both by the market and the state, within the framework of the state hierarchy, regardless of the form: either direct activity or direct state regulation.
In the first case, it is a private unregulated monopoly with the establishment of a monopoly-high price that society as a whole has to pay (we are dealing with direct social harm to monopoly).
In the second case, all the shortcomings of the administrative rather than the economic system are manifested, where the processes of politicization of solving the problem of natural monopoly take place (in the interests of the state and the ruling elites, but not in the interests of society as a whole).
It is easy to conclude that when we talk about bidding for a franchise, we are dealing with the contract system as a form of economic organization. The contract is concluded with the manufacturer (economic entity) that offers the best conditions (lower price, wider range of services, etc.).
Should we expect that the contractual system will once and for all solve the problem of natural monopoly? Of course not. Already in this work, we made a fundamental conclusion about the choice in a particular case of any of the three forms of economic organization: the market, the contract system and the hierarchy.
The phenomenon of natural monopoly is no exception, so bidding for a franchise in regulating natural monopolies is one of the equally likely options for action.
Franchise bidding has allowed the United States to address some of its natural monopolies in a better way than other ways of regulating them. This applies to the deregulation of road freight transport, to the organization of the work of local airlines, the postal service, to the work of cable television networks, in some cases to the work of public utilities, to the problem of deregulation of railways.
Why could this happen?
In each of the noted cases, the winner of the tender could be replaced without serious problems in assessing assets when transferring them to a new franchisee, since the main production facilities are owned by the state, and other assets can be relatively easily sold (bought) on the used property market. It is these provisions that force us to carefully consider bidding for a franchise as a possible form of solving the problems of certain types of natural monopolies in Russia, primarily at the local, local level.
For example, the problem of power supply of a certain territory is being solved. There are several generating stations, they produce electricity at different costs. Why not try to solve the problem of minimizing tariffs or the problem of providing additional services for the same price, for example, heating, on the basis of tendering for a franchise, provided that local authorities pay for it?
Problems will be better solved using all available opportunities, all forms of economic organization.
Speaking about natural monopolies, one cannot ignore another way of regulating them - price discrimination.
It seems to us that the possibility of using price discrimination exists both for a natural monopoly to increase net income, and for regulatory entities to reduce the overall negative effect of the activity of a given enterprise of a natural monopolist.
What is price discrimination? Economic theory gives the following answer to this question - the practice of setting different prices for the same product, provided that the differences in prices are not associated with costs.
The preconditions for the emergence of price discrimination should be sought in the contradictions of the market mechanism. On the one hand, the market is a great average. Behind the back of the producers, after the production process, he determines the selling price of the product. On the other hand, each economic entity (in our case, a consumer) is unique (different needs, utility estimates, incomes, etc.). Thus, given a single market price, there are always buyers who are willing to pay more for a given product than the established market price.
In addition, the isolation of certain markets (institutional, geographical, etc.) cannot be discounted. It also creates the possibility of using different prices in these markets when selling the same product.
Natural monopolies quite often resort to the practice of price discrimination to maximize their net income. To do this, they segment the market. An example of this approach can be the practice of setting higher tariffs for electricity, gas, communication services, utilities for enterprises and organizations and, accordingly, lower tariffs for citizens.
It is also possible to apply multiple tariffs depending on the time of service provision (communications, electricity, railway and air tickets, etc.).
However, the same mechanism can be activated not only by a natural monopolist, but also by a society that seeks to alleviate the burden associated with a monopoly. It can set decreasing tariffs for socially unprotected groups of the population (pensioners, disabled people, etc.). For example, the widely used practice of preferential tariffs for various types of services provided by natural monopolists.
The source of coverage for these benefits is important here. Very often in Russia it is either not determined, or without appropriate calculations, groundlessly, is shifted to the manufacturer. The most common example is utility benefits. The number of “beneficiaries” is already comparable to the number of people who do not have benefits. This contributes neither to the stabilization of the social situation, nor to the normal reproduction of the capital of the enterprise of the natural monopolist.
The practice of using price discrimination can be applied by society not only in the case of direct state regulation of a natural monopoly, but also in the case of bidding for a franchise.
Thus, price discrimination becomes a “double-edged tool” that can be successfully used by both natural monopoly and society to achieve their goals. As a result, a certain “balance of interests” arises and the acuteness of the problem on the part of the natural monopoly is softened (smoothed out, removed).
1.3. State regulation of natural monopolies
In countries with developed market economies, the modern concept of regulation of natural monopolies suggests that the use of state regulation is considered justified in cases where a certain product (service) is produced by a single economic entity, provided that competition between similar enterprises is impossible for technological and or economic reasons, and an increase in production of a single entity is accompanied by a decrease in unit costs (economies of scale).
In the economy of the USSR, all prices were set in a planned manner, and resources were distributed centrally, therefore, there was practically no special allocation of industries belonging to natural monopolies. The transition to a market economy necessitated the use of certain methods of regulating natural monopolies. This need is due to a number of reasons.
