Economic policy in the 90 years. Economic Reforms in Russia (1990s)
In 96, for the first time in three years, fellow citizens felt - what is the rapid increase in prices (10-100% per week), the purchase of food products "in reserve", queues in stores, depreciation bank depositsbankruptcy of the banks themselves. The unfamiliar word "default" has become quite understandable and familiar. There was talk of nationalization banking institutions, large firms, almost about a dictatorship.
It is believed that the crisis began on August 17, with the decision of the government of Sergei Kiriyenko on a moratorium on paying debts to foreign creditors, as well as with the expansion of the currency corridor to 9.5 rubles per dollar. However, most analysts say something else: on August 17, only an abscess that matured a long time ago opened, and the information that had been known to elected politicians and economics for quite some time became public.
So, 1996. Black Tuesday was safely forgotten. The dollar is taken into the corridor, and the currency is quietly sold on each corner at a price of about 6 rubles per standard unit. The State Duma election campaign has just ended, and preparations for the presidential election are in full swing. The standard of living is gradually rising, the majority of the population receives wages on time, and trade is developing. But at the same time, production volumes at domestic enterprises continue to fall, which is not surprising - due to the low cost of the dollar, imports are quite accessible to the masses, and there is no reason to say that it is almost always more beautiful and better than our products. Debt of enterprises also continues to grow, and no one seems to worry about it. And loans continue to come from abroad, no one seems to even think about the sources of repayment, the state maintains an appearance of stability and even a slight rise.
The first signal for everyone was to sound in the fall of 1996. Boris Yeltsin with difficulty said that he was very seriously ill, a complex operation was ahead. Opposition happily preparing for early elections. And the exchanges are completely calm. The ruble is not getting cheaper, the value of shares of enterprises remains stable. But in the West, where the economy is much more stable than ours, serious fluctuations in stock prices occur even when it turns out that the US president is also a man during working hours; The Dow Johnson index drops immediately, and everyone is talking about a possible crisis. In our country, the news of the President’s illness does not affect the economy at all. Is it weird? Sure! But why did not one of the economists ask the question - why is all this happening? Why is our economy so stable? Now we can answer this question: but because it was FULLY regulated, but not by administrative, but by pseudo-economic methods, when huge funds received from foreign loans were spent to support the stock price and the national currency.
In 1997, the President seems to be recovering. Young reformers are coming to the government, who are beginning to reform all the hardships. First we transfer officials to the Volga, assembled from imported components, and more expensive Mercedes, sometimes they collect pop stars, and persuade them to pay taxes, then they re-denominate because in Russia de growth has begun, and old money with such growth did not fit.
And the truth is - growth begins. It manifests itself in a very strange way - for some reason, the value of shares in a number is increasing russian enterprisesmainly, of course, extractive industries. Again, no one has any questions - why, say, Gazprom shares so rise in price when oil prices continue to fall on the world market? But oil is perhaps the only product whose trade brought real profit to Russia, and a decrease in budget revenues from the sale of “black gold” clearly should have made a serious breach in it. But the government continues to claim that difficult times are over, and we are entering an era of prosperity for Russia. Only for some reason, wage and pension delays are renewing with a new force. And the population, which most recently "chose the heart," again begins to murmur. Industrial events did not work, workers prefer not to pay wages, but no one is going to go bankrupt. It turns out a strange picture: nothing works, but the citizens of the country live, on the whole, not bad, but here the growth has been outlined.
Perhaps the last wide gesture of the government during the era of the "new stagnation" was the campaign to repay pension debts at the end of 1997. It looked quite convincing: found reserves, and were able to immediately give everything. Officially; in practice, not all and not all. As it turned out, the money to pay off the debts was simply printed, and the issue of unsecured money only significantly increased the pressure on the stability of the ruble, but did not solve macroeconomic problems.
So, to summarize under the period of relative stability of 1996-1997. This time, like no other, is suitable for the term “virtual economy”. Indeed, the Russian economy has turned into a kind of artificial reality, which had little to do with the true state of affairs. It cannot be said that the creation of such an economy had only negative aspects. After all, jobs were maintained, albeit with minimal earnings. As a result, we had social stability, which would be difficult to achieve in the event of mass bankruptcies, mass and free sale of enterprises to private hands, etc. But, unfortunately, the peaceful coexistence of socialist and capitalist economic models within the framework of one society is impossible, which led to an imbalance.
The events of 1998 can be perceived as the latest attempts to keep the economic situation in the same direction. Despite the fact that the stock price of Russian enterprises began to fall catastrophically, the ruble continued to be kept at the same, unrealistic, but such a desirable level - about 6 rubles per dollar. Change of governments, negotiations on obtaining new loans, writing of a beautiful new program, which obviously no one was going to carry out after the demonstration to Western lenders - we know what this led to. And the President’s statement the day before the announcement of the devaluation of the ruble that devaluation is impossible in principle, completely deprived him of confidence even of those who continued to harbor some illusions about his competence.
The growth of the dollar, which led to a sharp rise in price of goods of both imported and domestic production. Complete distrust of Russia as a partner in the global arena. Real prospects of bankruptcy of the country. A serious crisis of the banking system and the collapse of the most seemingly unshakable monsters, such as Inkombank and others. And most importantly - the impossibility of trying to correct the situation by the previous methods. The state, collecting huge loans around the world, spent them on maintaining the remnants of the old, expecting that they would give new, viable seedlings. Alas, the miracle did not happen, and as a result we had to start almost everything all over again, but in much more difficult conditions.
Russian economy in the 90s of the twentieth century
Parameter Name | Value |
Topic of the article: | Russian economy in the 90s of the twentieth century |
Category (thematic category) | History |
Social forces that initiated at the turn of the 80-90s. transformations in the Russian economy, initially intended to complete the transformational transition in two relatively short steps: the first to carry out quick and fundamental reforms of property and the economic mechanism, the second - the equally quick “inclusion” of market incentives, which almost immediately and automatically leads to a recovery of the economy and an increase in the level of of life. Numerous forecasts were made and promises were made that dramatic changes can be made in a few months, in ʼʼ500 daysʼʼ, that overcoming the recession and improving living conditions will occur to the “closest fall” and so on.
