Natalya Zubarevich last interview. Zubarevich Natalia about the cloaca in the Russian economy
K. Larina- Good evening! Program "2017". And here, in the studio "Echo of Moscow" in Moscow - Ksenia Larina, presenter, and in touch in St. Petersburg - Vitaly Dymarsky ... Vitaly, are you here?
To Dymarsky- I'm here.
K. Larina- Wonderful! Greetings. Hello dear! Our guest today is Natalya Vasilievna Zubarevich, economist, geographer, director of the regional program of the Independent Institute for Social Policy. But, in general, knowledgeable people call Natalya Vasilievna the best regional expert in the country. How do you agree with this?
N.Zubarevich- Not.
K. Larina- Well, okay, now let's check, Natalya Vasilievna.
To Dymarsky- What do you disagree with: with the “best” or with the “regional expert”?
N.Zubarevich- With an adjective.
N. Zubarevich: I would not call it a purge, although, as a rule, governors who had problems left
K. Larina- It is clear, since we have the main topic of the week, we usually single out the main topic, the most discussed one, in this program. If we talk about politics, this is, of course, a personnel purge, which has already been called a "gubernacle" that is happening before our eyes. It's just that one by one the governors are falling: the governor of Nizhny Novgorod, the head of Samara, Krasnoyarsk, Dagestan, the head of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug. Also, judging by the forecasts, they promise almost a dozen even before the start of the presidential elections - at least 10 people will still be replaced in this gubernatorial system.
And today I want to understand, to understand what it is, this personnel purge, what it means. Let me put the first question to Natalya Vasilievna. Many say that this is a generational change. Is it so? How do you define it?
To Dymarsky- Can I add it now? But Uss, who is 62 years old, has been appointed in the Krasnoyarsk Territory.
K. Larina- Young man. Maybe he is a modern young man.
To Dymarsky- The previous one was 64.
N.Zubarevich- Let's do it. Actually, this is not the first story. Who remembers the presidency of Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev, there was a year when even more governors were replaced. That is, such a series of salvos is not the first time.
Second, I wouldn't call it a purge, although, as a rule, governors who had problems with the level of support in the region resigned. It's true.
K. Larina Still, it matters, doesn't it?
N.Zubarevich“That matters first and foremost. That is, intra-elite conflicts; problems associated with the low level of support of the population, although the reasons were different - this is all basic about again. The problem is with interest groups and the federal level, as in the same Samara. I mean Rostec and so on. There is a basic foundation here.
I am always amazed by the camaraderie in decision-making inherited from the Soviet years: Walk, walk! Relax your shoulder! - why is it necessary like this, I'm a regionalist, I don't understand this logic. Because I can’t call it a demonstrative spanking, honestly, because different people left. And, for example, Koshin, the governor of the Nenets district, left simply because the budget collapsed in him, he simply collapsed.
We have two districts, two constituent entities of Russia - Sakhalin and the Nenets District, which live on oil revenues, because you can’t take oil rent from them there, there is a production sharing agreement, and they fell heavily when oil became $ 40 per barrel .
But Sakhalin had such a gigantic margin of safety, while the Nenets did not have this, and their budget flew off. Last year, in the first half of the year, revenues collapsed by 45%. And I had to cut everything so as not to fly into a monstrous deficit. Now he has recovered, a good plus, if you look ... Koshin was fired in a situation where budget revenues increased by 80% in the first half of the year.
K. Larina- Yes, they paid attention to this: the person showed just one of the best results.
N.Zubarevich- Rollercoasters are like that. But because there is a lot of discontent among the population. He cut to the living. And before, when incomes were growing, in the district ... there has always been, in the north, in general, there is a tendency towards “developed socialism”: when money appears, expenses begin to increase very quickly. By the way, Sakhalin did this less and increased non-social expenses, which, if something happens, can be cut down at any time. Spent on roads - stopped spending on roads. And in this format...
And Koshin inherited the Nenets Okrug with already incredibly inflated social spending. He cut people. It never ranks up. Therefore, they demolished him, in fact, because he tried to live on shrunken means. And this is a conclusion for the federal authorities. Discontent is growing rapidly, no matter what economic reasons happened what happened. All other stories are completely different.
K. Larina- But anyway, you started with the fact that there is a political reason.
N.Zubarevich― Reducing or low level support, the inability to find a common language with the elites, although everything is different. Koshin is local. And, excuse me, the Mordovian story is quite sad. Failure to become a leader who is accepted by different groups - Dagestan, please. And Tolokonsky simply remained a stranger to the region, although there were no particular conflicts. And he is a very rooted and very sick person for his region. I know him personally and can only confirm this.
N.Zubarevich: In Medvedev’s time, they were changed at least a year before the elections, so that he could get used to it, pick up the reins correctly
To Dymarsky- May I ask you a question about this? On the one hand, I understand the logic that the decline in confidence from the population, so they went downhill, all these named and yet unnamed governors. On the other hand, the decision was made from the other side, sorry for such a tautology. The decision was made by the center: Let's start a campaign to change governors, and then we'll see which governors fit our criteria for this campaign...
N.Zubarevich- Not certainly in that way. Look, the first idea is rejuvenation. This is without a doubt. Although the individual conditions of the region matter. Here Kotyukov certainly would not have pulled the Krasnoyarsk Territory. Second: this is the removal of the accumulated discontent before. By the elections, these governors of the IO or ARIO come clean, nothing can be hung on them.
K. Larina- I mean, like, “I already did everything for you guys. I removed. That's who brought you to this state ... ".
N.Zubarevich“Now a new life begins. This is such a marketing ploy is quite nothing. They didn't do that before. If you remember, during the time of Medvedev's leadership, they were changed at least a year before the elections, so that the donkey would get used to it, pick up the reins correctly.
And now, I have a feeling that we have already killed the electoral system to such an extent, we have already brought it to apathy, on the one hand, of the population, on the other hand, to automatism in technology already to such a level that it does not matter who is at the top is sitting. And this is the saddest thing for me.
The governor, he is strictly a governor, even if he is a local person with rare exceptions, because, of course, not everyone is like that. The governor depends only on the top. They will choose from below. These 25-30% will come and elect anyway, because "you have been given something new." Well, this is what we call "president of hope", "governor of hope". Completely replicable technology. It is not good, because now, just like at the beginning of the year and for the second time in autumn, we have simply been shown what this Russian “federalism” is. Well, it’s not just not there, but it’s already simply presented in some kind of simply mocking anti-form. You can not do it this way. Well, it's wrong to do that. It's not even good from a moral point of view. Because people are already alienated to such a degree from some kind of decision-making process in themselves in the region. They no longer affect anything. This bad story.
K. Larina“But these are technocrats?” Or what can they be called?
N.Zubarevich- Different. Maxim Reshetnikov is a very strong manager. I have also known him for many years. And I think that the Perm Territory, you understand, will receive an additional drive of transformation, changes - there are no questions here. Uss is a great diplomat who knows how to work with elites, a person who lives there and really fights for the interests of his region. Who will we get in Dagestan? As I understand it, there is still unknown - jam-sir. But there will not be a simple and good solution.
Parachutists are in Udmurtia... Well, if you need to change the leadership of the Public Board for your own, and put the one who was somewhere right, well, perhaps this is Udmurtia. Only I, as a regionalist, would like to understand: and in the garden of elderberry, and in Kiev, the uncle - how does this correlate from the point of view of managerial logic? In my opinion, no way.