Despite the presence of the technical efficiency of concentration of production in the hands of one enterprise, market practice reveals many facts of abuse of a monopoly position in the form of overstating costs or inflating profits, which negates the social effect of economies of scale due to the dictate of unjustifiably high prices. At the same time, such abuses are often extremely difficult to recognize from the outside due to the fact that the real state of affairs of a monopolist is, as a rule, carefully concealed information.
In view of the fact that natural monopolies, as a rule, produce products necessary for the normal functioning of most enterprises and constituting a significant part of the resources they consume, non-payments for the products of natural monopolies result in a crisis of non-payments on the scale of the state economy. The proliferation of non-payments is the result of price discrimination of natural monopolies and other economic structures that have influence in the market and are not constrained in their activities by the regulatory influence of the state.
The need to regulate prices in natural monopolies is due not only to the negative consequences of monopoly behavior. There is also a downside to the coin: a reasonable differentiation of prices for the products of natural monopolies can serve as a powerful instrument of the state's economic policy, allowing to regulate the economic activity of various industries and smooth out its seasonal fluctuations. In other words, the mechanism for influencing the economy through a system of regulated prices is an effective addition to fiscal macroeconomic policy.
Russia has not escaped the negative impact of natural monopoly industries in market conditions. With the general decline in production in Russia, the demand for products and services of natural monopoly industries, with the exception of communications, has been steadily declining. These industries are extremely capital intensive, and a significant portion of their costs are permanent. As a result, the share of fixed costs in the unit price increased. In addition, until recently, the subjects of natural monopolies financed investments largely from internal sources (investment and stabilization funds formed at the expense of cost and profit), which determined an excessive burden on tariffs.
Cross-subsidization of some consumer groups at the expense of others persisted in virtually all industries. Low tariffs for the population and budgetary organizations were subsidized at the expense of industrial and commercial consumers. For example, in rail transport, losses on passenger traffic are covered by freight rates.
However, it cannot be stated unequivocally that the natural monopoly industries during the years of transition to the market ensured prosperity at the expense of the rest of the economy. The consequence of price discrimination - catastrophic non-payments - hit its own source most painfully.
As a result of this section, the following main tasks of state regulation of prices in natural monopolies can be distinguished:
Balancing the interests of consumers (affordable prices) and regulated enterprises (financial results attractive to lenders and investors);
- determination of the tariff structure based on the principles of fair and efficient allocation of costs to tariffs for different types of consumers;
Stimulating enterprises in natural monopoly industries to reduce costs and over-employment, improve the quality of service, increase investment efficiency, etc.
Using the potential of price regulation mechanisms in pursuing a stabilizing macroeconomic policy.
Management of economic development in the regions.
The problem of the need for state regulation of natural monopolies was realized by the authorities only by 1994, when the rise in prices for their products had already had a significant impact on undermining the economy. At the same time, the reforming wing of the government began to pay more attention to the problems of regulating natural monopolies, not so much in connection with the need to stop the rise in prices in the relevant industries or to ensure the use of the possibilities of the price mechanism for macroeconomic policy, but primarily seeking to limit the range of regulated prices.
According to the Law "On Natural Monopolies", the scope of regulation includes transportation of oil and oil products through main pipelines, transportation of gas through pipelines, services for the transmission of electric and thermal energy, rail transportation, services of transport terminals, ports and airports, public and postal services.
The main methods of regulation were: price regulation, that is, direct determination of prices (tariffs) or the appointment of their maximum level; identifying consumers for mandatory services and / or establishing a minimum level of their provision. Regulatory authorities are also required to monitor various types of activities of natural monopoly entities, including transactions for the acquisition of property rights, large investment projects, and the sale and lease of property.
Foreign experience of regulation shows that the main thing in such activities is the maximum independence of regulatory bodies both from other government bodies and from the economic entities regulated by them, as well as the consistency of interests and areas of work of regulatory bodies, which will provide them with the opportunity to make politically unpopular decisions.
It is already clear that the process of forming regulatory bodies will not only be lengthy, but also painful. Ministries do not want to delegate the appropriate powers. The problem of financing is acute, it is rather difficult to attract qualified employees, since the salaries of civil servants are significantly lower than the salaries of workers of a similar level in regulated companies. Many of the best industry professionals who could do this kind of work are in high-paying positions in organizations that need to be regulated.
Therefore, today the most acute problems are staffing, the development of specific methods of regulation, improvement of the information base, which allows making informed decisions.
