The depreciation of the ruble in 1991. Economist mikhail khazin: the pavlovsk monetary reform was an adventure to save the ussr
Many remember in what year the Pavlovian reform led to the final impoverishment of the Soviet people. It is customary to call her by the surname of the first and, in fact, the last Prime Minister of the Soviet Union. Let us further consider what the Pavlovian reform of 1991 was: the reasons, stages, consequences of the transformations.
Country situation
The beginning of 1991 did not bode well for the falling apart. On the outskirts of the country, interethnic clashes became more frequent, there was a global shortage in stores, people lined up in huge queues. Gorbachev's economic transformations did not lead to anything, perestroika did not take place. The government tried to switch from a planned to a market economic system. Institutionally, however, the state was not ready for this - the country lacked the necessary people and bodies. The overwhelming majority of the population could not provide themselves with a sufficient amount of food and industrial goods. People are used to empty shelves. The only positive thing at that time was the stable payment of a modest salary. Of course, the country's leadership understood that if they begin to delay wages, it will result in mass protests. And the government could not allow this in any way. People, meanwhile, did not demand a large amount of material wealth. The population of the USSR is accustomed to restrictions, shortages, isolation. Everyone lived from paycheck to paycheck, trying to provide their families with food, first of all, and housing. According to prof. Volchik, the nature of the existing surplus of money supply was determined by the growing dysfunctions of the institutions of the planned economic regime. Inconsistent and chaotic transformations destroyed the centralized system, but at the same time did not contribute to the formation of market regulatory mechanisms and institutions.
Why did the Pavlovsk reform of 1991 begin?
There was a lot of money in the country. However, in the current crisis conditions, they constantly depreciated and turned into meaningless waste paper. The official reason was the fight against counterfeit banknotes "thrown in from abroad." In addition, the government decided to withdraw the unearned income of citizens. This statement of reasons was the most familiar to Soviet ideology. Unofficially, it was clear to everyone that the key goal was the elimination of banknotes printed in the late 1980s. to fulfill social guarantees accumulated in the population and increased the shortage of consumer products.
Change organizer
The author of the reform was Valentin Pavlov, a 53-year-old "supporter of the Minister of Finance. Since 1986, he headed the USSR State Committee on Prices. Accordingly, he knew not the ideological, but the real state of affairs. Pavlov had long been looking for different ways of withdrawing funds from the population, unsecured Since taking up ministerial office in July 1989, he constantly pondered the idea of \u200b\u200btransformation.In his plan, the reform included not only the withdrawal of surplus money, but also to raise prices, taking into account the cost of services and goods.
Conversion options
Pavlovsk city assumed several concepts. Among them were those that were previously used in other countries. Quite paradoxical concepts were also developed. For example, one of the options was the introduction of "parallel money" following the example of the 1920s, but in non-cash circulation. Another concept involved simply confiscatory cancellation of old banknotes without exchange and the mechanism of emission credit regulation. Such transformations were carried out in 1948 in the FRG by Chancellor Adenauer. As a result, it was actually eliminated. There was another, compromise option, according to which the Pavlovsk reform of 1991 could go. People did not have much money, the compensation of which was supposed to be within the strictly established amount. However, the management intended to carry out an exchange with a change in the scale of the national currency. This provided for the withdrawal of savings in excess of a strictly defined amount. The minister insisted on the speediest implementation of transformations, so that the funds stored not in banks, but "in boxes", people either would not have time, or would not be able to surrender in full. The Ministry of Finance had no doubts that the majority of the population had nothing to save from the scanty salaries, and only "dishonest people" could keep the stash in large denominations.
Rationale for transformation
The Pavlovsk reform of 1991 was to be approved by Gorbachev. For this, it had to be justified. Pavlov used a well-known method. In the summer of 1990, he submitted a secret note to Gorbachev and Ryzhkov. In it, the minister explains the need to exchange only 50 and 100 ruble bills of 1961 c. the fact that it is they in a huge volume that are exported abroad. Ryzhkov, then the chairman of the Council of Ministers, requested confirmation from the customs authorities. From there, it was reported that ten-ruble notes, not centesimal, are usually crossed the border. A discussion began, as a result of which Ryzhkov was dismissed. Gorbachev, who was rapidly losing popularity among the masses, needed a person who would take responsibility for the steps ahead. Pavlov perfectly suited this role. On January 14, 1991, his candidacy was confirmed for the post of Prime Minister.