Just like the security forces. We are now stepping on the same rake again. Remember the "zero years, the beginning of the "zero" - for many, not for me - that order is such a general, an FSB officer at the head of the region. I can simply name these regions: Ulyanovsk is a failure. Voronezh - a failure. Compare with what Gordeev is doing now, how much he does - and what was at the beginning of the "zero".
No. Experience ... not in horse food - it didn’t work. According to the new one, we are now appointing security officials. But this is a different job, these are different competencies.
N. Zubarevich: We have already killed the electoral system to such an extent that it no longer matters who sits at the top
K. Larina“It’s not even the security forces.
N.Zubarevich- Security. They are no longer army generals, not FSB officers, but simply guards. Well, I want to try. I understand that it is possible to concentrate all the resources of Rostec in the Tula region. But let me, as a regionalist, once again repeat publicly: this is not enough for the development of a problem region. And no general or guard will help here. There it is necessary to embroider so many bottlenecks and problems that a manager with the head of a manager and a good one is needed.
I am closely following the Yaroslavl region now. There goes, in general, a clash with the local elite. But it is unlikely that the new governor will be dismissed, but the collision is growing. Therefore, not everything is so simple. Yes, such a bad story in the style of campaigning - I already use this word many times, but it's true - and the result is different.
K. Larina- Pay attention, by the way, that it really comes to some kind of farce. You have probably seen these photographs, when practically twin brothers - there Nikitin and Azarov - absolutely one person with the same face.
N.Zubarevich- They told me a joke. Can? I heard yesterday. Walked so wide already. - "Let's go to Novgorod?" - "What Novgorod?" - "Which is 400 kilometers from Moscow." - "Well, what?" - Well, such ... this ... well, in which Nikitin is the governor ... ”And a split in two directions. But it seems to me that this is just someone joking, sorry for the vernacular.
K. Larina- The one who appointed, probably.
N.Zubarevich- Well, yes, yes. Because already somehow ... the humor went to the ears.
K. Larina- Still, in your opinion, are there any selection criteria?
N.Zubarevich- Yes, there were. Firstly, there is a training system, and it is quite thorough. And not only Russians give lectures there, but well-known professors who are in the field of management are invited there. That is, the training system is sort of adjusted, the personnel reserve is being prepared. And then begins what begins. Because we have a meritocratic principle in theory, when a person is chosen by quality, but it would be better if he was a person of his region. It is useful to go to a federal position and then return to the region. It's true, a good management story. But my inner voice somehow itches and says: Whatever this result, this choice is some kind of mistake in solving groups of interests, - that’s not very ... not always - I won’t speak badly, God forbid - but in In some cases, I can definitely say that the criterion for making a decision was not the meritocratic principle.
N. Zubarevich: I am closely following the Yaroslavl Region. There is a clash with the local elite. But they are unlikely to leave
To Dymarsky- Judging by what political scientists are writing these days on various political channels, in Telegram, including, in almost every region, this clash of interests of various groups.
N.Zubarevich- It's not in the region, it's the feds who decide.
To Dymarsky- Well, yes, this person is from Rostec, this person is from the Ivanov group with someone ... I don’t remember ... In general, they divided the entire elite into certain interest groups, which, good evening, is correct, and they decide among themselves, one of them puts his person in one or another region.
N.Zubarevich- Not so simple. I didn't stand there with a candle. I would be careful not to attribute specific people to specific companies, because life in Russia is fluid, and, as a rule, these associations are group ones, they are very flexible: today you are there, tomorrow you are in another place. Here is belonging to the security forces - yes, it is as eternal as the cockade on your cap, it is always visible. Everything else is quite flexible.
There are regions where the interests of individual businesses are really great. But now I’m ready to go through all the appointments - I don’t understand what does Rostec have to do with the Novgorod region? He doesn't exist like that. I understand that in the Samara region there are interests of this structure. But then again, honestly, life is more complicated than simple political science schemes. Here and personal relationships, here and properly built career moves. It's the sum of the circumstances. Therefore, I would not simplify that Vasya is Pupkin, Petya is Stepanov, and Fedya is Ivanov there. Everything is more difficult.
K. Larina- But, nevertheless, Natalya Vasilievna, does a new head, a new governor always bring with him an inevitable change of local elites?
N.Zubarevich- Trying, yes. In the same Yaroslavl region, the new governor brought with him people from the Moscow region, and they took command posts. The local elite did not like it very much, because the style is so ... well, how to say ... - somewhat aggressive, let's carefully choose the words. This is a long time ago. When Shamanov came to the Ulyanovsk region, the people of Nikita Mikhalkov came for him and steered, I would say, "hurried" there properly.
And, for example, the same Merkushkin, when he came, he was neat, he brought people with him to the Ministry of Property, to the Ministry of Finance, and began, as it were, to negotiate with the locals. But somehow it slowly happened that as a result everything was controlled by the Mordovian clan. So the start may be different. It is better to look in a year or two. That's when it becomes clearer.
To Dymarsky- I have another question, Natalya Vasilievna. Indeed, the governors Lately become very many security officials. At the same time, we know that in each region, relations between the governor and local security forces are always very difficult, since they are not subordinate to the governor, but are federal authorities. And if the governor is not a security official, then it is not yet clear which of them is stronger - again, it turns out to be a tautology - some local FSB officer or a technocrat governor or what to call him, as Nikita Belykh or Andrei Nikitin was in Veliky Novgorod. But when a general comes to the governor's post, how does he develop relations with him, with anyone, with these local power elites?
N.Zubarevich First of all, I am not an expert on these issues. Secondly, we have two security officials - these are the Yaroslavl and Tula regions.
K. Larina- Not yet evening.
N.Zubarevich- These are not security forces, sorry, just like that. These are security people, so I think that they have excellent relations with all representatives of law enforcement agencies in this region, because they are of a higher rank. That's all.
And the rest of the governors, as always, have the task of building relationships. They don't always get along, but I'll note that it's not just the security forces here. The prosecutor's office is there, the investigative committees are there.
In general, the governorship last years turned into not just walking through a minefield - it's true - because this position is now under distribution. This was not the case before. The governors have already become the scapegoat in Russia, and this is also a mine for federalism. Because after all, the person who manages the region cannot be as elementary as it is now being done, the ax-head, demolished, hung on him ... as it is called, “criminal group”, as hung in Komi. This is a bad story. Yes, people like it: how come - everyone went ... punished ... But, to be honest, you did not choose it through, you first installed it, then demolished it - and this is all a profanation of the administration of the territory.
K. Larina“By the way, why are you doing this?” I wanted to ask this question later, but since you remembered Komi, naturally, we should also remember about Nikita Belykh here. Why do this when you can do exactly what is happening now - remove and change, why do you need to destroy a person?
N. Zubarevich: Governors have already become a scapegoat in Russia, and this is also a mine under federalism
To Dymarsky Who didn't get along with?
N.Zubarevich- Firstly, I think that in Komi, yes, there are some elements of a fight between groups, moreover, Moscow. As far as I know, the administration of the North-Western District, the local prosecutor… Well, how can I tell you… But you didn’t pay attention that the level of aggression in society has also increased, and it’s the same among the elites. And if earlier there was demolition, now it is eating the liver of the enemy. And we observe it in a simple, uncomplicated form. This is such a corruption of morals, honestly, this throwing the boyars off the porch is not even so much for the crowd - the crowd is already fed up with the spectacle - this is a discrediting to a very large extent of the position of managers, top managers in the regions.