CHAPTER 2. NATURAL MONOPOLIES IN RUSSIA
Beginning in the late 1980s - early 1990s, negative trends began to appear in the Russian electric power industry. Against the background of the general economic crisis, the electric power industry actually became a donor for other industries and the population due to the lag in the growth of electricity tariffs from the rise in prices in other industries amid inflation, which is often galloping. Non-payments also played a major role. The lack of incentives to reduce production costs by enterprises in the industry has given rise to cost-based pricing. The tariffs included all actual costs without a proper understanding of the degree of their feasibility. Lack of transparency in the operation of energy companies, the inability to reliably determine the resources required to maintain and develop enterprises, and the containment of tariff growth by state regulatory bodies against the background of immensely inflated production costs led to the fact that before the start of the reform, more than half of the industry's enterprises became unprofitable. Against the background of a reduction in the own funds of energy companies, the volume of investments fell catastrophically: there was not enough funds for the current maintenance and renewal of fixed assets.
Even in the most prosperous energy systems of the European part of the country, the depreciation of fixed production assets has already exceeded 50% and began to strive for values \u200b\u200bat which the repair of equipment becomes impractical (its complete replacement is required). The current model of the electric power industry had a negative impact on the development of other sectors of the economy. The growing technological backwardness of energy-intensive industries and housing and communal services, underestimation of the cost of energy resources, and, accordingly, the lack of incentives for energy conservation, led to the fact that the specific energy intensity of the Russian economy was 2-3 times higher than the corresponding indicator of developed countries. Thus, the need to reform the industry became apparent.
The goals and objectives of the industry reform were determined by the RF Government Decree of July 11, 2001, No. 526 "On Reforming the Electricity Industry of the Russian Federation". The main goals of the reform include: ensuring the sustainable functioning and development of the economy and social sphere, increasing the efficiency of production and consumption of electricity, ensuring reliable supply of consumers.
The strategic objective of the reform is defined as the transfer of the electric power industry to a sustainable development mode based on the use of progressive technologies and market principles of operation, ensuring on this basis a reliable, cost-effective satisfaction of solvent demand for electricity and heat in the short and long term.
In addition, the main objectives of the reform also include:
· Creation of competitive electricity markets in those regions of Russia where there is a technical opportunity for this;
· Creation of an effective mechanism for reducing costs in the field of generation, transmission and sale of electricity and improving the financial condition of the industry;
· Stimulation of energy saving in all sectors of the national economy;
· Creation of favorable economic conditions for the construction and operation of new power generation and transmission facilities;
· Gradual elimination of cross-subsidization of various regions of the country and groups of electricity consumers;
· Creation of a system of state support for low-income strata of the population (compensation for tariff increases);
· Preservation and development of a unified infrastructure of the electric power industry, including backbone networks and dispatch management;
· Demonopolization of the fuel market for thermal power plants;
· Creation of a regulatory legal framework for reforming the industry, regulating its functioning in new economic conditions, incl. clarification of the status, competence and procedure for the work of the authorized state body, the system of state regulation, management and supervision in the industry.
In accordance with the decrees of the President of the Russian Federation of August 15, 1992, No. 923 and of November 5, 1992, No. 1334, RAO "UES of Russia" was established in 1992. These decrees were aimed at ensuring the manageability of the Unified Energy System and preserving the electric power industry in the form of a single complex when corporatizing enterprises and organizations that were leaving departmental subordination. RAO "UES of Russia" owns the property of main power transmission lines and electrical substations that form the Unified Energy System of Russia, shares of JSCs - power plants of the federal level, regional power supply organizations, the Central Dispatch Office and other organizations serving the Unified Energy System. RAO ensures the reliable functioning and development of the Unified Energy System of Russia, controls the use of over 70% of electric power and the production of over 70% of the country's electricity, organizes power supply to the population, industry, agriculture, transport and other consumers.
At present, the formation of the technological and commercial infrastructure of the wholesale electricity market has been completed: JSC FGC UES, JSC SO - CDU UES and the Non-Commercial Partnership Administrator of the Trading System of the Wholesale Electricity Market of the Unified Energy System (hereinafter - NP ATS "). The reform of the industry entities continues - RAO UES of Russia, its subsidiaries and dependent companies of energy and electrification, as well as independent subjects of the electric power industry. reforming the electric power industry, in accordance with which it is planned to carry out further reorganization of the subjects of the industry.
The main results of the reform in this direction:
Reorganization of AO-energo. The goal of reforming energy systems is to separate competitive activities from natural monopoly ones. As of April 1, 2005, the division by type of activity in 26 power systems of RAO UES of Russia (out of 74) was completed, the Board of Directors of RAO UES of Russia approved reform projects for 60 AO-energo, in 41 of them by general meetings of shareholders decisions were made to reorganize AO-energo. In total, 69 regional energos are to be reorganized. The reorganization of RAO UES of Russia is planned to be carried out by the end of 2006.
Creation of companies with the target structure of the industry:
1) Generating companies:
1.1) 6 wholesale generating companies (WGCs) and a single hydroelectric company.
The Board of Directors of RAO "UES of Russia" approved participation in all 6 WGCs and carried out their state registration. The completion of the main procedures for their formation is expected to be carried out during the end of 2005-2006.