Cabinet leadership
Pavlov began his career as prime minister with disinformation. From a high rostrum, he assured that no preparation for future reforms was being carried out. He said that financial reforms are only a part of the whole range of measures aimed at improving the economy. Carrying out money reform in isolation without solving other problems is meaningless, since it will not lead to any results. In addition, the prime minister said that the transformations would cost the economy 5 billion rubles. And at the end of his speech, he pointed out that the capacities for issuing banknotes that existed at that time would make it possible to accumulate the required volume of new banknotes within three years.
Excitement among the people
Soviet citizens, who have long been accustomed to the ideological attacks of the leadership, who have a poor understanding of the essence of the market economy, nevertheless felt some kind of catch from the party. The top officials of the state have already ceased to enjoy any kind of trust. Information about the upcoming reform was leaked through acquaintances, so some citizens managed to change their "hundred" and "fifty dollars" in advance. On the eve of the announcement of the exchange, part of the population managed to "change" cash at the ticket offices of railway stations and metro stations, in shops, and at taxi drivers. However, there were only a few such "lucky ones". Everyone suspected the reform, but no one knew when or how it would be carried out. The upcoming changes were discussed everywhere: in transport, in universities, on collective farms, in production, in the army. On the one hand, most of the population came to the conclusion that "there is actually nothing to save", and on the other, "they will be deceived all the same."
Pavlovsk money reform: the course of the "action"
On January 22, Gorbachev signs a decree according to which 50 and 100 ruble banknotes of 1961 are withdrawn from circulation c. and are exchanged for smaller new bills. From that moment on, the Pavlovian reform of 1991 began. The population had less money than expected. Cash exchange in the amount of up to RUB 1,000. produced only three days - from 23 to 25 January (Wednesday to Friday). At the same time, withdrawing money from accounts with Sberbank was limited to 500 rubles. The exchange was allowed until the end of March, but at special commissions. They considered each case of missing the deadline separately. Together with this, the citizen needed to be told where he got the amount of more than 1,000. The presidential decree was read out at 9 pm, when almost all organizations were no longer working. In a panic, the smartest citizens began to save their money. Someone urgently sent a transfer, someone bought several plane or train tickets for different flights in order to return them later. However, only a few managed to do all this.
Exchange process
The Pavlovsk reform created huge queues as early as the morning of January 23rd. At the cash desks of Sberbank were "delegates" of labor collectives who changed the banknotes of entire brigades. The management's calculation for working days was partially justified. Many citizens simply did not have time to get from production to cash registers. However, in some areas, the local administration met the population halfway. Exchange offices were opened in production, in post offices. In the queues themselves, conflicts arose, someone felt bad. As a result, the Pavlovian monetary reform made it possible to withdraw about 14 billion rubles from the population. According to the organizers' plan, of course, it was supposed to confiscate more than 51.5 billion out of 133 billion (about 39%). The Pavlovian reform, in addition, included the freezing of bank savings. These funds accrued 40% per annum. However, they could not be received until next year.
results
The Pavlovian reform sharply reduced the national income. Compared to 1990, it has decreased by 20%. At the same time, the budget deficit has increased significantly. According to various estimates, in 1991 it amounted to 20-30% of GDP. When the Pavlovsk reform was completed, its organizer made accusations against foreign banks, reproaching them for coordinated activities aimed at disorganizing the circulation of cash in the USSR. As part of the second stage of transformations, without any preliminary announcement, since April 2, prices for consumer goods have jumped sharply in the country, despite the fact that they have remained at a stable level for decades. All this led to an absolute loss of all confidence in the party leadership. The population considered themselves robbed twice.