In fact, the transformational changes in the Russian economy turned out to be extremely complex, contradictory and long-lasting, they took place in conditions of political upheaval and the collapse of the state. In the first half of the 90s. the transformation of the economy was carried out already in the post-Soviet economic and political realities. The main element of the measures taken at this stage was privatization (mainly in check form), as a result of which the share of state-owned basic funds fell from 91% (at the beginning of 1992).) To 42% (in 1995 ᴦ.); in the share capital of the state by mid-1995 ᴦ. amounted to 11%. In the course of changing the system of economic management and the economic mechanism, the idea of \u200b\u200b“cutting off” the state from the economy was realized. The role of the dominant economic ideology has been taken by the concepts of monetarism borrowed from abroad, which limit the functions of the state by regulation money supply in circulation (these concepts were developed in relation to the conditions of a highly developed market economy with a well-functioning monetary mechanism and long-term trends of economic growth).
In practice, Russian vulgarized pseudo-monetarism led to chaos in the economy resulting from shock ʼʼ liberalization ’of prices and subsequent hyperinflation (in January 1992 ᴦ. Consumer prices increased by 245%, by the end of 1992 26 26 times, then during 1993ᴦ. 4 times, in 1995 ᴦ. - 2.3 times). The collapse of the national currency led to the dollarization of the economy. In fact, inflationary confiscation of the savings of the population and inflationary redistribution of public wealth was carried out, which, combined with an almost free distribution state property new owners (the monetary value of the funds of enterprises turned out to be underestimated many times with respect to their real value, sometimes many thousands of times) and inflation-concessional lending to commercial banks - it led to the implementation of some historical analogue of the initial accumulation of capital. In 2004, when summing up the results of privatization, it was estimated that the state budget received about $ 9 billion from the sale of privatized property and facilities; for comparison, it can be noted that in Bolivia, where privatization was also carried out in the 90s, more than $ 90 billion was received, despite the fact that the country's economy is much lower than the Russian one and a much smaller share of the public sector has been privatized.
The robbery of the population was continued further through the criminal activities of private “funds”, banks and “financial pyramids”. During this period, there was a consolidation of those social forces in whose interests changes were made in the economy. This is nomenclature bureaucracy, which has doubled quantitatively and carried out “the conversion of power into property”, the administration of enterprises (on average 5% of those employed in enterprises) and criminal circles.
By the end of the 90s. certain positive changes have taken place in the Russian economy. Basically, the saturation of the consumer market was achieved, the degree of computerization increased significantly, the service sector developed, some elements of the market infrastructure arose. The opportunities for the manifestation of economic initiative and entrepreneurial activity have expanded. At the same time, these positive shifts were depreciated by the progressive destruction of the production, scientific, technical and, in general, civilizational potential of the country.
During the “reform” period, a more than twofold (according to official data) decline in production volumes occurred, and in competitive high-tech science-intensive industries on the world market, it decreased by 6-8 times. Along with a decrease in volume indicators, the efficiency of the economy sharply decreased: the energy, capital and material productivity of production fell one and a half to two times with a one and a half-fold decrease in labor productivity. The absolute decline in population continued (despite the influx of a significant number of refugees), and the average life expectancy decreased. At the beginning of 2000 ᴦ. incomes of more than 50% of the population did not reach the subsistence level; this level was more than 10 times the size of the minimum salary.
For the period 1991-2000 ᴦ.ᴦ. headcount in scientific research and development decreased by 45%; the number of patent applications has more than halved. According to UN experts, only direct annual losses of Russia due to a brain drain can be estimated at $ 3 billion, and taking into account lost profits - at $ 50-60 billion. At the same time, the United States received annually due to “import” of scientists and specialists up to $ 100 billion of additional gross product growth; half the increase in the number of American specialists in the field software carried out by emigrants from the former USSR. Over the past decade, total spending on research and development has decreased by 20 times. Reduced funding for education and health spawned degradation trends in these areas; their commercialization has led to increased social tension. Resource requirements for education were provided by less than 50%; state budget expenditures for health care in Russia amounted to $ 50 per year per person, while in the US - 3 thousand; in Western Europe - 1.5 thousand dollars. in year.
Agriculture was destroyed and the country's food security was lost; the share of imports in food products exceeded 60%. In the first half of the 90s alone, deliveries of trucks to agricultural enterprises decreased 36 times; grain harvesters - 1000 times. During the decade, large agricultural enterprises were almost everywhere liquidated and more than 44 thousand farmers went bankrupt; the remaining farmers, owning 5.2% of the land, produced only 1.9% of marketable products agriculture. From 1991 to 2000 ᴦ. grain production decreased by 1.8 times, milk - by 1.7, sugar beet - by 2.3 times; per capita milk consumption decreased from 382 to 226 liters per year, meat - from 75 to 48 kg, fish - from 20 to 9 kᴦ. The Russian food market has become a point of sale for poor-quality foreign products; 36% of imported whole milk products, 54% of meat products, 72% of canned foods did not meet the current quality standards in Russia.
An acute social problem has become the socio-economic differentiation of the population. Decile ratio, ᴛ.ᴇ. the ratio of the incomes of 10% of the most well-off population to the incomes of 10% of the least well-off part of it fluctuated in the 90s, according to official estimates, in the range from 14: 1 to 16: 1. Even these figures, which are clearly underestimated by many experts, indicate that the degree of socio-economic differentiation in Russia significantly exceeded foreign indicators (in the USA, the decile gap was, according to various estimates, 8-10: 1; in Western Europe - 5- 6: 1; in Sweden and China - 3-4: 1; it is considered socially dangerous if this coefficient exceeds 10: 1). Differences in the remuneration of workers and administration reached at least 20-30 times, industry differences - 10 times, regional - 11 times; To a large extent, the dependence of income on the real labor contribution has been lost. The number of officials' army increased, reaching 1340 thousand people by the beginning of 2000, which is more than double the corresponding figure for the entire Soviet Union (approximately 640 thousand people in the mid-80s). The cost of maintaining the state apparatus is only from 1995 to 2001 ᴦ. increased almost ten times (from 4.4 to 40.7 billion rubles).