1.2) 14 territorial generating companies (TGCs).
The Board of Directors of RAO "UES of Russia" approved the conditions for the establishment of 12 TGCs, state registration of 6 of these TGCs was carried out. The schemes for the formation of the remaining 2 TGCs have not yet been approved.
1.3) The company that unites all nuclear power plants in Russia - Rosenergoatom Concern.
At present, the executive authorities of the Russian Federation are preparing amendments to the legislation in order to transform Rosenergoatom Concern into an open joint stock company.
2) Companies that own power distribution grids - interregional distribution grid companies (IDGC).
The Board of Directors of RAO "UES of Russia" approved the participation of RAO in 4 IDGCs: IDGCs (all of them are created through the establishment of RAO UES of Russia 100% of subsidiaries). To date, state registration of 3 IDGCs out of 4 has been carried out: IDGC of Center and North Caucasus, JSC, IDGC-North-West, JSC, IDGC of the Urals and Volga, JSC.
3) Power supply companies.
In the process of reforming regional AO-energos during 2004-2005. energy sales companies were created. In accordance with the concept of retail market rules, the established power supply companies will be endowed with the status of a supplier of last resort.
The reform of the wholesale electricity market continues. The new concept of the target market model assumes a gradual transition to a system of regulated bilateral contracts for the sale and purchase of electricity between consumers and suppliers of electricity with a fixed price indexed taking into account inflation, rising fuel prices, etc.
Electricity volumes not covered by such contracts, as well as deviations from the contractual volumes, must be sold in the free trade sector of the wholesale market. At the same time, as we move towards a competitive structure of the industry, the volumes sold under these contracts will decrease, and the share of the competitive market sector will increase.
From May 1, 2005, a free trade sector was introduced on the territory of the united energy system of Siberia, taking into account the peculiarities of this IES - a high degree of participation in hydraulic generation and coal-fired power plants. The lack of experience of participation of subjects of the electric power industry located on the territory of Siberia in the free trade sector was also taken into account.
In addition, it is planned to introduce new sectors of the wholesale electricity market: a competitive balancing market, a system services market, a market for derivative financial contracts for the price of electricity, a market, financial rights for energy transmission. In the near future, a draft resolution on a mechanism for guaranteeing investments in the formation of a promising technological reserve will be submitted to the Government of the Russian Federation.
In general, taking into account the latest commissioning of generating capacities and structural transformations, the state of the industry, in the opinion of the management of RAO UES of Russia, has improved compared to the period when the decision was made to start reforming the industry. Thus, the process of reforming the electric power industry is not a constraining factor in the development of the industry, but, on the contrary, has a positive impact on its development.
In contrast to the USA and European countries, the basis of the transport system in Russia is formed by railroad transport. It plays a key role, both in supporting the economy and in integration processes. It accounts for up to 85% of cargo turnover, it provides foreign trade operations and transit through 30 border crossings and 40 ports.
Fixed assets of the railway industry, like other natural monopolies, during the 1990s. practically were not updated. Russia, in spite of its most advantageous geographical position, has almost completely lost its position in the field of transit traffic over two decades. (Thus, the volume of transit container traffic decreased by 86% over 17 years: 1981 - 136 thousand containers in twenty-foot calculation, 1998 - only 15.1 thousand). By 2000-2001. the debt of the Ministry of Railways of the Russian Federation exceeded 120 billion rubles. Reform of the railway industry became inevitable. Prior to that, for a number of reasons, primarily of a political nature, its beginning was postponed for more than one year.
In 1998-2001. the conceptual basis of the reform was laid, its active phase began in 2003, with the creation of RAO Russian Railways, to which all the functions of economic management of the railway industry were transferred. Three stages of reforming the industry were established only in 2001.
The main objectives of the first stage of the reform were:
· Development and approval of the concept of structural reform in railway transport;
· Establishment of JSC Russian Railways, including preparation of a set of documents regulating the company's activities;
· Separation of the functions of state regulation (Ministry of Railways of the Russian Federation) and economic management of the industry (RAO "Russian Railways").
In 1996, at the All-Russian Congress of Railway Workers, the "Main Directions for the Development of Railway Transport" were adopted. They defined the ideology of an evolutionary approach to industry reform, taking into account the experience of transforming state-owned railway companies in economically developed countries.
In 1998, by a decree of the Government of the Russian Federation, the Concept of the structural reform of federal railway transport was approved.
In 2001, the Government of the Russian Federation, by its resolution, approved the Program of Structural Reform in Railway Transport, in the development of which both the Ministry of Railways and representatives of other interested departments, major Russian and foreign consulting companies participated. The program established three stages of reforming the industry.
In 2003, the Russian Government approved the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Program of Structural Reform in Railway Transport for 2003-2005.
The end of the first stage of the reform came at the time of the establishment of JSC Russian Railways, which began its economic activities on October 1, 2003.
