Malafeev Sergey Nikolaevich Financial University. Silvestrov Sergey Nikolaevich
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Date and place of birth
Education
- Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov (in 1972 he graduated with honors from the Faculty of Economics)
- graduate School of Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov
Further training and internships: Budapest University of Economics, Academy of Public Administration (FRG), Ekol Normal (France), European Institute of Social Relations and Labor (Italy), Academy of National Economy, World Bank Institute.
Professional activity
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance;
Academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee of the CPSU (now the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation);
International Center for Social and Labor Problems under the Ministry of Labor;
Administration of the President of the Russian Federation;
Financial and industrial group "Interros";
Council of the Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation;
Oil and gas company ITERA;
Institute of International Economic and Political Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
Teaching activities
professor of the Department of Theory and Practice of State Regulation of Market Economy of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RINHiGS);
professor, Department of Economics, Moscow State University Lomonosov.
Research activity
Silvestrov S.N. - A prominent Russian economist.
Scientific specialization and professional interests:geoeconomics, current trends in world economic development and their impact on the economic functions of the state, economic policy, international monetary and financial relations and capital migration, monetary policy, fiscal regulation, regional economy, emerging markets, liberalization and restructuring of natural monopolies .
Silvestrov S.N. actively participates and directs scientific research on current issues of the modern Russian economy, in the formation of new areas of research, in the practical work of managing large (including interstate) projects.
In 2010, for his great contribution to the development of the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020, he was thanked by the President of the Russian Federation.
Among those implemented over the past five years under the leadership of S.N. Silvestrova of projects and research programs - Targeted program of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences "Information and analytical support for the activities of the RAS"; a joint project of the Russian Academy of Sciences and EuropeAid - “Science and Technology Commercialization under the EU-Russia Cooperation Program”; applied developments implemented as part of the research and expert analysis of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), various ministries and departments of the Russian Federation.
Member of the scientific and dissertation councils at FSBEI HPE “Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation” (Financial University), the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation (RANEPA), at the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Over 300 works in the open press and materials for official use (including twelve monographs and brochures) were published. In the open press in Russian and foreign publications - about 200 publications.
Member of the scientific and editorial board of the Ekonomika publishing house, member of the editorial boards and editorial boards of the magazines Vlast (until 1999 - deputy chief editor), Man and Labor, (until 1998), Economic Strategies, Inaestitions and innovations ”,“ Insurance business ”,“ Securities market ”,“ Business contacts ”,“ World of changes ”.
Membership in state and public organizations:
member of the expert council of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Council of the Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,
deputy Chairman of the Expert Council of the Committee on Social Policy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation
member of the Scientific Council under the Security Council of the Russian Federation;
member of the Analytical Council of the Center for Economic Conditions under the Government of the Russian Federation;
member of the expert council on economics of the Higher Attestation Commission;
member of the coordinating council of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences for Forecasting;
member of the expert council of the Russian Humanitarian Science Foundation (RHF).
new course - revolutionary reform
lessons of the past
like a memory of the future
(similarity and distinction of crises)
Sergey Nikolaevich sipvestrov
professor, Vice-Rector for Scientific and Innovative Development, Financial University E-mail: [email protected]
Annotation. The article provides a detailed analysis of two crises in the US economy - 1929-1933. and the crisis that began in 2007. The author identifies similarities and differences, the causes of the crises, traces the chronology of crisis events and their consequences.
keywords: crisis, banking panic, default, economic disaster.
Lessons from the past as a memory of the future (similarities and differences of crises)
SERGEY NIKoLAEvicH SILvESTRov
Chairman of the Board, PhD of Economics, Professor, Vice President for Research and Innovation Development Finance University, Honored Economist of the Russian Federation
Abstract This paper contains a detailed analysis of the two crises in the U.S. economy of 1929-1933 and the crisis that began in 2007. The author reveals the similarities and differences, causes of the crises, and also traces the chronology of crises "events and their consequences. Keywords: crisis, banking panic, default, economic disaster .
Experiencing and observing another crisis, you involuntarily recall the Great Depression and ask yourself whether a repetition of an economic catastrophe of such proportions is possible.