They are not white and fluffy, of course, people are different. I won't talk now, I don't know, but the theatrical effect with which this is done... But Serebrennikov is exactly the same story. All the different structural directions - the problems in them are solved by the authorities in approximately the same way: the boyars are thrown off to the crowd. This will come back to us very, very strongly, because an evil, aggressive society and an evil, fighting power within itself is always a direction - can I say intelligently? - not the deterioration of morals, but the loss of moral guidelines. Here we are a country that has already lost a lot of moral guidance.
To Dymarsky- Natalya Vasilievna, how do you think, how do you imagine, all these fights between the elites, intra-elite, they go on by themselves, and our Commander-in-Chief ... or rather, the guarantor of the Constitution observes all this and does not interfere, or each such decision should be consecrated from above ?
N.Zubarevich- Ask the Kremlin experts. My position is simple: I observe life in its regional and urban diversity. And, to be honest, I don’t have the slightest desire to discuss life inside the Kremlin, because I’m not interested, because the country is still developing in the directions that are basically set by evolutionary trends. Yes, you can spoil it, yes, you can slow it down - that's right. But this country is all the same large-city with huge peripheries, with regions very poorly stitched together, such an autonomy, these separate heaps. And this sets the format, and not who sneezed how upstairs.
Yes, Crimea has changed some basic trends a lot. Truth. But look, two years have passed, and slowly the situation begins to taxi on what it was moving on - degradation trends: inhibition, social aggression. The city structure, which does not give impetus to development, and city finances ... Therefore, well, let them - Ivanov and Petrov - decide somehow at the top. I look at life, it is more important to me.
K. Larina- But, by the way, can we draw any conclusions about Crimea during this time? In general, how much did this story cost us?
N.Zubarevich"So who's going to count?" Financing goes not only through the Crimean budget in the form of transfers. It goes through federal channels. The same Avtodor is a federal agency, it is it that is building the bridge. This is not through the Crimean budget. The same laying of this deep-water cable, water supply issues, they are often resolved through federal infrastructure. But the situation is stupid now: somewhere the transfer to the Crimea and Sevastopol is kept at the level of 80-90 billion. Crimea is the largest recipient of transfers in the 17th year in Russian Federation; in second place - Dagestan, in third - Chechnya.
In some interesting way, income tax increased 5 times in Crimea. But I know such toys, so I'm just wondering which of the companies they put there in order to fix this increase in income tax in Crimea. Someone. But you need to know.
What happens next. The level of subsidization is still now for Crimea where it is 60%, for Sevastopol it is less. Nothing really changes. Transfers are growing, investments are growing, but 80% of these investments are the budget.
N. Zubarevich: In some interesting way, in Crimea, the income tax increased by 5 times. But I know such toys
K. Larina- Let's stop there for now. Sorry Vitaly. We have a news release now. We wait, listen, and continue our conversation with Natalya Zubarevich in a few minutes.
K. Larina- We are returning to the 2017 program. Today we are discussing the change of personnel in the regions, among the heads of regions. We believe that, in my opinion, there are already more than fingers on one hand, you can say - people who have left and will still be. Our guest is Natalya Zubarevich, director of the regional program of the Independent Institute for Social Policy, economist, geographer, regionalist - that's the right word, and not the one I said at the beginning of today's meeting. I, Ksenia Larina and Vitaly Dymarsky remain in touch with us. Yes?
To Dymarsky- Yes.
K. Larina- Vitaly, I want to tell you some news. I came up with a question that is striking in its originality. I really wanted to vote. The question should already be hanging on the NetworkVisor and at the same time let's also conduct our telephone vote. The question is: Would you dismiss the head of your region? "yes", "no" - this is on our website, on the NetworkVisor. And the phone numbers are: if you are ready and think that it is necessary to dismiss the head of your region - +7 985 970 45 45. If you think not, he works and let him work further - 660 06 65.
What do you think, Natalya Vasilievna, are there many dissatisfied people today?
N.Zubarevich- I have a counter question on the agenda: what is the proportion of Muscovites among the listeners of your station?
K. Larina- Big, big.
N.Zubarevich So your question is somehow very focused.
K. Larina- I'll tell you so that we have the right to ask such a question, because now the radio, it's not just radio. Now the receiver is not turned on. Why do so many people listen and watch us on the Internet. And they can even answer this question in America - the governor of the state can be fired!
To Dymarsky- In this regard, while voting, I have a question for Natalya Vasilievna. All the same, all these management defects that you spoke about. First of all, we talked about personnel, but not only personnel, I mean in the regions. To what extent does this affect the mood of the population? Are there any sociological measurements?
K. Larina- You probably meet, often travel to the regions.
To Dymarsky- And if there is this discontent, and, of course, there is, of course, it cannot happen without it, does it pour out on local leaders or on federal ones?
N.Zubarevich- To do this, just look at the Levada Center and see: Putin's rating is holding like a stone, the ratings of the federal government and governors have gone down. And since the mayor is not particularly measured, but I communicate with them a lot, I can say that the mayors are the first to receive a reaction from the population and often a negative reaction. Therefore, the closer to the people, the greater the risks. And some mayors even told me: “They understand even at the top that we are already holding on to the last of our strength - are people unhappy?”
But the election results show us that everything is fine, everything is calm. Elections have ceased to be a measure of relations. We don't have feedback. I say terrible platitudes, because we wrote to them 5 years ago in the old strategy: "If you are so afraid of holding gubernatorial elections, then at least do the mayoral elections properly."
N. Zubarevich: A governor in the Russian Federation is successful when he is excellent at extracting money from federal sources
K. Larina- They tried. Roizman was chosen.
N.Zubarevich So I beg you!
K. Larina- And Urlashov was chosen at the time.
To Dymarsky- By the way, Sobyanin and Navalny also fought.
N.Zubarevich- Do you remember the result? He is the subject. It's a subject, that's another story. Mayors, municipalities… So at least take your temperature there. What can the mayor do when the whole cart, she looks up. No, they are afraid. Therefore, now, you see, in 77, in my opinion, regions or 75 mayors are elected only from among the deputies. The gubernatorial elections are filtered so, well, I say that you can probably bring the horse of Caligula - they will vote anyway. This is the wrong story.
K. Larina- And what makes people then, if they fall into such a vice, if they absolutely and completely depend on the supreme power, on the vertical - what makes them agree to such positions? In fact, they are not even executed by firing squad ... sorry that I interrupted you, I just perfectly understand how a person should feel when, in front of his eyes, they wring the hands of an honest person, in whom he has no doubt that he is honest, and drag him to the station, and he is sitting there now ... I mean Nikita, first of all.
And what should the person who might replace him, who will take his place, think? That "tomorrow I will be at this place." How to guess? It turns out that all your work consists only in guessing the desire of the owner or in another way? I exaggerate, of course.
N.Zubarevich- No, I don't agree. It seems to me that this is a more exaggerated story. Firstly, yes, the position has now become much more “executive”, and the former bonuses, when everything is calm, when there are no particular protests, you don’t particularly conflict with the elite, you follow orders, I live. Now this is all over.
It seems to me that you and I underestimate the desire of people for both power and self-realization. But I can say that, according to indirect estimates, not everyone who was sent to the regions was happy. This is how I would put it very neatly. They understand the risks, because, indeed, governors have become scapegoats in Russia. And here's how to be? A person has one life, he wants to realize himself somehow. He understands that in career ladder, if he refuses such an offer, he flies out, just flies out. And this is a mixture, as it were, of needs and hostage - that's how it is. Life is complicated.