During the first stage of the reform, the following main tasks were solved:
· Development of a legislative framework and regulations governing the activities of railway transport, brought in line with the civil legislation of the Russian Federation (federal laws "On railway transport in the Russian Federation", "Charter of railway transport of the Russian Federation", "On amendments and additions to the federal law" On natural monopolies "and other laws and acts);
· Inventory of property and land of railway enterprises;
· Carrying out restructuring of arrears of railway transport enterprises on payments to the budgets;
· Preparation of fundamental documents regulating the operation of railway transport (Price List No. 10-01 "Tariffs for the carriage of goods and infrastructure services performed by Russian railways", "Rules for non-discriminatory access of carriers to the infrastructure of public railway transport", "Rules for the provision of services for the use of infrastructure public railway transport ").
The main result of the first stage of reforming the railway industry was the separation of the functions of state regulation and economic management.
The Ministry of Railways of the Russian Federation retained only the functions, including the reform of the industry, the development of a regulatory framework and licensing of activities in the federal railway transport. All the functions of economic management in railway transport were taken over by Russian Railways, 100% of which is owned by the state. The authorized capital of JSC "Russian Railways" is 1 trillion. 535 billion 700 million rubles (more than 60 billion dollars). Its property included 987 enterprises. The entire industrial infrastructure of 17 railways, locomotive and carriage repair plants, factories for the production and repair of track machines, electrical plants, factories for the production of spare parts for rolling stock, research and construction organizations were transferred to the disposal of JSC "Russian Railways" and etc.
The main tasks of the second stage of the reform are:
· Creation of independent structural divisions of JSC "Russian Railways" (joint-stock companies), carrying out certain types of activities in railway transport (freight transportation, transportation of passengers in suburban traffic, services for the repair of technical equipment and production of spare parts, services for the production of means of railway automation, others activities);
· Reorganization of Russian Railways by spinning off a joint-stock company operating in the field of long-distance passenger transportation;
· Gradual termination of subsidizing passenger transportation at the expense of freight;
· Creation of conditions for increasing the level of competition in the field of transportation and the transition to free pricing in competitive sectors;
· Attraction of investments for further development of the railway industry.
In August 2004, the Russian Railways Board of Directors adopted the draft Strategic Development Program for the Company until 2010. According to the program, "Russian Railways" by 2010 should be a vertically integrated transport corporation, implementing two main tasks, which are defined in the draft program as equal.
The first is the efficient provision of infrastructure services to independent carriers and operators. The second is performing the functions of a universal public carrier of all types of cargo and categories of passengers on the Russian and international markets.
In February 2004, the first business project for the organization of break-even commuter passenger traffic was implemented - the high-speed section Moscow - Mytishchi. This route has become a kind of testing ground, demonstrating the possibility of organizing break-even passenger transportation by Russian Railways.
Also in 2004, the Russian Troika company was created, the co-founders of which were the Far Eastern Shipping Company and RAO Russian Railways. The company makes its own contribution to the development of competition in the field of container transportation (it should be noted that this area, in contrast to, for example, passenger transportation, is therefore highly competitive). CJSC “Russkaya Troika” is actively building its own rolling stock (by the end of 2006 it is planned to increase it to 1200 80-foot flatcars for transporting containers).
Thanks to the successful development of this company, TransContainer, a branch of Russian Railways, and other subjects of this market sector, Russia finally managed to move from words to deeds in the revival of the Transsiberian Container Service, which operated so successfully in Soviet times and provided transit transportation of containers from countries of the Asia-Pacific region to Europe, and partly to the Middle East), and also in the opposite direction. Thus, from 1998 to 2004, the volume of container traffic on the Transsib increased from 15 to 121 thousand TEU (containers in twenty-foot terms). The peak volume of 1981 has already been almost reached (it is another matter that the volume of world trade has grown greatly over the past 25 years).
In May 2005, RAO "Russian Railways" decided to create 9 subsidiaries of JSC "Russian Railways" in the field of production and repair of track equipment; the corresponding subdivisions of Russian Railways into separate joint stock companies). Thus, already in the first half of 2005, 15 subsidiaries of Russian Railways were created, and by the end of 2005 - from 6 to 10 more.
The head of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Russian Federation, German Gref, proposed to gradually separate the passenger route from RAO Russian Railways: first, turn the newly created company into a branch of Russian Railways, then into a subsidiary, and at the last stage into a separate company. In March this year, the fundamentals of the concept of reforming the long-distance passenger complex were adopted, and the reform of the Federal Passenger Directorate of RAO Russian Railways was launched with the transfer of the property of the passenger complex to it. It will include 16 regional directorates, 46 carriage depots, 332 stations, 25.5 thousand passenger cars. Subsequently, this directorate will be transformed into an independent federal passenger company.