According to the integrated human development index, Russia by the end of the 90s. ended up in the sixth dozen countries in the world. The demographic crisis began to acquire the features of a demographic catastrophe. The population of Russia declined annually by 800 thousand people; significantly reduced average life expectancy, which is primarily due to socio-economic factors. The need for a radical adjustment of the course of economic reforms became apparent.
The Russian economy in the 90s of the twentieth century - the concept and types. Classification and features of the category "Russian Economy in the 90s of the XX Century" 2017, 2018.
MOSCOW, Dec 26 - RIA News. The economic reforms that took place in Russia 20 years ago and were known as “shock therapy” were inevitable, but softened negative consequences for citizens it was quite real, according to direct respondents interviewed by the agency "Prime" of those events.
In their opinion, the repetition of the scenarios of the 1990s in the current Russian economy is impossible, since it has moved onto a market track, financial institutions have been formed, and the export of resources brings significant income. At the same time, experts emphasize the need to fight corruption and get rid of oil dependence in order to completely eliminate such options.
Dramatic liberization
In January 1992, Russia actually began the liberalization of prices for goods and services - they were exempted from state regulation practiced in the Soviet era. At first, a mark-up limit was set, but later it was canceled. At the same time, state control over prices for a number of socially significant goods and services (milk, bread, housing and communal services, etc.) is still preserved to one degree or another.
Price liberalization has become one of the most important links in the transition of Russia from a planned economy to a market one. However, it was not consistent with monetary policy; as a result, most enterprises were left without working capital.
The central bank was forced to turn on the printing press, which accelerated inflation to unprecedented levels - several thousand percent a year. This led to the depreciation of wages and incomes of the population, irregular payments of salaries, and the rapid impoverishment of citizens.
As a result, hyperinflation caused a drop in demand, which exacerbated the economic downturn, as well as a real contraction of the money supply, which was additionally burdened on servicing stocks and bonds that appeared as a result of the first wave of privatization. In addition, Soviet savings, which were not indexed, depreciated.
On the eve of the 20th anniversary of those dramatic events, the Prime Agency appealed to economists who occupied leading posts in economic departments in the 1990s and asked them to tell what became the prerequisite for reforms and whether it was possible to minimize losses for the economy and society.
How it all began
A brief overview of the reasons for the economic situation that has arisen before the arrival of a team of reformers led by Yegor Gaidar should begin with Stalin, said Andrei Nechaev, president of the Russian Finance Corporation and first minister of economy of the Russian Federation.
"He carried out a crazy and bloody collectivization, actually breaking the backbone of agriculture in an agricultural country, his associates continued this. As a result, the country was unable to feed itself. The maximum grain import was 43 million tons per year, and all the supply of livestock to large cities was based on livestock imported feed, "Nechaev recalls.
“But there was nothing to pay for import - the only demanded commercial product of the USSR was oil. Prices for it fell in 1986, they tried to survive for 2-3 years at the expense of foreign loans under Gorbachev’s reforms. As a result, the country's foreign debt in a short period of time exceeded 120 billion dollars, although back in the early 80s the Soviet Union had virtually no external debt. Five years later - in 1991 - the USSR was gone, "he states.
Evgeny Yasin, scientific adviser at the Higher School of Economics, former Minister of Economics of the Russian Federation, agrees with the idea that the experiment with the planned economy failed - the socialist system has completely lost the capitalist system. “It was not Russia that lost, but those who set up this experiment. It became clear that we had to switch to the Western model, which Japan seemed to be the most successful model at that time,” he recalls.
According to Yasin, liberalization and privatization were inevitable, and they needed to be carried out as quickly as possible, because it was clear that the reforms would definitely be painful. Only then could institutional construction begin. “In other countries there were similar imbalances, but not with such grave consequences as ours,” he added.
Chinese script failed
Critics of the reforms argue that, on the contrary, liberalization should have been preceded by privatization, and that by institutional reforms, the creation of a viable private sector. They also speak of the “Chinese path”, when the planned economy is partially preserved.
"The Chinese version with the slow introduction of market relations under tight state control in Russia of the 1991 model was not and could not be discussed," Nechaev is sure.
"If in the late autumn of 1991 and in January 1992 in a highly monopolized Soviet economy we would have been involved in the phased creation of market institutions that promote competition, Russia really could not survive the winter of 1992," he said.
According to him, the Latin American path with the construction of state capitalism does not lead to long-term success and promises enormous risks, for which the default of Argentina serves as an example.
The then president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, was also offered another alternative - forcible seizure of grain from peasants, commissioners in factories, a total card system. Fortunately, he did not go for it, recalls the first Minister of Economy of the Russian Federation.
A model of a soft, smooth transition to market rails could be implemented, but not in Russia in the early 90s, when the Soviet system completely collapsed, I am sure the chairman of the board of directors of MDM Bank, the former deputy head of the Ministry of Finance and the first deputy chairman of the CBR Oleg Vyugin. “The USSR authorities were already inactive, and the new ones started from scratch and did not function properly,” he explained.
Among the main costs of the privatization of those years, Vyugin called the principle "whoever came first, that and the owner." The problem is that the rules of the game were fuzzy and not enforced.
“Was privatization fair? Absolutely not. Could an alternative be found and postponed? Alas, no,” Nechayev argues. According to him, the state was already seized in the country, and it was necessary to try to somehow introduce this process into a legitimate framework.