Conclusion
As the results of public opinion show, the Pavlovian reform was one of the key reasons for the failure of the coup. It is known to have been undertaken by conservatives from the government and the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee in 1991. It is noteworthy that the reformer Valentin Pavlov was also among the members of the State Emergency Committee. Subsequently, he said that at that time few people realized and believed that it was not an ideological issue that was being resolved. At the end of January 1991, the population of the country said goodbye not only to the missing banknotes, but also to part of their past. People living in Vladikavkaz, who witnessed these events, even now often recall how on January 26, a day after the general excitement, a well-dressed man with a suitcase appeared at the State Bank building. He opened it and poured a bunch of 50-ruble bills onto the snow and set them on fire. From the point of view of modernity, according to Volchik, this form of reform is absolutely unacceptable. However, if you assess the situation in the same way as the previous leadership did, then there was simply no other way of financial transformations. Almost all the reforms of the USSR were of a confiscatory nature. And this "action" of the early 90s was no exception.
One of the last nails in the coffin of the Soviet economy was the monetary reform of 1991, popularly known as “Pavlovskaya” after Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, who put it into practice.
On January 14, 1991, Valentin Pavlov, previously the president of the All-Union Economic Society, was appointed to the post of Chairman of the USSR Government.
Having previously held the post of Minister of Finance of the USSR, Pavlov has already worked out various options for withdrawing the "excess money supply."
By 1991, on the wave of cooperation, a small stratum of businessmen had already formed, possessing significant sums. In addition, in the conditions of a commodity deficit, when there is generally not much money to spend on the population, there was a huge amount of money on hand that could not be bought.
In an interview for the Vremya program, commenting on the need for reform, Valentin Pavlov noted that, in his opinion, the 50 and 100 ruble bills are “the most important element of the shadow economy” since they serve money circulation in non-transparent spheres of the economy.
At the same time, according to the estimates of the Chairman of the Government of the USSR, the denominations of 50 and 100 rubles accounted for "more than a third" of the banknotes in cash circulation.
It was assumed that the withdrawal of cash from circulation would reduce inflation, as well as hit the shadow economy.
The essence of the reform was as follows: on January 22, 1991, in the evening on the Central Television of the USSR in the program "Vremya" it was announced that "in the interests of the overwhelming majority of the country's population", bills of 50 rubles. and 100 p. 1961 issue will not be accepted "in all types of payments" after some 3 hours, i.e. from 0 o'clock on January 23.
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In order not to lose absolutely all the money available in this denomination, the population was given the illusory opportunity to exchange the "fifty rubles" and "stolniks" of 1961 for notes of a smaller denomination of the same 1961 issue or the same denomination, but the sample of 1991.
The time allotted for exchange transactions was extremely short and inconvenient (3 working weekdays, from Wednesday to Friday). Naturally, not everyone was able to exchange their savings. Thus, in the stampede at the cherished windows of the savings banks, the population lost part of their funds set aside for a rainy day.
![](https://i2.wp.com/allperestroika.ru/reforma%20deneg%20vremia4.jpg)
In the matter of changing money, people went to all sorts of tricks, for example, they urgently exchanged money with taxi drivers who had not yet heard of the decree.
The decree was promulgated on January 22 in the Vremya program, i.e. at 21 pm, however, the circulation of banknotes stopped only at 0 o'clock on 23 January - thus, the most resourceful received 2-3 hours to carry out such frauds as money transfers to themselves, buying tickets at railway ticket offices, Aeroflot ticket offices and the like.
In addition, the Pavlovian reform implied restrictions on the withdrawal of cash from accounts in the Savings Bank, where it was so gracefully at one time recommended to keep money for citizens of the USSR. Now each depositor could withdraw no more than 500 rubles from his account. per month.
The Pavlovian reform was designed to remove the excess money supply from circulation. As a result, 14 billion cash rubles were withdrawn from circulation, but another result of this reform was the finally collapsed public confidence in the government's actions.
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In addition, there were complaints about the practical implementation of the monetary reform in life.
For example, in the issue of the Vremya program on January 23, a story was shown that some savings banks did not exchange banknotes on the 23rd, referring to the fact that “there were no orders”.