In addition, in April, a decision was made to create four suburban passenger companies jointly with the governments of Moscow and the Moscow Region, the Sverdlovsk Region, the Krasnoyarsk and Primorsky Territories. The next stage is the creation of such companies in the Chelyabinsk, Orenburg and Kurgan regions. (Currently, four companies are already operating on the West Siberian railway, one private company is on Moskovskaya (on the Moscow-Kaluga route). In these companies (except for Kaluga), Russian Railways holds a controlling stake, and regional administrations are co-founders). Nine more business plans for the creation of suburban passenger companies with the participation of the administrations of the regions of the Russian Federation are under consideration.
In 2007, it is planned to complete the transfer of all suburban services to independent companies on a regional scale (since the beginning of 2005, local authorities have become responsible for organizing suburban passenger traffic, which are obliged to compensate for the loss of these traffic).
There is not a single country in the world where passenger transportation would be highly profitable. An illustrative example is Japan, where out of 17 companies in this area, only 7 are profitable (some are even super profitable), while 10 others operate thanks to subsidies from the central and local budgets. Losses of JSCo «Russian Railways» from passenger traffic in 2004 amounted to 62 billion rubles, for 9 months of 2005 - 37 billion (by 2007 it is planned to reduce them to 31 billion rubles). They are only covered by lucrative freight traffic.
The global task of the third stage (2006-2010) of reforming the railway industry is the formation and development of a competitive market.
The final stage of the reform involves the sale of licenses for the provision of services in the sector of long-distance and suburban passenger transportation, partial privatization of companies for the transportation of passengers in suburban and long-distance traffic, repair plants, and various non-core assets of RAO Russian Railways.
Partial privatization of subsidiaries of Russian Railways is also possible, but it can be carried out only after the State Duma adopts a special law on privatization and its approval by the President of Russia.
In general, the state and, accordingly, RAO Russian Railways are interested in the appearance on railway transport of full-fledged companies - competitors, carriers, and not just operators (in fact, freight forwarders) that could use the infrastructure of Russian Railways (first of all, track economy), bringing new investments to the industry and giving a new impetus to its development. Thus, the state is ready to reduce the share of Russian Railways in the field of freight transportation to 50% in value terms. In addition, RAO Russian Railways plans to reduce its share in the total number of the Russian car fleet to 50%.
This direction of the reform is already being actively promoted: in 2004 alone, the number of cars owned by private operators and freight owners increased by 20%. If in 2004 the quantitative share of the private carriage park was 26.4%, and its use in the total volume of traffic was 32%, by the end of 2005 these figures could be 33% and 40%, respectively. In the field of freight transportation, RAO Russian Railways will be focused primarily not on high-profit transportation, for example, oil products, but on a low-income sector - transportation of coal, grain and other goods with a certain social focus (up to 80% of oil product transportation will be given to private carriers and operators).
The completion of the third stage of the reform is planned for 2010, but in reality, the timing of the completion of the reform will be determined by its progress and can probably be postponed for several more years. Thus, the Federal Passenger Company can be created on the condition that the federal budget for the corresponding year will provide funds to cover planned losses from its economic activities. (RAO "Russian Railways" for almost two years discussed with the Ministry of Finance of Russia the procedure for reimbursing the costs of passenger transportation, but no decision was made on this issue). Moreover, on November 7, 2005, Vladimir Putin demanded to postpone the reform of the railway industry, explaining that no budget funds were envisaged to finance unprofitable passenger enterprises, the withdrawal of which from Russian Railways is scheduled for mid-late 2007. It can be assumed with a high degree of probability that this reform will be suspended until the next presidential elections in 2008 in order to avoid the premature consequences of the unpopular price liberalization among the population in the next sector of the economy (it is no secret that about 70% of passengers are low-income people).
The reform of RAO GAZPROM began later than other natural monopolies and, in fact, is only an internal reform of the company. There is no need to talk about any serious changes in the industry as a whole (measures to demonopolize).
The main goal of the internal reform is to increase the efficiency of the UES reform for realizing global competitive advantages. The company intends to become an integrated and diversified international energy company, one of the world leaders in the oil and gas industry.
At the first stage of the reform (2002-2003), the management structure was improved, the regulatory procedures were adjusted; a budgeting system was introduced. The second stage of the reform began in 2004. The main task of the stage is to optimize the structure of management of the main activities at the level of subsidiaries, each of which is responsible for a separate cycle: exploration, production, transportation, processing, storage and sales.
Each of the subsidiaries will specialize in performing a narrow range of specialized functions, which will avoid the dispersion of financial and human resources into related, non-core activities. The result of the second stage of the reform should be a higher transparency of financial flows, a reduction in non-core expenses, and an increase in the efficiency of management of subsidiaries. (Cost transparency will allow for reasonable tariffs.) During 2004, preparatory work was carried out (development of a regulatory framework, creation of new legal entities, preparation of a scheme for interaction between subsidiaries, staffing). Subsidiary Gazpromregiongaz consolidates all regional distribution networks. A company will be created to service the main gas pipelines. Underground gas storage will be handled by a new specialized enterprise - Podzemgaz. A specialized company for the production of oil and gas condensate will be created (probably on the basis of the acquired Sibneft).