K. Larina“Then how do we define the criterion for success?” What should be presented and done?
N.Zubarevich― Good question. For the authorities, the criterion of success is not the same as, for example, for me as a regionalist. This is generally obvious. The criterion of success in the region is when you have a more or less human life, when business comes to you, invests; when you have jobs and not janitors, but better ones; and when the infrastructure of your places, especially cities, improves.
But once again: a governor in Russia is relatively successful when he is excellent at extracting money from federal sources. Well, here Chechnya does not need to be knocked out, but everyone else needs to. Although no, Chechnya also knocks out. We hear screams from time to time. Transfers were cut by 2% in 16th - in January, in February, Mr. Kadyrov spoke loudly about this.
Or the second story: when he can save what is rapidly growing and swollen from him, "Schaub was not taken away." Here are two skills. Here the second skill was needed by two subjects: Moscow and Sakhalin. They really care about income. And everyone else needs, rather, the first. And literally 3-4 more… 6 governors, from whom you can’t take away so much, and they don’t ask anything special from the center. So, it seems to me that they have more opportunities to engage in development. Let's see.
To Dymarsky- I cannot but ask you, Natalya Vasilievna, the Petersburgers will not forgive me if I do not ask you about Petersburg.
K. Larina- By the way, Poltavchenko is also in this rating of those leaving. We know that everyone is waiting...
To Dymarsky- This has been talked about for a long time. And he suddenly even gave an interview, which he never does, and to whom? " Novaya Gazeta". He thinks he's popular.
N.Zubarevich- Sobyanin also believes that he is popular, what can you do? I would say so. If we compare Moscow and St. Petersburg, these are two different stories. Moscow is the story of a powerfully swelling budget, such huge programs at great expense. I repeat once again: 11% of the total budget of Moscow in the first half of the year is landscaping, every 9th ruble, and healthcare from the budget will be every 8th, well, 7th. Feel it, right? Have questions. Expenses for schools are not increasing, and for the improvement in the first half of the year they increased by 37%. The Moscow budget at the end of the year will be 2 trillion. This is crazy money.
Peter doesn't have that kind of fat, of course. But that's why Peter doesn't have such powerful programs. First, My Street, landscaping, everything, and now we have renovation on the march so that income tax cannot be transferred to the federal budget. Peter's is more modest, calmer. And the structure of the budget is more social, because Poltavchenko does not aim at big projects, he stupidly has no money for such a big one. But at the same time it is more difficult for him to show the result. Well, somehow it goes neither shaky nor rolls. The budget is in surplus, the surplus is small. The social sphere has never been cut like in Moscow, they acted more carefully.
Here you have a choice: you either Sochi, version 8, or somehow it goes day by day. That's what Petersburgers like more? I would have asked them.
To Dymarsky- St. Petersburg residents have other criteria and factors influencing. All these scandals - Isaac, Kadyrov's bridge - these things are non-economic.
N.Zubarevich- But note that Sobyanin is not personally involved in such stories, because the monument to Vladimir is not the Moscow authorities. Here is much more technocratic with all the good and bad sides of this process. Because St. Petersburg is emotionally loaded with the fact that, well, these are not governor’s affairs, he shouldn’t have got into it. Well, what can I say - sometimes I like technocrats more, honestly.
N.Zubarevich: The Moscow budget will reach 2 trillion by the end of the year. It's crazy money
K. Larina- Natalya Vasilievna, this is not the first time you have used the term “federalism” with irony today and put it in quotation marks ...
N.Zubarevich- In quotation marks...
K. Larina- But say this: is it possible to call a period in recent history Russia, when did they try to remove these quotes, to turn the country into a real federal one?
N.Zubarevich- You know, we have a dispute all the time, among people of my profession, after all, the 90s - was it an attempt at federalism or stupid decentralization? When the center is weak...
K. Larina Take as much sovereignty as you like...
N.Zubarevich- And somehow people tumbled us, poked around as best they could. I would say this - this is my personal opinion - to a greater extent it was decentralization with a weak center, but it laid some institutional foundations for federalism. Another thing is that they were weak, it turned out to be very easy to uproot them literally at the end of the decade. And we are now observing this process already in caricatured forms. Here's what we see - it's a cartoon. This is not even just the oblivion of federalism, but it is already on the other side of the minus, already with some caricatured things. This is what is killing me. Well, okay, you don't want this federalism - it's clear you have a different way of thinking - but please don't scoff, at least without it.
K. Larina- And what does it threaten? What could be the consequences?
N.Zubarevich- This is a bad story, because the advantage of the country is its diversity. Diversity helps you get through tough times. A system that stands on many bases, it is much more flexible than a vertical one. It's like a spring: it's worse here, it's better here - somehow it will endure together. All history teaches that federalist systems are more stable. Well, do you want to try again on your experience? Well, try it. But these fears, this "verticalization" of brains is always in everything - an inescapable property of the Russian managerial class: they must control everything.
To Dymarsky- But this, good evening, is due to some fear of disintegration, right?
N.Zubarevich- Fears, fears.
K. Larina- And there is such a risk of collapse, yes.
To Dymarsky- That you need to keep it all in one hand.
N.Zubarevich- Well, Primorsky Krai ran away from you, just at a gallop, picked up his pants and ran ... That's just how they were waiting for him in China and Japan, we haven't had the Primorsky Republic for so long since 1921.
To Dymarsky- There is also North Korea.
N.Zubarevich- That's why it's funny. Loss of control in the form of disintegration is the completely inflamed consciousness of our elite. Because we have conspiracies both inside and outside ... When the brains are arranged like this, it is quite difficult to deal with this sore ... There it is already necessary to see a psychiatrist.
To Dymarsky- Fears are not around the Primorsky Territory, fears, as I understand it, are around the two republics - Tatarstan, Bashkortostan - and the Caucasus.
N.Zubarevich- I would say that the Caucasus is a bit of a different story. But if you go to Dagestan, talk a little with people, no one is going to crawl away from Russia. With a subsidy level of 79% ... no, Chechnya - 83%, Ingushetia - 84%, Dagestan - 76% there. Well, yes ... Therefore, fears again.
About Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Please stop scaring me already. Smart authorities, especially in Tatarstan, are doing their best and trying to maintain a special status. This is an economic and political story. This is not a question of separatism. These are attempts, as it used to be, to channel the streams of federal aid to the maximum, not even aid, but large projects. And now they are trying to fight for status. It is important for them that they retain some special status. If you think this is a breakup story, no. This is a story of compromise. The key word here is "compromise". Since there is no culture of compromise in Russia, and since in Russia - "you are the boss - I'm a fool, I'm the boss - you're a fool" - we cannot achieve normal, built relationships - we put pressure. This is also bad. It's getting stronger, you can see it. This is also a bad trend.
K. Larina- That is, after all, an empire, not a federation.
N.Zubarevich“Imperial, of course. The syndrome of bruised empire... Russia is bruised by space - even Berdyaev said. It's true. Such a huge space gives rise to fears, especially in managerial fear. Yes, and the population is somehow there ... it is both proud and afraid. And how the authorities are afraid and proud. Second, imperialism is, without a doubt, a long-term problem. We will not solve it in one or two generations. Empires did not collapse all at once. They still have to break up in the brain. And for two or three generations we will hang out and shy away like this. It is simply desirable to move step by step all the same in the right direction, and not the opposite.
K. Larina- Wait, after all, the collapse of the empire and the collapse of Russia are two different things.
N.Zubarevich- Yes. First, Russia is the center of an empire, an imperial country. Secondly, by the collapse of the empire, I mean the preservation of imperial values in the mass consciousness. About this, not about the borders outlined by striped pillars. The style of thinking about territories, the style of managing territories was and remains imperial. Can we survive quickly? No, long story.