The panic caused by the urgent need to exchange banknotes led to a certain drop in labor discipline and, accordingly, labor productivity. It is understandable - people were quite rightly worried about the future of the "hard earned" and things at work faded into the background.
The subsequent increase in the rate of emission of rubles in 1991 nullified the whole meaning of the reform. In his book "The Fall of the Empire" Yegor Gaidar cites the following data on money issue in 1991: April - 4.77 billion, May - 5.50 billion, June - 18, 74 billion (Gaidar E.T. empire, M .: ROSSPEN, 2006, p. 367)
And already in 2 months - on April 2, 1991, a decree on new state retail prices will be issued, which increased prices in stores by an average of 3 times.
Due to the subsequent emission, the Pavlovian reform did not lead to a decrease in the money supply, while it was during this reform that significant personal savings were essentially confiscated from the population of the USSR.
For reading 9 min. Views 1.7k. Posted on January 28, 2017
Confiscatory currency reform in the USSR in 1991
On January 22, 1991, the last Soviet monetary reform began, which received the name "Pavlovskaya" in honor of its creator, Minister of Finance, and later Prime Minister of the USSR Government, Valentin Pavlov.
India carried out a similar confiscation reform two months ago - banknotes of the maximum denominations - 500 and 1000 rupees (which was about the same amount in rubles, the rupee rate was close to the ruble) were withdrawn from circulation.
On the eve of the anniversary of the Pavlovsk reform, January 21, 2017, the Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation Anton Siluanov very positively assessed the Indian experience:
“We probably need to think about reducing cash settlements. Many countries are following this (path - ed.) - especially look now, in India, a large-scale attack went to cash payments. This is very correct, since it is an element of whitewashing the economy. Due to this instrument, it would be possible to collect more taxes and make our economy more transparent, "Siluanov said, speaking at the congress of the United Russia party."
In anticipation of the publication of the M2 volume on 01/01/2017, against the background of continuing attacks by international enemies on the ruble, the reader is invited to feel nostalgic and remember how it was. Go.
The official reason for the financial reform was the fight against counterfeit banknotes "thrown by enemies from abroad," as well as with the unearned income of citizens. This made it easier to explain the idea from the point of view of the familiar Soviet ideology of those years. Unofficially, everyone understood perfectly well that it was necessary to get rid of the excess money supply of banknotes printed at the end of the 1980s in order to fulfill the social guarantees accumulated in the hands of the population and dispersed the shortage of consumer goods.
The main driver of the reform was the 53-year-old Finance Minister Valentin Pavlov, who called himself a supporter of "state capitalism."
The minister insisted that the exchange be carried out as soon as possible, so that the money accumulations stored by citizens not in the bank, but "in the box" either did not have time or could not be returned in full. The Ministry of Finance did not doubt that the overwhelming majority of the population had nothing to save from the scanty salaries - only "dishonest people" are capable of keeping stash in large bills under their pillow.
On January 10, 1991, at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet, Valentin Pavlov denied rumors of an impending reform.
There is no preparation for reform, ”he assured from a high rostrum. - Firstly, the monetary reform is only a part of a set of measures aimed at improving the economic situation, and its isolated implementation without solving other problems will not lead to anything. Secondly, the reform will cost the state about 5 billion rubles. Thirdly, the existing facilities for the issue of banknotes allow accumulating the required amount of new money within three years.
Business journalists pointed out to the prime minister the sealed stacks of banknotes, which they managed to capture in photos in various banks, and referred to unnamed sources in the financial sector. But the “once lied” Pavlov was echoed by the then Chairman of the Board of the State Bank of the USSR Viktor Gerashchenko, who at all corners denied rumors about the forthcoming reform.
And yet, a significant part of Soviet people who lived "from advance payment to payday" were not worried about these rumors. Until January 20, 1991, many of them, contrary to previous practice, were not paid their salaries, mainly in large denominations. After three days, it was difficult to regard it otherwise than mockery.
Then all this lies were explained by the "increased secrecy of the operation."
The presidential decree was read at 21.00 in the evening edition of the Vremya program, when almost all financial institutions and shops were already closed.