During 2005, a feasibility study is under way, the results of which will determine the possibility of creating new subsidiaries, the preliminary names of which are OOO Gazprompererabotka (consolidates the processing of gas and liquid hydrocarbons, in particular, it is supposed to include the Sosnogorsk GPP, the Surgutsk ZSK, the condensate preparation unit for transportation Urengoygazprom "), Gazpromneftedobycha (oil and condensate production), Gazpromavtogaz (CNG filling stations), as well as the spin-off of service companies. It is also planned to highlight the social sector.
The global problem of the Russian gas industry is the severe depletion of gas reserves at the main fields (Urengoyskoye, Yamburgskoye and Medvezhye). In recent years, only the Zapolyarnoye field has been brought into development. During 2006-2010, when gas production at Zapolyarnoye reaches the planned level, the decline in production at old fields may reach a critical level.
The development of new large deposits in Yamal will require serious investments (at least 3-4 billion dollars a year). Meanwhile, RAO GAZPROM allocates the main investments specifically for the transport system, first of all, for the construction of new export gas pipelines (by 2010 the first stage of the North European gas pipeline to Germany will be launched, subsequently it will serve other countries as well; construction continues parts of the Blue Stream gas pipeline to Turkey).
I think that without serious financial injections from the state or otherwise attracting large-scale investments, RAO Gazprom will not be able to continue developing new fields on the Yamal Peninsula in order to prevent gas production in the long term. Of course, everything is in the hands of the state, but a reasonable step would be to separate the transport infrastructure from RAO into an independent unit controlled by the state (in fact, the gas analogue of Transneft). In the extractive sector, it would be possible to take a course towards demonopolization, which, with an appropriate legal framework and guarantees, would help to attract private capital and an active inflow of investments for the development of new fields and create competition in the industry.
JSC "Joint Stock Company for Oil Transportation" Transneft "was established in accordance with the decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1403 dated November 17, 1992 and is the legal successor of the Main Production Department for Oil Transportation and Supply (Glavtransneft) of the USSR Ministry of Oil Industry. Founder - the Government of the Russian Federation.
During the reign of M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin in 1985-2000. not a single kilometer of oil pipelines have been built in Russia. In addition, for a number of reasons, a significant number of objects were mothballed or dismantled. In fact, the industry was on the verge of degradation and complete destruction (the average age of oil pipelines was 26 years). The media, not without reason, called the company the owner of a pile of rusty scrap metal scattered thousands of kilometers. Nevertheless, the situation was broken, and AK Transneft began to develop. 2000-2004 over 1.5 thousand km of oil pipelines, hundreds of other facilities, including social ones, were built. In addition to new construction, the company annually invests over $ 1 billion in technical re-equipment and renovation of fixed assets, and in 2005 it is planned to allocate 1.5 times more funds for these purposes. Over the past five years, the increase in export opportunities amounted to about 100 million tons (from 142 million tons to more than 240 million tons). In 2004, the intake of raw materials by the Transneft system amounted to about 450 million tons. In 2005, the company able to ensure the export of at least 255 million tons of oil. This year, there is even a slight excess of opportunities for oil transportation in certain export directions.
According to the Energy Strategy, approved by the Government of the Russian Federation, the volume of oil production in 2010 and 2020. should amount to 490 and 520 million tons, respectively. Transneft will be ready to transport such volumes when the Baltic pipeline system expands and the construction of the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline begins.
Transneft projects have opponents both among oil companies and in other circles. (So \u200b\u200bthe companies "Lukoil" and "Yukos" sought to build their own oil pipeline with access to the port of Murmansk). There is also an opinion that the 15-year practice of maintaining state control over the oil pipeline system has not proved its effectiveness. Nevertheless, the company, acting in the public interest, is one of the most well-managed natural monopolies, actively developing, over the past 5 years leading in terms of investments.
According to Transneft, in all areas of operation, from the cost and timing of construction to specific operating costs, a private CPC (Caspian Pipeline Consortium) is several times more expensive than the state-owned BTS (Baltic Transport System). For example, the unit cost of one oil pumping station in CPC is $ 40.2 million, in BTS - $ 19 million. The cost of laying a ton of metal on the linear part in the CPC is $ 4.4 thousand, on the BPS - $ 2.8 thousand. Transhipment of one ton of CPC oil costs $ 94.3, BTS - $ 40.8. For Transneft, tariffs are set by the state and amount to an average of about 40 cents for the transportation of a ton of oil per 100 kilometers, and the tariff on the CPC pipeline is almost five times higher. LUKOIL's tariff for the 150-kilometer oil pipeline in Komi, which they own, is almost 15 times higher than that of Transneft.