The inevitability of shocks
In general, experts are sure that it was impossible to do without those reforms - otherwise Russia would have been waited by other, maybe even worse tests.
Any reduction in economic activity — which was evident in the early 1990s — leads to the fact that the burden of inflation and unemployment falls on the less protected sections of the population, argues Vyugin. The question of whether this could have been avoided, he calls rhetorical. “At that time and under those conditions, there was nothing else left, and nobody suggested anything else,” he states.
“If there weren’t those reforms, we wouldn’t have survived to the current crisis, against the backdrop of the general collapse of the Soviet system, there would have been other, perhaps even more serious upheavals,” Yasin, in turn, argues.
Perhaps something could have been done less painfully, somewhere to stretch the deadlines, but it was important to carry out these reforms in such a way that everyone was well, it would not work out in any way, he believes. “I remember - Gaidar then said that we must do what we are doing under the bloody dictatorship or under a charismatic leader. Fortunately, we didn’t have the first, but we were lucky with the second - we had Yeltsin with his charisma, which he ultimately donated, ”said Yasin.
"Could something have been done differently? Of course, yes. Probably, it was possible to introduce not a VAT, but a sales tax. Chubais considers his development of the so-called voucher privatization funds to be his serious mistake. But it seems to me that we did not make conceptual errors, but "Only those who do nothing are not mistaken in the nuances. In those terribly difficult months, Gaidar saved the country and really gave the foundations of a new market economy," Nechaev concluded.
The current economic authorities of Russia hold a similar opinion. “I think there was no way out. Only this way we could solve the food situation. Everything else dragged along with it. We could not do anything differently. Revolutionary decisions bring results due to some kind of primary impoverishment of fellow citizens. There are no other options ", - believes the deputy head of the Ministry of Finance Sergey Storchak.
It was impossible to stretch the decision in time, he is sure. "Leave prices controlled for certain socially significant goods? You see, these point solutions do not work anywhere. How much help did Egypt get with its control over prices? The hope that by controlling prices it is possible to ensure social stability - yes, in life maybe one politician, maybe two. Then everything returns to square one, "Storchak noted. For the growth of the economy, production growth is necessary, but under price control it is unlikely to ensure a decent increase in capacity, he added.
No repeat expected
According to interviewed economists, those reforms, despite their severity, have borne fruit. “The economic growth that we observed from the beginning of the 2000s until the crisis can be used as an argument that liberalization has borne fruit. Thanks to a set of reforms, in a short period of time, a huge country has moved from a state dictate to market economy, virtually without the participation of external capital, dispensing on its own, "says Vyugin.
Yasin also generally assesses the reforms of the early 90s as successful. "Now we are also going through difficult times, but there can be no talk of anything like that," he said.
In general, experts are sure that a repetition of the situation in the early 90s with a total deficit and hyperinflation in the current Russian economy is impossible.
Hyperinflation of the 90s was caused by the collapse of the system of the previous regime, Vyugin recalled. Now it is hardly possible, the institutions of a market economy and regulators are formed and firmly on their feet. "Of course, everything is man-made, but it is unlikely that the country's leadership and the current economic system will fail, "he said.
Another thing is a certain jump in inflation. It is possible if external shocks adversely affect the Russian economy, for example, oil prices collapse, then budgetary obligations will have to be cut and borrowed on foreign markets, which is very costly and problematic in the current situation, Vyugin believes.
“Then the situation was absolutely unique, incomparable in scale with any crises, oil decline, the collapse of the eurozone and other disasters that we fear,” recalls Yasin. “Now we live in a market economy, export energy, we have financial institutions. "The inflation that we are observing is also high for our economy - we need about 2-3% per year, then growth can be activated. But there will be no hundreds or thousands of percent per year."
Nechaev, for his part, believes that many risks of the late USSR remain in present-day Russia, including dependence on export of raw materials and a “terrifying level of corruption”. "We are still sitting on the same two pipes, it’s just that oil costs not $ 17, but 100-120, and you can behave a little differently," he stated.
At the beginning of 2000, instead of 47 thousand enterprises and organizations (the end of the 80s), 26 thousand large joint-stock companies (including those with state participation of over 75%), 124.6 thousand privatized enterprises in industry and the service sector (60% of the total), 270.2 thousand farms, 1.7 million private enterprises mainly in the field of market infrastructure (including 850 thousand small enterprises), about 27 thousand large agricultural enterprises, 110 thousand budget beneficiaries, 1315 commercial banks, which allows us to talk about a certain degree of the formed market multi-personality of the Russian economy.
In Russia, the decline in GDP production for 1991–96. amounted to 39%, including 6% in 1996. In 1997, GDP production amounted to 100.4%, in 1998 - 95%, in 1999 - 101.4%.
The depth of the decline in production in Russia is higher than the transformational one, which is due to a more deformed than in other post-socialist states, economic structure, 75% of which was in the defense industry and production of capital goods, inconsistent market reforms and mass production falling into the shadows (30-50% of GDP included in its officially registered sizes).
A decrease in the rate of decline, but a decline in production and GDP that continues for 9 years, leads to a decrease in the living standard of the population through the confiscation of accumulated incomes, inflation, an increase in unemployment (or its suppressed character caused by the “pupation” of enterprises) and a deepening of the differentiation of the population by the level of income income, as evidenced by both the growth of the C. Gini coefficient and the growth (until 1996) of the concavity of the M. Lorentz curve. the coefficient increased from 1: 1.8 in the 80s to 1:16 in 1995 and 1: 14.1 in 2000
The fall in real incomes of the Russian population in 1991–96 amounted to 30%, consumption of material goods and services decreased by 10%. In 1997, per capita real income grew by 2.5%, in 1998 - fell by 18%, in 1999 - by 15%.