Under the terms of the reform, the exchange of confiscated bills was accompanied by the strongest restrictions: citizens could exchange 50 and 100 ruble bills for new ones only within three days - from 23 to 25 January. It was possible to change money after the specified period only by decision of special commissions. It was only possible to exchange in cash an amount of no more than 1,000 rubles per person (88,500 rubles in January 2017 prices, the average salary in January 1991 in the RSFSR was 308 Soviet rubles, in 2016 the average salary in Russia was about 36-37 thousand rubles) , and pensioners were allowed to change only 200 rubles. (17,700 rubles in January 2017 prices) - the possibility of exchanging the remaining banknotes was considered in special commissions until the end of March 1991, which considered each case that was not settled in the allotted time separately (business trip, expedition, health status, etc.). It was necessary to prove where the person got the amount over 1 thousand rubles. The district executive committee commissions, which were entrusted with the reception and verification of such statements of citizens, physically could not cope with the piled-up work. They did not even "let down" clear criteria for determining the illegality of the accumulated.
At the same time, the deposits in the Savings Bank were frozen. Only 500 rubles could be obtained from the deposit. new, in addition, a procedure was established for payment for goods and services in a non-cash manner without limiting the amount (I suggest that witnesses of the era recall in the comments what could have been paid in 1991 by bank transfer and in what order). Since citizens could have deposits in several savings banks, including in different cities, on the last pages of a civil passport, employees of the savings banks made notes about the amounts withdrawn from deposits. The deposits accrued 40 percent per annum, but money could be received in cash only next year.
Since the exchange of money was carried out in a very short time, long queues immediately lined up in the savings banks. The exchange was also carried out at the place of work of citizens and at the post office.
The reform hit thousands of people who held rubles in stockings and in Sberbank. The fortunes of 15-30 thousand, accumulated for decades, collapsed.
After the completion of the exchange of large money, Pavlov appeared in the press with accusations against Western banks in coordinated activities to disorganize money circulation in the USSR.
Due to the sharp depreciation of the Soviet ruble, the deposits were unfrozen ahead of schedule: by the Decree of the President of the USSR dated March 22, 1991, the compensation of these deposits has not yet been completed and will continue in 2017–2019.
On April 2, 1991, the state-regulated prices for food products, transport, utilities were increased 2-4 times, the exchange rate of the ruble was significantly reduced.
In December 1991, experts from the Kommersant newspaper summed up the results of the whole of 1991 and found that, taking into account the “Pavlovian” reform, prices rose 7.8 times over the year. At the same time, the greatest contribution to the price race was made not by market factors, but by various kinds of force majeure circumstances, such as exchange of banknotes and official statements about upcoming cataclysms in money circulation.
1993 Russia confiscatory currency reform
Although the reform was of a confiscatory nature, that is, the state limited the number of exchanged old bills for new ones, people managed to forget about it. Which is understandable: by the time of the 1993 reform, there was nothing especially to take from the population.
In fact, the reform of 1993 is the birth of the Russian ruble, which on July 26 stood out from the currency space of the former Soviet republics. The accumulations in the Soviet ruble were withdrawn, all banknotes with the Soviet ruble became invalid - the Soviet ruble ceased to exist (accepted for payment) and a new currency appeared - the Russian ruble.
The formal basis for the start of the reform was a telegram dated July 24 signed by the then head of the Central Bank, Viktor Gerashchenko.
The telegram said that from zero hours on July 26 all over the country the circulation of banknotes of the 1961-1992 model ceases. And all "old" Soviet rubles are subject to exchange before August 7. With restrictions: initially it was prescribed that no more than 35 thousand rubles (about $ 35) per person could be changed by registration. After the operation, a stamp was put in the passport so that people would not try to use the right twice. Panic began in the country. Therefore, President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree according to which the amount increased to 100 thousand rubles, and the term of the reform was until the end of August 1993.