I think that in the future, AK Transneft should become a well-managed company with transparent costs and reasonable tariffs, which will be able to attract both external and internal investments, in which Russian and foreign oil companies should be primarily interested, and also direct investment from the state. In the field of oil transportation, the private sector should also develop. Probably, it can be represented by consortia of the largest oil-producing companies, which will be able to compete with the state-owned Transneft, developing new private transport infrastructure in addition to the existing state-owned.
CHAPTER 3. PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATURAL MONOPOLIES
As a rule, the use of state regulation is considered justified in cases where a certain product is produced by a single economic entity, provided that competition between similar enterprises is impossible for technological or economic reasons and the growth in production of a single entity is accompanied by a decrease in unit costs (economies of scale). In recent years, the scope and scale of government regulation have been significantly reduced in many developed countries, both due to technological innovations in some industries, and as a result of the emergence of new theoretical approaches to the formation and regulation of relevant markets.
Often the concept of "natural monopoly" can be successfully applied to enterprises with a networked organization of the economy, when the maintenance of parallel networks leads to an unjustified increase in costs per unit of output. The best examples at the federal level are the transmission of electricity, oil and gas, railroad transportation, as well as certain sub-sectors of communications, and at the regional level, these are utilities, including heating, sewerage, water supply, etc.
The branches of natural monopolies are characterized by a high degree of monopolization of the production and sale of goods or services, as well as the difficulty of ensuring freedom of choice between different suppliers. The freedom of consumers of their products is limited organizationally and technologically (by the existing configuration and bandwidth of the network, the interconnection of production and consumption processes) and economically (economies of scale with an increase in production capacity).
CONCLUSION
Natural monopoly is a structure, as a rule, state-owned, which monopolistically carries out economic activities in areas where the organization of such activities on a competitive basis is either impossible or leads to prohibitively high production costs.
Since these giant corporations occupy a monopoly position in their industry, the first place is the issue of state regulation of their activities.
According to the Federal Law "On Natural Monopolies" No. 14-FZ, the main tasks of state regulation of natural monopolies are:
· A decrease in the practice of using the advantages of a monopoly position in the industry by the largest corporations, which negatively affect the entire economy;
· Price regulation;
· Creation of competition;
· Termination of the practice of cross-subsidization of various groups of consumers;
· Further development of the regulatory framework that regulates relations between market participants;
· Delimitation of competence between federal and territorial bodies for regulation in the spheres of natural monopolies;
· Determination of the specifics of further privatization;
· Increasing the efficiency of exercising the powers of the state on the shares it owns.
The finances of natural monopolies, giant companies, remain extremely non-transparent, not only for shareholders and outside observers, but also for the management itself. Analysis of costs, financial flows, calculation of economically feasible tariffs is very complicated by a confusing system of internal accounting, a system of cross-subsidization, a large number of affiliated structures that have, incl. and non-core assets. From the side of these monopolies, there is constant pressure on the state aimed at regular and tangible increases in prices and tariffs for their products and services. In recent years, the growth of these tariffs has made a decisive contribution to the overall inflation. Under these conditions, the effective work of natural monopolies is extremely important for the development of the entire economy as a whole.
The main direction of reforming natural monopolies is to isolate from their composition that part that, in fact, contains an element of natural monopoly (this is mainly the transport infrastructure), and the creation of a competitive environment in all other areas, which are now united by one organizational roof by the monopoly sphere.
Three main natural monopolies (RAO GAZPROM, RAO UES OF RUSSIA and RAO RZD) are the backbone of the entire economic and political system of Russia, both in geopolitical and economic terms. Equally important is the role of JSC Transneft, which is the main link in Russian raw materials exports (Russian foreign trade has a pronounced, hypertrophied, raw materials orientation - more than 80% of exports are raw materials). Reform of these four monopolies will play a key role in the implementation of the Energy and Transport strategies of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020.
Only active renewal of fixed assets, accelerated development of infrastructure will allow these companies to maintain and strengthen their role in ensuring the unity and integrity of the state, its economic independence. At the same time, I believe that their relative contribution to the budget revenues should gradually decrease as the country's economy develops.
Indeed, the government's long-term retention of prices for the products and services of natural monopolies at a low level (much lower than the world level) did not at all contribute to the recovery of the economy due to the ruin of inefficient, resource-intensive industries and the creation of new enterprises focused on high productivity and quality (in fact, it is not yet clear how Russia will be able to catch up with China and the countries of Southeast Asia in terms of costs, and Europe and Japan in terms of quality). However, assessing the situation as a whole, I believe that it was impossible to go to the other extreme - a quick release of prices and a quick, thoughtless, reform (count - the collapse) of natural monopolies, succumbing to the demands of world financial organizations. In the 1990s, in conditions of political instability, the disastrous state of the national economy, with an unfavorable external economic environment, disintegration processes, mediocre management of the state in general and the economy in particular, the preservation of natural monopolies was a key stabilizing factor, both politically and economic aspects. On the other hand, of course, this also preserved the imbalances in the structure of the economy.
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