The “discovery” of suppressed inflation and price liberalization led to high inflation in transition economies, the suppression of which is ensured the faster the higher the sequence and pace of market transformations (the Baltic countries, on the one hand, and Ukraine, on the other).
In Russia, the CPI has changed as follows:
1991 - 261%;
1992 - 2680%;
1993 - 1008%;
1994 - 324%;
1995 - 231%;
1996 - 123%;
1997 - 111%, 1st half of 1998 - 104.5%, 1998 - 184.4%, 1999 - 138%, 1st quarter of 2000 - 105.6%.
The transformational recession, overstated employment in a centrally controlled economy objectively determine the increase in unemployment during the transition period, the number of people who are not employed in the economy and looking for work in Russia in the first quarter of 2000 amounted to 9.2 million people, or 12.5% \u200b\u200bof the total economically active population in accordance with the methodology of the International Labor Organization, and the number of officially registered unemployed is 1.2 million people, or 2.7% of the economically active population.
The agrarian crisis and the complete monopoly of state ownership of the land complicate the formation of the diversity of the economic entities of the agrarian market and the solution of the agrarian problem escalating in all post-socialist countries. These factors are also superimposed on the need for land restitution, if not to specific owners (Baltic countries and Eastern Europe), then to repressed layers of the population (Cossacks).
Due to the concentration of entrepreneurial qualities, mainly among the nomenclature, which always sold them “in the shade,” in criminal forms, the initial accumulation of capital could not fail to take place in the forms of “nomenclature” privatization of state property or resources and non-payments.
The crisis of statehood, combined with the criminal forms of the realization of entrepreneurial qualities, leads to an increase in the criminal situation in the economy, the merger of state structures and shadow capital, which sets the task of strengthening economic security both internal and external. These processes are due to the fact that at critical moments for society, traditional ties are broken, and the value system is undergoing deformation. The dangerous tendency of the disintegration of society into atomic units and groups, waging a struggle of all against all in their narrowly selfish interests, is intensifying. The rules of the game are in effect, determined not so much by legal norms as by the real balance of forces and influence of corporate groups that seized control of the former state property. The primacy of power over law makes it difficult for an effective owner to appear. Instead, it is characterized by the figure of a temporary worker, striving for the earliest possible enrichment and transfer of capital abroad.
Hence the origins of the criminalization of economic relations and public life generally. Obviously, the way out of the economic crisis cannot be achieved only with the help of state structures, through reforms from above. The bureaucratic apparatus itself is highly susceptible to corruption. It is necessary to stimulate the processes of self-organization and self-development of society, that which determines the energy of development of the system.
High deficit of state budgets, leading to high monetary and credit emissions, generating inflation. The deficit of the state budget of Russia was:
1995 - 70 trillion. rub.;
1996 - 80.55 trillion. rub.;
1997 - 89 trillion. rub.;
1998 (plan) - 132.4 billion rubles, which was to be covered by the issuance of government securities and external borrowing, in fact - 143.7 billion rubles. (5.3% of GDP), 1999 - 101.3 billion rubles. (2.5% of GDP), in fact - 58 billion rubles.
Overestimation of the emerging at the beginning of the 20th century. trends of socialization and socialization of the economy led to high monopolization of all areas of the economy of the countries of real socialism, which necessitates demonopolization in the process of privatization and further functioning of state (state) enterprises based on the disaggregation and commercialization of their activities.
High tax pressure: taxes account for 22.2% of GDP, and together with social contributions - 33%, government spending - 45% of GDP, which exceeds the optimal limits according to the A. Laffer curve.
Investment Crisis - 1991–96 investments decreased by 72.1%, in 1997 - by 5%, 1998 - by 6.8%, 1999 - an increase of 2.7%.
Strengthening the criminal situation in the economy, the merger of state structures and shadow capital, which sets the task of strengthening economic security, both internal and external.
Despite the economic, social, national, geopolitical and other features of each of the post-socialist countries, the reaction of their economies to market transformations is completely normal, which indicates the intrinsic nature of market self-regulation of modern economic civilization.
The differences in the implementation of the general laws are due to differences in the starting economic situation: the level of development, dependence on international trade, the degree of advancement of economic reforms, and the level of economic imbalance. For example, Poland’s agriculture consisted of many small (too small to be effective) farms, the rest consisted of huge inefficient state farms and cooperatives, Hungary introduced a regulated market since 1968, and Czechoslovakia was tightly managed state economy until 1989, but in both there were fewer macroeconomic imbalances than in Russia and Poland. Thus, the current economic situation in each country influenced the particularities of the implementation of general laws.
The set of transformations tested in different countries that strengthen the market character of the economy allows us to distinguish the economic stages of the transition period:
Creation of political and institutional prerequisites;
Liberalization of the economy;
Macroeconomic (financial) stabilization;
Privatization
Structural adjustment.
The historical sequence of these stages in Russia was as follows:
1991–93 - the collapse of the administrative system, the formation of the foundations of a market economy;
1994–95 - stage inflationary, protectionist policies;
1996–97 - achievement of financial stabilization, restructuring of enterprises, stopping the decline in production;
1998–99 - financial crisis and its consequences.
By their nature, the transition economy is mixed, with a predominance of the public sector and collectivist forms of ownership. The following sectors are present in it:
State (in 1995 it covered 50% of fixed assets and produced a third of GDP, occupied 40% of the workforce, in 1999 the production of GDP in the public sector fell to 20%);
Private (individual and joint);
Corporate;
Small goods (shuttles, street trading, peasant farms);
The presence in the market economy of many economic entities representing various forms of ownership and forms of management, objectively determines the mixed nature of the transition economy, i.e. coexistence of both new and old sectors, which reflects the inertia of the economy.