For that brief three-year period from the fall of 1929 until the spring of 1933, the real gross domestic product of the world's leading economies declined by more than twenty-five percent. Almost a quarter of men of working age were left without work. Commodity prices fell by 50%, consumer goods - by 30%, while reducing by almost a third of wages. In the United States, bank lending is reduced by 40% and, ultimately, the banking system is collapsing. Almost all large sovereign debtors among developing countries and in Europe, including Germany (the third, according to the scale of that time, world economy), fall into insolvency. Economic chaos has affected everyone, even
the most remote edge of the planet. Since then, in peacetime, there has not been a similar period of economic turmoil, which would be close in scale to such a cataclysm.
Depression 1929-1933 is the sum and sequence of a number of interrelated crises. The recession of the German economy in 1928, the collapse of American financial markets in 1929, the ensuing credit crisis and banking panic in 1930; the practical collapse of European finance - for various reasons, including as a result of the UK abandoning the gold standard in 1931 and the cessation of American investment.
Numerous episodes of banking, credit, currency crises, multiplied by the inconsistent and often erroneous actions of the financial authorities of different countries, coinciding, led to an all-encompassing global economic crisis.
S. N. Silvestrov LESSONS OF THE PAST AS A REMEMBER OF THE FUTURE
All events, only on a superficial glance of a long history, can be found analogues in the modern crisis, which began in 2007 in the United States.
The first event. The Mexican peso crisis in 1994 resembles the recession of the German economy in 1928, triggered by the sudden cessation of US capital inflows. In the late 1980s - early 1990s. Mexico, like Germany in the 1920s, attracted large short-term dollar loans in a period of growth. When the United States sharply raised interest rates in 1994, debt servicing went up. In just one year, it was necessary to pay $ 25 billion with foreign exchange reserves of $ 6 billion. For Mexico, as for Germany in 1929, it turned out to be difficult to continue servicing debt obligations. The country faced a choice - deflation and insolvency (default), the second after default in 1982. In the context of increased financial globalization, the debt crisis could quickly spread to other countries.
With the similarity of general adverse conditions, there are, of course, differences in consequences. The scale of the Mexican economy is less than the German one of those years. Mexico's share in the global economy in the 1990s three times less than the share of Germany in the late 1920s, and the structure is peripheral.
The biggest difference is crisis management. The US Treasury Department, led by Robert Rubin, appointed shortly before these events, is developing a detailed plan submitted to B. Clinton. It was originally intended to use the Reserve Fund of the Ministry of Finance, created by F. Roosevelt, but Congress did not approve the decision. The bankruptcy of Mexico was prevented by the quick assistance in the form of an emergency loan of $ 50 billion, backed by IMF guarantees. In addition, Mexico freely devalued the peso, which managed to regain confidence.
Germany in 1929, shortly after a difficult period of hyperinflation, was left alone and no one could help her. Bound by the rules of the gold standard, which are respected despite the worsening situation, Germany sacrifices economic stability in order to maintain the stability of the Reichsmark.
Another, very clear parallel to the crisis of the 1930s. can be found in the 2000 stock market downturn. Both stock market crises are a consequence of
bloated due to the economic boom of the “financial balloon”. Valuation of shares, especially high-tech companies, has lost any connection with economic reality. They turned out to be extremely overestimated, according to rough estimates - by 30-40%.
And in one case and in another case after their sale, it becomes obvious that the price increase was the result of a significant degree of the actual coincidence of interests, and in many cases a collusion of corporate management and exchange speculators.
In both cases, the nature of the losses is similar. First, the capitalization level of high-tech companies falls - by almost 40% in the first year, calculated in relation to GDP.
Following this, there is a sharp decline in investment. The reaction of the authorities is almost the same. In the first year after the collapse of 1929, the Fed's interest rates are reduced from 6 to 2%, in 2000 - from 6.5 to 6%, by the summer of 2001 - to 3.75, and then to 2%.
Banking panic in 1931-1933 began with the Bank of US bankruptcy and in many ways resembles the financial crisis that began in 2007. It all started with doubts about the reliability of financial intermediaries and a decrease in confidence in complex banking products and, ultimately, their producers - banks.
For two years, waves of banking panic swept through the United States, and depositors withdrew their money from banks. The current crisis is also provoked by a massive onslaught on the financial system. However, the significant difference is that now the consequences are much larger, since not only individuals, investors, but also bankers and large investors seek to save their savings. They withdraw their funds from various financial sources and institutions, commercial and investment banks, investment and other funds, hedge funds, from all special-purpose organizations artificially designed for over-the-counter transactions that multiplied in the zero years. Each financial institution, to one degree or another, was at risk of insolvency.