To Dymarsky- And what do you think, will the situation in Crimea change along with this or will it not change - I mean even psychological - what is above, what is below? Will they also move towards the Russian regions or is there still some kind of special ...
N.Zubarevich“Some time is a priority. It is clearly expressed in large infrastructure projects linking Crimea with the territory of Russia. Such a holiday of the soul and name day of the heart will not last long. When they sew it up - a highway, a bridge, energy supply, a thermal power plant and everything is as it should be - appetites will be curtailed there. Because Russia, especially in its current state, stupidly now has no money for the Crimea. Well, yes, you can tear out 100 billion rubles. At 1.5 trillion, this is somewhere less than a percent, but it still comes at the expense of other regions.
K. Larina- Do people understand that Crimea is supported by Sakhalin?
N.Zubarevich- No, Sakhalin is the breadwinner... I don't think people understand this. They were promised a lot. They are waiting for this promise. Very few jobs are being created in Crimea. The level of part-time employment in Crimea and Sevastopol is the highest among the subjects - part-time work - all these crisis manifestations ...
I repeat once again: yes, now investments have grown, transfers are growing all the time, but 70-80% of investment is the budget. It's not about business. For now, here's the story. I think that after the introduction of the bridge, the agility will decrease. They will try to do something with recreation, but in the territory where business with the risks of sanctions cannot enter, nothing will work out quickly.
N. Zubarevich: Russia, especially in its current state, stupidly now has no money for Crimea
K. Larina- And I also want to have time to ask such a question about the Russkiy Mir project and this Novorossiya. How viable was he, in general, from the very beginning? What did you want to do it?
N.Zubarevich- Well, first of all, these are pieces of Ukraine. It is necessary to look at what opinion polls were, relations and so on. We only see the result.
K. Larina- There is no result. Tied up and everything.
N.Zubarevich- Exactly. Therefore, inside Russia, I understand better, and I can say that we see a growing separation of Moscow from the rest of the territory. We see that things are not going well with the Far East... Well, listen, now the Far East accounts for 7-7.5% of all investments in Russia. Territory Far East more than a third of the territory of Russia. So not much yet. Indeed, we are slowly turning to China. But we export to China… now I will say: 10% of our exports go to China, and 20% of our imports from China. If we think that we are exporting something like rags from there, then 50%, with a small amount of imports from China, are machinery and equipment. And more than 90% of our exports to China are oil and coal. First of all, oil. Look, we're already a raw material appendage of China.
K. Larina“I want to announce the results of our vote, dear friends! Almost my favorite size. 88% of Ekho Moskvy listeners are ready to dismiss the head of their region. But there are also 12% of the lucky ones, apparently, these are the governors themselves, who still remain in their places. Here is the ratio. Well, I think it's to be expected, of course. Satisfied, unfortunately, few.
You know what we haven't talked about yet? Of course, a very important point. Still, when a person understands that his voice means something, then the one whom he supports understands that his current life depends on the voice of a particular person.
N.Zubarevich- Yes.
K. Larina- And you're talking about feedback. This is not even a feedback link, it is some kind of umbilical cord that should connect the leader with his electorate.
N.Zubarevich- Absolutely. It's resilience, it's support. And the fact that we broke this system disempowers not only the majority of Russians, but also mayors and governors, and so on. And this is politically a very bad story.
K. Larina Well, we should be finishing our program now. Thanks a lot to our guest. Let me remind you, this is Natalya Zubarevich, director of the regional program of the Independent Institute for Social Policy. I could not determine the voting results on the Internet, I did not find where it is, because we have so many different screens that I could not find anywhere. But, I hope that voting will continue on the Internet, and you will be able to catch up there, as they say, and see the results. Masha, tell me out loud.
- 86 ― 14.
K. Larina - Oh- O! It's my favorite size! Do you hear Vitaly? 86 - 14 - most importantly, a stable percentage ratio.
To Dymarsky- Size matters.
K. Larina- Thank you very much, Natalya Vasilievna!
N.Zubarevich- Thank you!
Natalya Zubarevich, director of the regional program of the Independent Institute for Social Policy, delivered a lecture at the European Discussion Club at the Higher School of Economics. In her speech, she tried to analyze what challenges the current economic crisis and what institutional changes the country needs. Lenta.ru recorded the main points of Natalia Zubarevich's lecture.
Rich and poor regions
If we decompose the country according to the economic component, then in Russia 11-13 percent of citizens live in rich regions (Moscow, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, YNAO, St. Petersburg and Sakhalin have been added to them since the late 2000s). Another 16-18 percent of the population lives in 10-12 regions with competitive advantages (Tatarstan, Perm, Krasnoyarsk Territories, Samara, Leningrad, Tyumen Regions, etc.) - these are developed, multifunctional regions that are not so rich, but have resources for development. they are.
At the other extreme - 10-11 percent of the population living in poor regions. These are not only underdeveloped republics with a predominance of the shadow economy and poor institutions. Several Russian regions with uncompetitive economies and long-term depression have low per capita GRP indicators; their development problems are also not solved quickly. Poor regions need long-term help through rent redistribution to reproduce human capital even with poor institutions or depressed economies. If this is not done, the population will be marginalized and security problems will worsen.
Russia's problem is the middle peasant regions, where 61 percent of the population lives. In regions with a median level of development, competitive advantages are weaker, so the quality of institutions is extremely important. If they work well, then the potential of the region is revealed, and if not, then the little that exists collapses.
It is constantly said that the country has enormous inequality in the public sector, but this is not entirely true. There are only seven regions where per capita budget revenues are significantly higher than the national average. All of them receive rent - status (capital) and oil and gas. This is rich Moscow and recently wealthy St. Petersburg thanks to the transfer of Gazprom Neft, part of Gazprom, VTB and other large Russian companies. The revenues of the northern capital are being administratively increased through the redistribution of capital rent. Previously, it was concentrated in Moscow, providing the city with huge budget revenues, which received income tax from all the largest companies in the country. These are also regions - recipients of oil and gas rent: rich autonomous regions and having an annuity from them Tyumen region, as well as Sakhalin and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug.
And it's all. If you look at the rest, you will not find fundamental differences there, they are more or less equal in terms of per capita budget revenues, taking into account price differences in the regions. Transfers from the budget help not only to pull up the underdeveloped republics, but also to reach some of them to a level exceeding the Russian average (Chechnya and Ingushetia). This is the price of peace. The Russian recipe for this is money. While the money is being divided, there is no time to shoot.
Who feeds the federal budget
If we take all tax revenues from the territories to the federal budget as 100 percent, then the main contribution to the federal budget - almost 60 percent - is made by only four subjects of the federation: 28 percent of all taxes come from KhMAO, 16-18 percent from Moscow, 10 percent from Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, 5 percent - Petersburg. The federal budget receives the mineral extraction tax (MET), which is provided by the leading regions of oil and gas production, and the value-added tax (VAT), which is concentrated where there are most end consumers - in the agglomerations of federal cities.
The second perspective is how all the taxes collected in each region are distributed between the regional and federal budgets. In most regions, 70 to 100 percent of the collected taxes go to their budget. The inverse proportion is only in oil and gas producing, most of all “taken away” from the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District (80-85 percent), Tomsk and Orenburg regions, the Nenets Okrug and Udmurtia (65-70 percent). Oil rent (MET) is withdrawn from oil and gas producing regions.