Reforms of President Yeltsin
By the fall of 1991, the deficit had become appalling; hunger awaited in the country. President Yeltsin carried out great economic reforms in the early 90s. 20 century For this, he selected a team of young reformers - liberals, the main of whom were Gaidar and Chubais. Prime Minister Gaidar introduced the market in Russia, while Chubais introduced private ownership of company property. Gaidar conducted a campaign on price liberalization on January 1, 1992. He abolished the state pricing of all types of goods and resources and granted this right to manufacturing enterprises with the goal of leading the country out of the world of “planned absurdity” into the world of “market rationality”. Specialists expected a slight increase in prices, but no one expected such a large increase in prices. Prices increased by 26 times during 1992. Therefore, this economic policy is called "shock therapy." A similar policy was carried out in Poland, there was also a giant jump in prices. People went to the store like a museum to look at goods that they had not seen on the counter for many years, but they could not buy these goods because of the high price level. Subsequently, the salary level caught up with the price level and goods became available to the majority of the population. What is the reason for such a jump in prices in 1992? That monopolistic enterprises were able to raise prices for the purpose of their own enrichment, for example, iron and steel enterprises raised prices immediately by 14 times. A crisis of defaults arose. All enterprises at that time were still state-owned, and they could not be made bankrupt for debts. Inflation occurred, and citizens' savings were completely burned in the fire of this inflation.
To make enterprises responsible for their debts, including bankruptcy, and to introduce economic control over the labor of employees with bonus and fine, Chubais launched a campaign to privatize enterprises. The insolvency (bankruptcy) of an enterprise is the inability to repay debts to creditors. Bankruptcy proceedings usually end with the transfer of the company from the debtor's hands to the hands of creditors or the sale of the company at auction, when creditors receive debts from the proceeds of the auction. In personal terms, the fate of a bankrupt is deplorable, because no one else wants to deal with him in business. Russian privatization developed at an unprecedented rate: only in 1993-1994. 64 thousand enterprises were privatized, and in total for 1992-2000 - 135 thousand enterprises. At the first stage, enterprises were sold on privatization checks (vouchers). Voucher privatization was necessary in order to create an impression of social justice; moreover, at the time privatization began, there simply weren’t people in Russia who had enough money to privatize enterprises. In fact, those who were closer to power were appointed the oligarch, in this way Berezovsky, Khodorkovsky, Gusinsky, Abramovich and others became the oligarch. They got the factories in the property through various frauds. Each citizen received one check, he had to choose one of the privatized enterprises and invest this check in the privatization of this enterprise. Chubais promised that the price of each voucher will be equal to the price of the car, in fact, its price was often equal to a bottle of vodka. Entrepreneurial dealers appeared who bought them in huge quantities at such ridiculous prices from drunkards. Other people invested vouchers in unprofitable enterprises that they themselves worked for, subsequently these enterprises went bankrupt and the vouchers disappeared. Still others invested their vouchers in investment funds, for example, in the Perm fund, which were headed by swindlers, later these funds disappeared without a trace, and the vouchers disappeared. And only the fourth invested their vouchers in successful companies, for example, Gazprom and RAO UES, but still they did not wait for dividends and after a few years sold their shares to larger shareholders of these companies. As a result of the privatization company, several richest oligarchs appeared in Russia, especially in the oil and raw materials industries. Having bought vouchers for nothing, some businessmen managed to buy state enterprises on them. For example, Perm businessmen bought the Sport factory for vouchers, later the new owners took a foreign currency loan, supposedly to purchase imported equipment against the property of this factory, but the money taken on credit disappeared without a trace with the new owners, the factory ended up in debt. Nevertheless, the privatization campaign was necessary and useful. In the future, privatization was carried out for money, and not for vouchers. As a result of the devaluation (depreciation) of the ruble in 1998, the price of domestic goods decreased compared to imported ones, so domestic enterprises were able to squeeze foreign competitors on the domestic market. In the conditions of the economic crisis, private enterprises tried to reduce their costs and get rid of housing, hostels, rest homes, kindergartens, culture houses and hospitals, which brought them only losses.
VKontakte Facebook Odnoklassniki
American "shock therapy" led to an unprecedented collapse of Russia
Yeltsin’s “hard times” and its impact on the material situation and spiritual and moral condition of Russia have not yet received in our historical literature and in the media an objective, true and comprehensive assessment, although much has been written about this. It was not properly disclosed for the people which external and internal forces stood behind Yeltsin's “reforms” and determined their character and orientation. And this is understandable: the neoliberals who came to power are far from interested in the truth about how their policies led to the collapse of Russia. At one of the meetings at the Academy of Sciences, I happened to hear this opinion: "We are still waiting for such an XX Congress, from which the whole world is gasping."
What happened to Russia in the 90s? Let's start with the influence of an external factor. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise to power in Russia of a new "elite" led by B. Yeltsin were perceived by the ruling circles of the United States as the emergence of extremely favorable geopolitical conditions for the implementation of the idea of \u200b\u200ba global "American empire." To do this, they needed to solve another problem - to eliminate Russia from the American path as an important subject of world politics.
To this end, President Clinton’s administration has developed a new foreign policy doctrine called the “New Containment Policy” of Russia. In fact, it was a continuation of the Cold War policy with the use not of military, but of “indirect methods of influence” on Russia. Even employees of the German Foreign Ministry took this course of the United States with bewilderment. In the German officialdom of Internationale Politik, they wrote in October 2001: “There is now no reason for a strategy of“ new containment ”and“ negative impact in a light form ”or a strategy of“ selective cooperation ”with respect to Russia. Russia poses no danger. She is an important partner with, as before, a major impact on security in Europe and Asia. ”
Instead of following the wonderful principles of the Charter of Paris, signed by all European countries and the United States on November 27, 1990, after the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany and aimed at creating peace, security, global cooperation and prosperity in Europe, Washington chose to continue the course of "indirect destructive impact ”, this time in relation to Russia.