The modern banking crisis is more virulent than the banking panic of 1931-1933. In the 30s. most depositors needed to line up to collect their savings. Nowadays, huge amounts of money
The world of the new economy
new course - revolutionary reform
can be moved with one click on the "mouse". Moreover, the world financial system in terms of quantitative indicators has exceeded the global GDP by many times and represents a complex structure of heterogeneous interconnected elements. Destabilization - one of them - has unpredictable consequences in terms of scale and depth.
Channels and instruments of influence are more diverse, and their effect on the global economy is much stronger. Most banks and financial conglomerates rely on access to sources of large short-term borrowing. Large multinational banks are now more vulnerable than in previous crises. Due to these circumstances, the crisis of large banks multiplies across borders, spreads quickly and acts more destructively. This was vividly demonstrated by the episodes of the failure of AIG and Leman Brothers.
Central banks seek to compensate for losses and losses. In 1931-1933 The Federal Reserve stood by and did not intervene. This caused the bankruptcy of hundreds of banks and led to a credit crisis. Lending volumes decreased by 40%. During the last crisis, central banks and ministries of finance, taking into account the lessons of history, reacting with unprecedented consistency, poured huge amounts of liquidity and temporarily provided capital to banks.
There is no doubt that without these measures the world financial system could collapse again. On the other hand, the final results of the crisis and the anti-crisis measures taken by central banks have not been fully manifested. One thing is clear: the financial crisis, similar in scope to the crisis of the thirties, was prevented.
And one more event. The European financial crisis of 1931 also has a modern counterpart in the crisis of emerging markets in 1997-1998. However, in this case there are distinctive essentially new features.
In 1931, the loss of confidence in European banks and currencies forced Germany and the countries of Central Europe to control capital flows, introduce protectionist measures and stop payments on their debts. This resulted in a drop in confidence and a banking crisis, an epidemic of fear and forced Britain to abandon the gold standard.
In 1997, a series of similar crises in financial markets affected Asian countries. Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea were forced to stop servicing their debt obligations. The exchange rate of most Asian currencies against the dollar collapsed, finally undermining confidence in the securities markets in emerging markets. In 1998, a partial default took place in Russia, and two years later in Argentina. And again, the difference is in the scale of economies affected by various crises. In 1931, the European economy was only half the size of the American one. In 1997, defaulted countries' GDP was only a quarter of US GDP.
Historical comparisons are extremely useful for anticipating recurring events and making political decisions. However, in most cases they are not entirely accurate.
Nevertheless, the danger of an economic catastrophe of 1929-1933. far exceeded the total effect of the debt crises of the 19801990s, the financial crises of 1997-1998, the stock market crises of 2000-2001, the price crisis of 2000 and the financial and economic crisis of 2007-2010, followed by a series of debt crises and prolonged ongoing stagnation in the group of developed countries.
There is a feature in the pro-crisis development of the modern global economy that may have mitigated the effects of the crises of the last decade. In the 30s, the results of overlapping and coincidence of different in nature and place crises converged. And they were realized in a short time interval of 2-3 years, and their concentrated impact on the global monetary and financial system caused the Great Depression. The world emerged from economic failure, according to various estimates, for more than a decade and was plunged into numerous local military conflicts and the ensuing world war.
Between the recent crises, significant time intervals can be noted. Although the frequency of crises in different segments of the economy, their duration and complexity of exit, as observations show, have increased markedly. The danger of a resonant effect of the coincidence of heterogeneous crises in time and place is also growing. The threat of a deeper economic crisis remains real.
S N. Silvestrov LESSONS OF THE PAST AS A REMEMBER OF THE FUTURE
For many years, some believed and continue to believe that an economic cataclysm like the Great Depression could have been the result of unrecognizable and objective processes that the government could not resist. Numerous studies describe depression as an economic mess, an earthquake, and compare it with the flood and unforgiving fortune. At the same time, there are recurring crises that are inherent in financial systems, and the risks of their occurrence are intensified with globalization on the basis of liberalization of international economic relations. And they are pushing the development of the global economy towards the search for new forms and the creation of agreed methods and tools for global regulation.
It is also important to emphasize that the Great Depression and modern crises are not only a consequence of the contradictions or vices of modern capitalism. An attentive observer will notice that large-scale crises are often the result of erroneous economic policies or unjustified assessments of the real situation and, as a consequence, the adoption of erroneous decisions on risk mitigation and crisis management methods.