Initially, the exchange limit was set at 35 thousand rubles (at that time - about $ 35, in January 2017 prices - $ 58, or 12,500 rubles in January 2017 prices). Citizens of Russia (according to the registration in the passport) could exchange the indicated amounts within two weeks, from July 26 to August 7, in the institutions of the Sberbank of Russia, which was stamped in the passport. Amounts exceeding 35,000 rubles were to be credited to time deposits for a period of 6 months.
Panic began in the country. On July 26, decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1107 was issued, increasing the amount of banknotes of the 1961-1992 sample accepted for exchange to 100 thousand rubles. (about $ 100 equivalent, in January 2017 prices - $ 167, or 35,724 rubles in January 2017 prices) per person, and the reform period is until the end of August 1993. The banknotes of 10,000 rubles of the 1992 model were exchanged without limiting the amount. The exchange period was extended until the end of August, during this period it was allowed to use 1, 3, 5 and 10 ruble bills in circulation. On July 27, a telegram from the Central Bank was issued containing similar provisions.
Subsequently, the exchange was extended until the end of the year, but an explanation was given that from October 1, exchange of banknotes is possible only upon presentation of documents confirming the impossibility of exchange at an earlier date. The term of use in circulation of banknotes of 1, 3, 5 and 10 rubles, extended initially until the end of August, was later also extended until December 31, 1993.
Many people physically did not have time to exchange their cash savings, and this money was gone.
Coins in rubles and kopecks formally remained legal tender until the 1998 monetary reform.
By the time of the 1993 reform, the average salary in the country had risen to 53 thousand rubles. A kilogram of meat, for example, cost more than 2,000 rubles.
Officially, the reform was carried out with two goals - to neutralize inflation, which turned into "hyper" after the liberalization of prices in 1992, and also to stop the flow of money from the former Soviet republics, which began to switch to their currencies.
By the summer of 1993, rumors spread throughout the country that a new currency exchange was being prepared. Perhaps people understood that such inflation problems could not last forever. But there were conversations, and very confident. The authorities added fuel to the fire, regularly refuting these rumors, but the people only more asserted in the opinion that changes in banknotes were coming.
The people were worried and tried in some way to save at least those small funds that they had. They did not want to bring it to the bank, remembering 1991. Credit organizations were tempted by high rates, but the people no longer believed and preferred a cash form of storage. About 10% of income, that is, the money left over from current consumption, people exchanged for currency. In 1993, the cost of foreign banknotes exceeded savings on deposits and securities by about 35%.
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Ten years ago, in December 1993, the last Soviet monetary reform was officially and finally completed - the circulation of banknotes of the 1961 model in denominations of one, three, five and ten rubles was stopped.
The exchange of money is a usual thing for us. Over the past twenty years, we have changed banknotes and got lost in zeros more than once, but the 1991-1993 monetary reform had an almost revolutionary effect - almost the entire population of the country became equally poor.
The USSR government acted extremely inconsistently in its attempts to reverse the crisis situation. We can recall the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1990) on the forthcoming revision of prices (that is, on their increase), which was publicly announced by N. Ryzhkov. The response to this statement was immediate. In a matter of days, the demand for all goods rose sharply, and a total shortage spread across the country. A barrage of criticism fell on the Council of Ministers, and the government postponed a price review.
Another example of government inconsistency was the introduction in late 1990 of a five percent tax on all sales to supplement the state budget. But soon (under pressure from industry lobbies) the government decided to significantly narrow the range of taxable products, and the value of this tax came to naught. At the end of 1990, V. Pavlov, the former Minister of Finance in N. Ryzhkov's government, became the head of government, representing the interests of conservative economic and political circles and the military-industrial complex. To stop centrifugal tendencies, a course was taken to tighten economic measures. There was no longer any talk of privatization and liberalization. Soon V. Pavlov accused the private banks of some foreign countries that they are seeking to destabilize the situation in the USSR. President Gorbachev gave permission to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB to interfere in the economic activities of enterprises (including joint ventures), which led to a sharp reduction in investment and trade activity of foreign capital in the USSR.
On January 10, 1991, Valentin Pavlov officially announced that there would be no monetary reform. Because it will not help - complex methods of economic recovery are needed. The majority of the population will even remember that the minister was ready to lose his hand in order to prove the justice of his words.