This structure should be kept in mind when we start talking about decentralization. Because in half of the regions of the Far East, in the underdeveloped republics, almost all the taxes collected remain. Tax decentralization can give little to the middle peasants, their budget revenues will grow insignificantly. The fiscal security of relatively developed regions will improve more noticeably, but those who are already rich will benefit the most. Therefore, in a country living on rent, there are no easy and simple solutions in terms of tax decentralization. And we must understand that any downward redistribution - MET and VAT - is a bonus to the rich. Although part of the income tax that the center takes, it is high time to give the regions.
Drying oil rent
Thanks to the rent, Russia got through the crisis of 2009 with fewer problems - it was flooded with money. The amount of transfers to the regions over the year increased from 1.2 trillion rubles to 1.6 trillion, that is, by a third. In 2010, when the crisis was ending, the Ministry of Finance tried to reduce transfers, but in 2011 free help regions again increased to 1.8 trillion rubles. The optimization policy began to be carried out more strictly in 2012, the volume of transfers to the regions in 2014 decreased to 1.57 trillion (excluding Crimea).
Photo: Dmitry Azarov / Kommersant
Since mid-March 2014, Crimea has received 7.2 percent of all transfers from the federal budget. If that year the peninsula had been part of Russia for all 12 months, it would have received almost 10 percent. At the same time, the population of the peninsula in Russia is 1.6 percent. But Crimea is now the number one geopolitical priority. Two other geopolitical priorities are also significant in terms of their share in transfers - the Far East (12.2 percent to 4.1 percent of the population) and the republics of the North Caucasus (10.6 percent to 4.4 percent of the population).
This is how the center chooses its priorities, and not a single governor can even utter a word, because federal decisions are not discussed. Russian governors know these rules of the game better than multiplication tables. They will go around and ask tête-à-tête for additional transfers, but they cannot say anything publicly about federal decisions on the distribution of already drying rents. The rules of the game form the regional elite that we have.
The Hunt for Funding
In 2014, the volume of transfers amounted to less than 1.6 trillion rubles. Only a quarter of this money was distributed according to the formula - in the form of an equalization grant depending on the level economic development regions (GRP per capita). Another 20 percent of this money is subventions allocated for the execution of federal powers in the regions. The rest is mainly subsidies for balance, which are allocated as the Kremlin and the government decide, and numerous subsidies that the regions must co-finance (this money comes from ministries and departments). And if you walk their corridors correctly, if you have the right people in the lobbying groups, you can get a lot of money.
The success of informal lobbying is very clearly seen in Chechnya. In 2012, the subsidy for equalization gave it 19 percent of all budget revenues, and subsidies for balance - another 35 percent, all kinds of subsidies - another 16 percent, and as a result, Chechnya had and maintains a level of per capita budget revenues that exceeds the average for the country.
Another example is Chukotka. In the early 2000s, when Abramovich became governor, she had a budget of 3 billion rubles, but in a couple of years it grew to 17 billion. Sibneft traders registered in Chukotka received large tax incentives, but shared revenues with the district budget. The “Chukotka miracle” did not last long, after the sale of Sibneft in 2005, the federal budget had to compensate for the shortfall in revenues for the district. A common case for Russia is the privatization of profits and the nationalization of losses.
Photo: Konstantin Lemeshev / Kommersant
Duties of the Governor
Before the new crisis, the system was built up clearly, the governors were responsible for three main points: peace in the region, the correct results of federal elections and the implementation of salary decrees. And attraction of investments, various regional projects is a bonus. They will praise him for it, they will make good PR. But not a single governor was fired for meager investments or economic failures.
During the crisis, salary decrees were pushed back, federal elections are not coming soon, and there are problems with calmness - he needs money, and there are fewer of them. Since 2015, the federal budget has begun to shrink, a 10 percent sequestration of spending has been announced, and hence transfers to the regions.
Governors will go from office to office even more and beat out money. They already spend up to a third of a month in Moscow, vice-governors dangle here, knocking on the thresholds of ministries and departments for the same purpose. The undercover struggle of the regional authorities for the shrinking pie of transfers will only intensify.
The struggle is fierce, because the regions are burdened with large debts due to the implementation of salary decrees. In January 2015, the total debt reached 2.4 trillion rubles (including municipal debt). On average, it is equal to a third of all budget revenues of the regions, excluding transfers, but in almost half of the regions - from 50 to 120 percent. At the same time, the vast majority of Russian regions have a budget deficit (75 regions in 2014, 77 regions in 2013), so they have nothing to repay their debt.
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that 44 percent of the debt structure is loans from commercial banks with high stakes and short return period. Only the lucky ones, including Chechnya, Ingushetia, the same Chukotka, the Republic of Mordovia and a number of other regions, the debt consists mainly of budget loans received from the Ministry of Finance. They are much cheaper and can be extended. There are already such examples. Tatarstan and the Krasnodar Territory received large budget loans for the preparation of the Universiade and the Olympics, and then the federal government decided that these “innovatively active” regions would have budget loans extended for 20 years at a rate of 0.5 percent per annum. At the current rate of inflation, this means the actual forgiveness of the debt, it will depreciate in 5-7 years. But also debt commercial banks v Russian conditions not so scary. The regions were mainly financed by Sberbank and VTB, owned by the state, and the federal authorities will somehow come to an agreement with them. The system of "manual" control extends not only to public authorities. Looking at all this, you begin to understand that a harmonious and perfect system has been created in its own way, but it definitely does not work for development.
Dependent population of Russia
Does the Russian population need decentralization? On the one hand, yes, because everyone curses the "snickering" Moscow. But if you dig deeper, it turns out that our population is very old, dependent on the redistribution of oil and gas rent, with huge income inequality, a quarter is employed in the informal economy without any guarantees and rights, and simply survives.
The incomes of the top 20 percent have doubled from Soviet levels, but the bottom two quintiles (40 percent of the country's population) are still worse off than in the USSR, their incomes are below Soviet levels, and the third quintile has just returned to this level. The Russians have become more dependent on the state, the share of benefits and pensions in the income of the population has reached almost 19 percent. Many people are afraid to change anything because it could affect their pensions, benefits and other social benefits. The poor are easy to manage. In the 1990s, “every grandmother had a package of buckwheat and a can of condensed milk” was enough, now the scheme is the same, only monetized - by the elections in all regions, spending on social protection of the population is growing.
Photo: Viktor Korotaev / Kommersant
What changes in a crisis? The population of Russia is a multiple world champion in survival in any conditions, but this does not contribute to the development of human potential. Most Russians will step up coping strategies and shrink consumption. For a much smaller part that considers itself competitive, well educated and earns more, in the event of a prolonged crisis, a forced return from the already familiar development strategies to survival strategies is possible. This is very stressful. The way out of it is emigration, either internal, with closure in a narrow circle of contacts, or real. For all groups of the population, the demands of decentralization, not to mention the federalism that frightens many, will be relegated to the tenth plan, and before the crisis they were far from being in the first place. After all, Russia is a country with a weak regional identity.
Where to expect change
In a crisis, one should not expect changes in relations between the center and the regions. Change will happen differently and slowly. The address of the changes is the largest cities with more educated and higher income populations. It is in them that a social stratum is being formed, freer and more independent of the state, thinking broader, wishing to live by the rules, and not by the concepts. It is in them that dissatisfaction with the current Russian institutions is growing faster, which makes the development of large cities hostage to the bad rules of the game. Large cities have significant budgetary resources, but most of them are withdrawn to the regional level. Residents of large cities are deprived of the opportunity to directly elect mayors, city managers are imposed on them, agreed with the governor. The vertical is delivered from the sky to the plinth. But this cannot go on indefinitely.