Well, besides the description of the sequence of events in the financial markets in 1929-1933. and studying the Roosevelt crisis management programs, can explain the depth and scale of the Great Depression? One of the explanations is in the post-war policy of the leading states. The decisions taken at the Paris Peace Conference (January 1919 - January 1920) obligated countries that did not recover from the effects of the war to bear a heavy debt burden. Germany was supposed to pay reparations (totaling 132 billion gold marks or $ 33 billion) to France and the United Kingdom alone in the amount of $ 12 billion, France owed $ 7 billion to US and British war loans, and the UK increased US debt to 4 billion When converted to modern dollars, this means that Germany had a debt of 2.4 trillion dollars, France - 1.4 trillion, and the UK - 800 billion dollars. Serving such huge debt obligations absorbed the energy and attention of financial authorities. Debts themselves became latent factors that prepared the breakdown of the global financial system.
The second explanation is the behavior of central banks and financial authorities in general. For many years, they sought to mitigate some of the economic consequences and political mistakes associated with reparation payments and military debts. However, at the same time, another mistake was made in coordinating the economic policy of the 1920s. Such a mistake was the decision to return to the gold standard.
Gold reserves at this time correspond to the established prices, their distribution after the war is extremely uneven, with a clear imbalance in favor of the United States. The problem was complicated by the return of Europe to the gold standard with inadequate exchange rates. As a result of imperial ambitions, Great Britain, in its desire to maintain the position of the pound and its rivalry with France, sets the overvalued pound. “In the 1920s British growth was hindered by a deflationary policy aimed at lowering wages and supporting the pound, revalued at the pre-war exchange rate. The aim was to restore the role of London as an international financial center and serve the interests of the class of rentier holding securities denominated in sterling. As a result, unemployment remained high and export competitiveness fell. Britain’s GDP and exports were the worst in Europe, ”Angus Madison describes the choice of British policy that intensified the crisis in Europe.
The quartet of central banks (USA, UK, Germany and France) for some time managed to maintain relative stability in the global economy and financial relations. But this result was achieved only if the Fed kept a low interest rate and supported the German economy through borrowing. This system originally contained seeds of self-destruction.
Accepted conditions led to other unforeseen consequences. Ultimately, a low interest rate policy in support of international monetary and financial relations accelerated the emergence and expansion of the “financial balloon” in the US stock markets. Already in 1927, the Federal Reserve was forced to work in two mutually exclusive directions - to provide liquidity to Europe and to control speculative operations on stock exchanges.
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S.N. Sylvester lessons of the past as a remembrance of the future
As a result, none of the goals have been achieved. The experiments of President G. Hoover to curb speculators turned into indecision, but were sufficient to stop the provision of loans, so necessary to Germany.
The deep recession in Central Europe was the result of these actions. They gave rise to deflationary processes throughout the global economy. In the end, in the last week of 1929 the “balloon” bursts and now the USA is falling into a long recession. So the American “financial balloon”, having absorbed international loans, introduces the economies of Germany and other countries into a crisis. And his breakdown is shocking the American economy.
It can be assumed that the efforts spent on supporting an unreliable monetary and financial system, still based on an unreliable gold standard, would inevitably lead to a financial crisis in one form or another. But this did not create rigid predestination for the crisis to develop into a global catastrophe. Financial crises were not a new phenomenon either for Europe or for American financiers. By that time, almost a century of experience in crisis manifestations in the economy had already been accumulated. Markets, and especially financial ones, controlled by an "invisible hand", function normally until the economy enters a crisis. In the new situation, agents operating in financial markets, as has been noticed, are losing their guiding lines and are falling into a chaotic state. Unreasonably irrational and even panic actions are typical characteristics of their behavior during a crisis. In such circumstances, to restore equilibrium, it is necessary not only the “hand”, but, first and foremost, the head and institutions that can carry out intellectual regulation.
Since 1929, the global financial system has been in the hands of people involved in the leadership of the Fed, whose ideas did not meet the requirements of the current state of affairs in the global economy. They firmly adhered to the opinion shared by US President G. Hoover that the US economy would automatically return to equilibrium and there was no need to counteract deflationary processes, which would inevitably go away on their own. The role of politicians in the slide to crisis is well illustrated by the duet of two presidents. G. Hoover and his administration are the authors of many ideas.
and the practical initiatives that Franklin Roosevelt was able to implement for the benefit of restoring not so much the economic balance as faith in its possibility. This did not require cooperation, but the demarcation with the predecessor and its erroneous economic ideology for this moment. And only then, purposefully and largely intuitively, it was possible to restore the confidence of the majority of the population and begin the economic recovery, which dragged on for years.