Late in the evening of January 22, after the closing of the savings banks, Valentin Pavlov announced in the Vremya program that the banknotes of 50 and 100 rubles, issued in 1961, were being replaced with new banknotes. The population was given three days to exchange banknotes. It was possible to change at the place of work. Those who did not work - in the savings bank at the place of residence (a special stamp was put in the passport).
In the first three days, 350 rubles could be exchanged. In the next six months, it was possible to gradually exchange up to 1.5 thousand rubles, citing the fact that this does not exceed the annual salary of an ordinary Soviet person.
On January 23, 1991, Pavlov retired 50 and 100 ruble bills from circulation. One of the reasons for this measure was as follows: the fact is that the ruble - forint - dollar and ruble - zloty - dollar operation brought much more income than the ruble - dollar, because the exchange rate of the forint and zloty in relation to the ruble was artificially underestimated. It is not known how many large ruble bills were thus abroad; in any case, Pavlov named the figure of 100 billion rubles.
The exchange of large bills, which was carried out freely only in the amount of a monthly salary and was accompanied, moreover, by the freezing of a significant part of deposits, hit ordinary citizens the most painfully. In addition, on the eve of the exchange, many enterprises and institutions received money to pay wages almost exclusively in large denominations. Due to the lack of small bills, the savings banks did not exchange money for pensioners. There was a threat that not everyone will be able to exchange money in the three days that have been released.
The government was forced to revise the terms of the exchange of large bills twice. After each postponement, the government's monetary gain from the exchange decreased. Immediately after the exchange, it amounted to about 10 billion rubles, in March - 8 billion rubles, and by April it decreased to 4 billion rubles.
Nevertheless, the exchange of money created certain opportunities for stabilizing money circulation. However, this last chance for the ruble to recover was thwarted by further steps by the government.
Although in April 1991 the nominal money supply was minimal, the breakdown in the stabilization of monetary circulation occurred precisely in April, that is, at the time of the price reform, which was supposed to consolidate the results of the January exchange of banknotes.
As a result of this reform, state retail prices rose by about three times, the purchasing power of the population was reached, and cooperative and bazaar prices fell. However, at the same time, the government agreed to pay significant monetary compensation. As a result, the printing press was started and no longer stopped.
The main reasons for the significant increase in the emission of money in June-September were the beginning of the collapse of the USSR and the refusal of the former republics and now sovereign states to transfer funds to the union budget.
Under these conditions, President Mikhail Gorbachev violated the Union legislation, taking 93 billion rubles from the State Bank in July bypassing the Supreme Soviet. for the maintenance of the army and the state apparatus. As a result, inflation, which began even before perestroika and accompanied every step of it, grew into hyperinflation due to the gigantic expansion of the money supply. The price reform did not change the state of affairs in the consumer market. The growth of the deficit outpaced the rise in prices. The government was counting on the exact opposite effect. The Cabinet of Ministers believed that, taking into account the payment of government compensations, it would be able to reduce the living standard of the population by 40%, bringing it closer to the level of 1978-1979. In this case, in the opinion of our ministers, in order to maintain the standard of living they are accustomed to, the population will withdraw 2 thousand rubles from savings books. in year. This will absorb the increase in savings of recent years and the economy will return to the non-inflationary 1971-1973 years.
The reform, which went down in history under the name “Pavlovskaya”, hit the wallets of thousands of people who kept rubles both “under the mattress” and in Sberbank. Were "multiplied by zero" fortunes of ten, fifteen, or even hundreds of thousands, accumulated for decades. Over the course of one day, millions of Russians became beggars, completely losing their trust in the state for several years.
Valentin Pavlov was the last and probably the most unpopular finance minister and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. First, because he carried out a confiscatory monetary reform. And secondly, he spent it at a time when the regime was already safe to scold.
The last Soviet reform was a turning point in Russian economic history - the era of confiscations began. The liberalization of prices in 1992, voucher privatization, and August 1998 deprived citizens of their savings over and over again.
Moreover, the reform took on a frightening character also due to its unexpectedness.