The influx of migrants to the largest cities will increase the number of people with more modern consumption standards and lifestyles, and values will change as a result. Sooner or later, many will understand that it is better to live by the rules, and not by the concepts. These values, having taken root in large cities, will be transmitted to the periphery in exactly the same way as the diffusion of consumer modernization is going on, but with a lag in time.
If more competitive territories and cities develop faster, then intra-country inequality increases. These are objective costs, measures are needed to mitigate inequality. It is not easy to find a balance between stimulating and equalizing policies, but this task can be solved.
But so far the opposite is true: centralization has reached its limit, there is no balance of interests, no system of checks and balances. Rigid vertical leads to the degradation of institutions and local initiative. The dependence of the regions on the center is increasing due to the redistribution of rent and the growth of debts. Regional authorities are not capable of consolidation and coordination. After more than ten years of appointments based on the criterion of loyalty, the quality of the governor corps has declined, some of them are professionally unfit to lead the region. The demand of the population for the development of their region is poorly articulated, households implement individual survival strategies and rely on social benefits and benefits. All this is summarized by a harsh word - degradation.
Even federal government suddenly weakens, then rational decentralization is unlikely in the existing institutional environment. A variant with chaotic decentralization is more realistic, when a kind of khanates or principalities will be formed in the regions. If there is no rigid vertical, a “war of all against all” for power and resources will begin in the regions.
The Russian pendulum will inevitably move towards decentralization. The main thing is that it should proceed gradually, with a smaller amplitude and not in a situation of collapse of the central government. Then an institutional system will be gradually formed in the country, ensuring a balance of interests of the center and regions. The role of the crisis is that all the defects of the existing system are highlighted like a spotlight. And this is important for getting rid of illusions.
Natalya Zubarevich Natalya Before talking about the new, current crisis, it would be nice to put it in context. Our first crisis was the hardest, fatally deep and long. It was the transition from plan to market. It began at the very end of the Soviet period, we began to fall actively since 1992, and to make it clear what a crisis really is, just the figures for the fall for 1991 and 1995: industrial production fell by more than two times, 48% remained , incomes of the population at the very bottom, about 45% of what it was in Soviet times remained. At the same time, the unemployment rate was not monstrous - 9.5%, because the "replacement" of unemployment was non-payment of wages. The context of the current crisis This first crisis - we call it transformational - is our own, internal, we created it through the transition from one political and economic regime to another. What happened then? Economically, this crisis was the most painful for regions with a developed manufacturing industry, especially machine-building and textile industries. They fell down very hard. Remained in many third, and even less than 30% of production. The second group of the most bruised are the underdeveloped republics. The industry there, at the first test of the crisis, fell down - 25-30% of what it was in Soviet times remained. And the third group is very interesting - these are cities of federal significance. Less than 30% of the industry remained there too, but it was a normal reformatting from the industrial type of development, through a blow, through a fall, to a gradual transition to a post-industrial one, which is typical for very large cities. Who noticed this first crisis weaker? If we're talking about economic indicators, the situation was much milder in the oil and gas regions. Then, after two or three years, metallurgists quietly crept up to them, who in Soviet times worked for the country's market, and somewhere by 1995 they were already quite familiar with the global market, since we had cheap raw materials, and labor, and environmental payments are minimal. Russian metallurgy rushed to the global market. Here is the first crisis. It began to stagnate in 1996, and then, literally 2 years later, we were hit by the second crisis - the financial one. This financial crisis is induced, first of all, it is Asian - then it went around the world. And secondly, we deepened this crisis with our own hands, accumulating debts and going into a severe default. This combination led to the fact that, first of all, the incomes of the population fell, they fell because of the devaluation, because the ruble collapsed six times, the incomes of the population fell by a quarter. The industry did not fall much. Immediately after the crisis, it began to grow. It was not an industrial crisis, it was global, it was short, according to the "fall-wrung out" scheme. And during this crisis, we received the highest increase in unemployment, it reached 13% - this is a lot for the Russian Federation. Who has suffered in this second global crisis, aggravated by their insane budgetary actions? Moscow. Banks flew, many people lost their jobs, those who were already in market services. But literally in the middle of 1999, everything began to rebuild. The periphery noticed this crisis only by price tags, in general, nothing terrible happened. What is the specificity of this crisis compared to all the previous ones? Once again, it started as an internal one and during 2013 and until mid-2014 it went on as an internal one, and only from the second half of 2014 external factors were added to it. This is, first of all, of course, the fall in oil prices. This hits, first of all, the federal budget. For regional budgets, this is not so important, they do not particularly receive these revenues. I assure you that even for oil and gas companies this is not so important, because the higher the price of oil, the greater the share in the form of rent is taken away by the state. And many companies do not care, oil costs 35-40 dollars per barrel, or 100-110, because the delta goes into the pocket of the state, goes to the budget. Accordingly, this crisis was exacerbated by external...
Economist, director of the regional program of the Independent Institute for Social Policy Natalia Zubarevich delivered a lecture at the London club "Open Russia" on "The crisis in Russia - a regional projection: what to expect and what to prepare for".
Natalya Zubarevich: Let me tell you what is really happening in Russia. I will try to draw a picture so that you more clearly understand what to expect and what to prepare for.
Another crisis in Russian history - not the first, but completely new. In general, we had different crises. The first crisis, as we remember (the youth does not remember), is a transformational one. It was very difficult to move from plan to market. This transition took four years. He was the heaviest.
The second and third crises were global. We were not lucky, because it hit everyone and hit us. These were not internal Russian crises - we were hurt. Although there was domestic debt in 1998, they accumulated debt with their warm hands. But anyway, it was the Asian crisis, but it flew to us.
But this crisis, a new one, began as an internal one. Since 2013, the industry stopped growing, investments began to fall, debts of the regional budgets began to accumulate sharply and grow. We created this crisis by the peculiarities of our institutional design, our climate, our decisions.
And only then, in the second half of 2014, did oil prices skyrocket. In 2015, prices for non-ferrous metals and coal fell by a quarter, and now for iron ore and cellulose. That is, it began to be added, added, and our export industry now does not feel ideal, with the exception of chemists - they are more or less fine so far.
But the bottom line is that this crisis began as an internal one. This is a crisis of bad institutions. This is a crisis, I would say, the end of the old growth model. And the oil has already just sealed it.
Compare how hard it goes. I understand that the farther from Russia, the stronger the apocalyptic feeling. Relax. To make you relax, compare the rates of decline. Here is the dynamics of industrial production.
First crisis. Like? More than double down. Dynamics of incomes of the population.
Second Crisis. Look at the dynamics of the population's income - a quarter at once. See what we have in 2015. Yes, the industry is the recession of 2009. Feel the difference? Well, yes, problems. As in the old joke: well, horror, but not horror-horror-horror! This is a slow crisis. Its problem is that it is long. It will not end according to the “fell-wrung out” scheme - this must be very clearly understood. This crisis is long, yes. It will stretch.
And when it slowly gets worse, worse, slowly, it leads to the most terrible thing - addiction. And when you get used to it, and you stop resisting, and every time you adapt to what you have, it ends in degradation. That is the risk of this crisis. Addiction, adaptation to the worst and degradation - this is the most dangerous thing in it.
Let's look at geography. She is very curious. During the transformational crisis of the 1990s, the Soviet manufacturing industry, as expected, fell - it was uncompetitive. And the underdeveloped republics, in which this industry was generally induced, fell - such was the Soviet experience of industrialization. And the oil and gas industry felt normal in the regions. And then, by the mid-1990s, metallurgical industries also built in - they crawled out for export, they succeeded.