As a result, the main debt of the central bank was not fulfilled. The central bank did not act as a lender, as it is assumed in extreme circumstances, to reinforce the banking system at the time of the first signs of panic.
Unlike the Fed leadership, the Bank of England and the Reichsbank were ready to actively intervene, but both experienced a chronic shortage of gold and had no room for maneuver. And under pressure from the dying gold standard until 1931, they were forced to remain observers of developing deflation in the United States. The Bank of France had a gold reserve, but due to political contradictions and an underestimation of the situation, the financial authorities did not take the necessary measures to smooth out the crisis.
Thus, what began as a hidden recession in the United States and Germany has grown into a global economic crisis. The great depression, in addition to objective factors, is the result of a lack of intellectual will, blind follow, misunderstanding of economic processes by decision makers, political recklessness and narrow-mindedness, as well as greed and selfishness.
Literature
1. Maddison, Agnus. The World Economy, Vol. I: Historical Statistics, OECD. Development Center Studies, 2006. Table 1b & Table 1c. P. 424-447.
2. Ahamed, Liaquat. Lords of Finance. The Bankers, who broke the World. L: The Penguin Press, 2009. Ch. 23. P. 545.
3. Greenspan Alan. Age of shocks. Problems and prospects of the global financial system. M .: Alpina Business Books, 2008.S. 164.
4. Maddison, Angus, Ibidem, P. 104.
5. Rothbard Murray. The Great Depression in America. M .: IRISEN "Thought", 2012. S. 454-459.
Silvestrov Sergey Nikolaevich — doctor of Economics, Professor, Honored Economist of the Russian Federation, Full State Advisor to the Second Class, Full Member (Academician) of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences (RANS).
Date and place of birth
Education
- Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov (in 1972 he graduated with honors from the Faculty of Economics),graduate School of Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov
Further training and internships: Budapest University of Economics, Academy of State Employees (Germany), Ekol Normal (France), European Institute of Social Relations and Labor (Italy), Academy of National Economy, World Bank Institute.
Professional activity
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance;
Academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee of the CPSU (now the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation);
International Center for Social and Labor Problems at the Ministry of Labor;
Administration of the President of the Russian Federation;
Financial and industrial group "Interros";
Council of the Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation;
Oil and gas company ITERA;
Institute of International Economic and Political Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
Teaching activities
- - Professor, Department of Economics, Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov.
Professor of the Department of Theory and Practice of State Regulation of Market Economics of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation (RINHiGS);
Research activity
Silvestrov S.N. - A prominent Russian economist.
Scientific specialization and professional interests: geoeconomics, current trends in world economic development and their impact on the economic functions of the state, economic policy, international monetary and financial relations and capital migration, monetary policy, fiscal regulation, regional economy, problems of emerging markets, liberalization and the problems of restructuring natural monopolies.
Silvestrov S.N. actively participates and directs scientific research on current issues of the modern Russian economy, in the formation of new areas of research, in the practical work of managing large (including interstate) projects.
In 2010, for his great contribution to the development of the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020, he was thanked by the President of the Russian Federation.
Among the projects and research programs implemented over the past five years under the direction of S. N. Silvestrov are the Target Program of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences “Information and Analytical Support for the Activities of the RAS”; a joint project of the Russian Academy of Sciences and EuropeAid - “Science and Technology Commercialization under the EU-Russia Cooperation Program”; applied developments implemented as part of the research and expert analysis of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), various ministries and departments of the Russian Federation.
Member of the scientific and dissertation councils at FSBEI HPE “Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation” (Financial University), the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation (RANEPA), at the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Over 300 works in the open press and materials for official use (including twelve monographs and brochures) were published. In the open press in Russian and foreign publications - about 200 publications.
Member of the scientific and editorial board of the Ekonomika publishing house, member of the editorial boards and editorial boards of the magazines Vlast (until 1999 - deputy chief editor), Man and Labor, (until 1998), Economic Strategies, Inaestitions and innovations ”,“ Insurance business ”,“ Securities market ”,“ Business contacts ”,“ World of changes ”.