A special role in achieving the goals of the new American strategy was assigned to the Yeltsin regime, which was advised by more than 300 American advisers, among whom there were many CIA officers. The Russian press cited a lot of evidence about how Russian policy was managed during the “new containment” of Russia. Former Chairman of the Supreme Council Ruslan Khasbulatov, very knowledgeable in the secrets of the then politics, wrote that Yeltsin voluntarily agreed to the role of a US puppet. “Through various tools”, he agreed with the Americans “at the highest political level” the composition of the government, the political, economic, social course of the state, its foreign policy.
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, publishing in December 1997 the IMF directives to the government of Chernomyrdin, posed the legitimate question: “Why does Russia need its own government?” The editor-in-chief of this newspaper, Vitaly Tretyakov, wrote in an article entitled “The Government of Serfs”: “Let's call a spade a spade: in essence, we are talking about external management of at least the economy of our country. Even smart people do this, but, firstly, they are not citizens of Russia, and secondly, no one elected or appointed them within the Russian Federation, that is, Messrs. Komdessu and Wolfensohn are absolutely not responsible to anyone in our country. So they manage bankrupt ... Servants who temporarily break into power are sitting in the Kremlin. ”
It was about a team composed of Yeltsin, Gaidar, Chubais, Berezovsky, Gusinsky, Gref, Abramovich, Chernomyrdin, Kozyrev and many other nouveau riche. What could be expected, for example, from Chubais, a member of the closed Bilderberg Club, created by representatives of the American financial oligarchy in 1954? This club has become an important link in the "world power" along with the Trilateral Commission, established by the Rockefeller, Morgan and Rothschild group in 1974, as well as the American Council on Foreign Relations and other similar organizations involved in the development of geopolitical issues in the interests of the US "world elite". The Bilderberg Club included such prominent politicians as G. Kissinger, Z. Brzezinski, D. Bush, a number of major financiers and industrialists. Apart from Chubais, I. Ivanov, who was under Yeltsin the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the secretary of the Security Council and became a member of the LUKOIL board of directors, was chosen from Russia.
Using Yeltsin and his team, the Clinton administration hoped to create material and spiritual poverty in Russia, a state of ruin for its statehood, economy, science, education, and armed forces, to prevent the country's revival, turn it into a raw materials, oil and gas appendage of the West and put the country’s security directly dependence on the price of oil and gas in the world market. The best way to achieve these goals was considered the introduction in Russia of "capitalism with American characteristics."
It was a disastrous path for the country. He brought uncontrollability of the economy and social processes in the country. The period of “initial capital accumulation”, which the Western countries went through more than 300 years ago, was marked in Russia by the unbridled elements of the market, wild arbitrariness and the impunity for economic crimes encouraged from above. With incredible speed, a state of general poverty was created in the country. At the beginning of 1992, the ruble and state securities, Russian citizens and enterprises lost their savings, tax collection fell to a minimum, after which all the troubles of Russia followed. The overwhelming majority of its national wealth was donated for nothing (“a penny for a ruble,” as Clinton adviser Strobe Talbot wrote) of various kinds of crooks in order to foster a financial oligarchy closely connected with the United States and American proteges in influential government structures.
The American “shock therapy” led to an unprecedented collapse of Russia - paralysis of its production due to criminal privatization and the lack of solvent demand of the population, more than half of which fell below the poverty line, overflow of financial oligarchy, shadow economy and crime of Russia's huge financial resources and national wealth abroad ; the exodus from poverty to the West, mainly in the USA, scientists, cultural workers, technical intelligentsia; the collapse of the armed forces, the undermining of scientific, technical and educational potential, the decline of agriculture, the inability to modernize unacceptably outdated (70-80%) industrial equipment.
Russia was gripped by a demographic crisis. In the comments on the preliminary results of the 2002 census prepared for the meeting of the Government of the Russian Federation, it was said: “The extinction of the Russian people is taking place at a monstrous rate ... There is absolutely planned, well-calculated depopulation of the Russian population by someone.”
There were many calls in the media for the legislative and executive authorities to come to their senses, think about their own national interests, and stop pursuing a policy of destroying Russia. There was no shortage of appeals to the European public about the destructive actions of the Yeltsin regime. So, in the “Appeal to the German public”, signed along with me by Leo Kopelev, Yuri Afanasyev, Vadim Belotserkovsky, Sergei Kovalev, Grigory Vodolazov, Dmitry Furman and other representatives of the Russian intelligentsia and published in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 12/19/1996 -Russische Zeitung in February 1997, said: “With bitterness and indignation, we observe how the German government in every possible way supports the antidemocratic regime that has arisen in our country in all its cruel and unlawful actions and how most of the German media voluntarily or involuntarily trying not to notice the deep crisis that swept Russia.
We cannot imagine that the German leadership is not sufficiently informed about this crisis. Many people in Russia even suspect that the West, including Germany, is providing Yeltsin with unconditional support, because he hopes with his help to permanently reduce Russia to the rank of weak states. Given the strong condemnation and the threat of economic sanctions on the part of democracies, the Yeltsin team would hardly have dared to overthrow the Constitution and establish an authoritarian regime, unleash a monstrous war in Chechnya and hold recent anti-democratic elections, that is, act in such a way from October to December 1993 that this predetermined the escalation of the crisis in Russia.
The catastrophe develops on its own: only in this way can the situation in our country be characterized. The economic policy of the caste around Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin turned the thin layer of the old communist nomenclature and the "new Russians" into the unimaginably rich, plunged the vast majority of industry into a state of stagnation, and the majority of the population into poverty. In property relations, the gap between the class of rich and poor is now much deeper than the one that caused the October Revolution in the past. ”
This appeal, like many others, was ignored by the ruling circles of Western European countries. On the one hand, they were under the heel of the United States and did not dare to object to the support of the Yeltsin regime, on the other - in Western Europe there were many supporters of the maximum weakening of Russia. The inertia of the Cold War and fears acted, as if Russia would not again become a powerful power and return to an expansive policy, from which it decisively dissociated itself during the reforms of the 80s.
When analyzing the results of the activities of the Yeltsin team during the 90s, one involuntarily gives the impression that the occupying authorities were operating in Russia. According to the then calculations of economists, it will take from 20 to 30 years to eliminate the disastrous consequences of “shock therapy”. The damage from it was compared with that which was inflicted on the country during the Second World War.
This opinion is still held by many Russian experts. So, director of the Institute of Europe Russian Academy sciences academician Nikolai Shmelev in his article “Common Sense and the Future of Russia: Yes or No?” wrote: “Today it is unlikely that any realistically-minded people will dare to say that in the foreseeable 15-20 years we will be able to repair all the damage caused by the current“ troubled times ”. Over the past two decades, Russia has lost half of its industrial potential, and if emergency measures are not taken, the remaining half will be lost due to obsolescence of equipment in the next 7-10 years. At least a third of agricultural land has been taken out of circulation, about 50% of the cattle population has been put under the knife. According to some experts, up to a third of its brains have left the country during the same period. In a dilapidated state are science, applied research and design, a system of professional training. Over the past two decades, not a single large industrial enterprise has been built in Russia (with the exception of the Sakhalin project), not a single power plant, not a single railway or highway of serious importance. ”
It is not surprising that the American billionaire Soros, speaking at an international forum in Davos on January 27, 2013, drew attention to the deplorable state russian economy. But he did not name those who contributed to this. This was told by a prominent American researcher Stephen Cohen in his book "America and the tragedy of post-communist Russia." He wrote about the catastrophic consequences of the American policy of the destruction of Russia. He acquainted his assessment of this policy with a wide circle of Russian readers in the article “The USA pursues an unreasonable policy towards Russia”: “The American state has been participating in the internal affairs of Russia since the end of the Cold War, and it has not brought anything good. The United States should just shut up, go home and do its own business ... These are bad times for Russia, bad times for Russian-American relations, and I don’t see anything improving. ”
In 1996, a group of prominent Russian and American economists, concerned about the economic situation in Russia, addressed the Russian president condemning the “shock therapy” policy and proposing a new economic program that could lead the country out of a crisis fraught with dire consequences. On the Russian side, the appeal was signed by academicians L. Abalkin, O. Bogomolov, V. Makarov, S. Shatalin, Yu. Yaremenko and D. Lvov, on the American side - Nobel Prize winners in economics L. Klein, V. Leontiev, J. Tobin , M. Engriligator, M. Powmer. The appeal, in particular, proposed the following:
The Russian government should play a much more important role in the transition to a market economy. The state’s non-intervention policy, which is part of the “shock therapy”, has not paid off. The government should replace it with a program in which the state assumes the main role in the economy, as is the case in the modern mixed economies of the USA, Sweden, and Germany.
- “Shock therapy” had terrifying social consequences, including a huge increase in the number of absolutely poor people, poor health and life expectancy, and the destruction of the middle class. The government should be proactive in restructuring the industry.
Serious government measures must be taken to prevent the criminalization of the economy. Taking advantage of government non-interference, criminal elements fill the vacuum. There was a transition not to a market economy, but to a criminalized economy. The state is obliged to reverse this and eliminate the cancer tumor of crime in order to create a stable entrepreneurial climate and stimulate investment in production.
The state should revive consumer demand by increasing pensions and salaries, promote the formation of sufficient funds for social needs and provide support to the healthcare system, education, ecology, science, which in general could protect Russia’s two great assets - its human capital and natural resources.
It would be advisable for the government to use the proceeds from foreign trade in gas and oil, not for the import of products and luxury goods, but for the modernization of obsolete factories. It is necessary to achieve that the rent from the exploitation of natural wealth turns into state revenues.
New policies require patience. The transition of the economy to a system of market relations takes time, otherwise disaster cannot be avoided. The architects of "shock therapy" did not recognize this; the results, as expected, caused a deep crisis.
These were the main aspects of reform adjustment for Russia, developed by world-famous economists. But the Yeltsin regime did not pay any attention to the recommendations of the "economic sages." Unfortunately, his followers completely ignored them. By the way, we note that the Pope condemned the supporters of "capitalist neoliberalism" in one of the speeches made by him during a trip to Cuba in January 1998.
In this regard, one episode is very revealing. Chubais, having familiarized himself with the program of "economic wise men," hastened to Washington, visited the State Department and expressed his protest in connection with the program, which could put an end to the whole policy of the Yeltsin team. The US State Department reacted positively to Chubais’s intervention, condemned the program and the participation of American scientists in its development.
Gaidar, Chubais and others like them tried to justify themselves by saying that they supposedly wanted to put an end to the communist regime in one fell swoop and prevent its return. In fact, they did everything to destroy and plunder Russia in one fell swoop, which was what the Clinton administration planned. Strobe Talbott, who developed Clinton’s policy on Russia, wrote: “With the sincere approval of most Western experts, they (Gaidar and his team. - Approx. Auth.) Believed that such tough measures were necessary for two reasons: first, to create conditions for sooner or later the inevitable solvency of the Russian state, and secondly, to break the ridge of the Soviet leviathan. " As the saying goes, "they darted into the Soviet Union, but ended up in Russia."
The greatest historical paradox of the end of the twentieth century is that in less than one decade, one superpower - the United States - cracked down on another superpower - Russia, without firing a shot and spilling a single drop of blood from its soldiers. This has not yet been known to history.
Leaving the presidency of Russia, Boris Yeltsin apologized to the Russian people in his farewell speech, but did not say what kind of sins it was. For the fact that in December 1991 he signed a declaration on the dissolution of the Soviet Union in Bialowieza, thereby violating the will of the people expressed for preserving the country in a referendum in March 1991? Or because for 10 years of his reign he brought Russia to the brink of disaster? Or because, having seized power in the Russian state, began to serve the American "backstage"? There is no forgiveness for all this. Herostratus could have accomplished this, which history had not yet known.