The second crisis is the crisis, first of all, of the gigantic Russian debt. It hit Moscow; the periphery did not notice much. Because banks were pouring in Moscow, prices were rising everywhere, but in Moscow even more clearly.
The third crisis is mainly an internal one - the uncompetitive Russian engineering industry - and a global one. Because metallurgists were the first to fall. In November-December 2009, the metallurgical regions showed a decline, you know what? Minus 35, minus 40: this is serious, this is for real. The blast furnaces were just on strike. It was very tough.
And there were territories that did not notice this crisis at all. The Far East flew through it just like an airplane - everything is fine, we are preparing for the APEC summit, we are building a pipeline, we have a very decent subsidy, "everything is fine, beautiful marquise." And underdeveloped republics - no problem. You had a subsidy of 70-80%, so it has not gone away.
And now there is a new crisis. It is already viewed geographically as follows. Firstly, for the first time, modern machine-building regions flew off - this is the auto industry, a new one that came to us together with Western companies, high-tech; he stumbled over the ceiling of effective demand. People don't have money to buy it.
The second is our semi-depressive mechanical engineering. Every crisis beats them. But who is in the pluses, look: import substitution by import substitution - you can sing about it for a long time, but ... In general, to be honest, the point is not only the ban on the import of European Union products, but, first of all, the ratio of the ruble and the dollar.
Import substitution is really happening in our country; people are getting poorer, they can no longer buy another. The agrarian south is doing well. Yes, there are problems, but against the backdrop of the country, he is better off.
The oil and gas industry, our indestructible everything - either zero, like Khanty and Yamal, or pluses, like new deposits: I mean Sakhalin, Nenets, Yakutia - there is growth.
And, finally, enchantingly, for the first time in 25 years, the regions of the military-industrial complex are growing. There the question is very clear: how much money, so much growth. All of these are public investments. No private business is investing there. How much money the budget has enough, so much they will grow.
There are three most difficult moments in this crisis.
First of all, these are budgetary problems.
These are investment issues. A country that has been reducing investment for three years in a row (and Russia is like that), and at an increasing pace, is a country that is shrinking its future. No investment - no new jobs.
And the third is a very strong consumption crisis. People began to consume significantly less, even compared to how their incomes fell: people got scared.
It must be understood that this is to a lesser extent an industrial crisis. It is not about factories, although there are problematic ones. But that's not what collapsed. The industry was partially affected. And this is definitely not yet a crisis about unemployment. There are other forms. The standard “factory stopped, everyone lost their jobs” is not about this crisis.
Before explaining, I will enlighten you very briefly. In 2015, the federal budget got up. In 2015, he ended the year for the first time with a $2 trillion deficit. This is a lot.
What is the problem? 37% - customs duties, their share in income. Customs duties fell by 40%. They are based on oil and gas duties. And imports have decreased in Russia by almost 40%, and these duties have gone down. What remained was the mineral extraction tax. But until recently, there was no budget deficit in 2014, because the mechanism worked. Here is the oil price going down. The federal budget, which collects almost all the rent from oil prices, is losing. And at the same time, the ruble is falling in your country, and the federal budget collects more rubles due to this. This is how they balanced almost until the end of 2014.
In 2015, this raspberry ended, because the ruble fell slightly. But he fell even now, in January 2016. So, cycle number 8 - again, we'll balance it a little.
The budget will feel bad, but it will not die, and it certainly will not squander all the reserves. And, believe me, the reserves will be saved like you can - cut expenses.
Now look at how the process of cutting costs is going. So I named the deficit for 2015 - almost 2 trillion. Now look at what we have with income, what with expenses.
Federal budget revenues decreased by 5%; at the same time, oil and gas companies grew by 18%, but other, non-oil and gas companies grew by 8% - inflation helped, income tax in rubles grew.
Now look at the costs. They grew by 16%. Until we balance. What started to balance? These disadvantages are culture, healthcare, education. But here's a red arrow specially placed: security and law enforcement - have already begun to cut these costs. Everything! Life forces. So far, defense spending is in fantastic pluses (plus 35 in 2015). My forecast for 2016 is that they will shrink, there is nowhere to go. What they will definitely not compress, and you will now explain to me why, is the cost of physical education and sports, plus 75%.
What is the reason? What, we love physical education and sports so much? Championship - he, dear! This is an inexhaustible obligation - you will have to finance. And it would be necessary to slow down, but no way: by 2018, the stadiums should be built. Now look at the three quarters of 2015.
That's the federal budget we blinded. More than 21% - defense, more than 12% - national security: that is, a little more than a third - social policy. There are two things sitting there - these are transfers to federal beneficiaries, which fall within federal competence, and a transfer Pension fund which grows every year.
You can see how little the federal budget spends on the reproduction of human capital - this is basically what the regions should do. My forecast for 2016 is that the national defense will have to be cut down. There will be fewer militant statements, because "I don't care about fat, I would live."
So that you understand how they live Russian regions. It seems that everything is gathered in the center; but it is not so. If we take only tax revenues without duties, then the ratio is almost 50/50.
Both regional people and the opposition like to say that all the money was taken up. Oil rent was taken upstairs to make it clear. She grew up a lot, and she was selected upstairs. This is normal - it then needs to be redistributed. See how dependent the regions are on transfers (everyone understands the word “transfer”? This is a transfer from the federal budget). The red share is Medvedev's national projects. You can see how the transfer was added: it was 0.6%, it became 1.2%. We walked around the buffet on big oil money very well. We have increased expenses so that you are my mother! Look, here is the crisis of 2009: 1.2-1.6%, transfers to the regions increased by a third. So that's why they skipped. Every year the volume of transfers physically, in rubles, excluding inflation, is reduced. Regions have to adapt to the contraction - commitments are already inflated.
When we have inflated obligations, in addition to national projects, the main ones were presidential decrees on wage increases. Moreover, they were made in such a way that 70% of the costs fell on the shoulders of the regions. And only 30% was added by the federal budget. The regions got out as best they could - they had to be very tough to account for the decrees. Result: three years of deficit.
Thank God, in 2015 there are the same number of regions, but the deficit is smaller - about 191 billion.
But look: 2015 is ending, and what is the scale of the deficit? There are regions where it is under 20% or more. This is destabilization. Why is this picture bad? The fact that the regions have been in crisis for the third year, their budgets have been unbalanced for the third year. This is a very bad management situation. And how it will be resolved is not completely clear; while she is hanging. Some amount of money is thrown in, the toughest problems are sorted out somehow, but all the same it flounders in an unbalanced state.
What should the regions do? They crawl, occupy. This picture for me is Russia. Why? First, everything is different - you see. Second, pay attention to red and green. Red is loans from commercial banks. These are expensive loans, they have to be repaid, they are usually short. And green is budget credits. And even if you have some wonderful Chukotka - and it is wonderful, with a level of debt that is almost equal to its own income, without transfers from its budget; Chukotka can score on everything.
What is a budget loan? This is a loan that has been issued at a rate of 0.5% per annum since this year. Are you economically literate people? Can you imagine the scale of inflation in Russia? This year there will be 14. And it can be extended - at least for 10 or even 20 years. And for those who got this green one well, you can not be upset, no matter what the scale of their debt. They will agree with the federal budget.
And someone was not lucky, for someone this debt is presented in red - loans from a commercial bank. And here are the big questions. And this once again shows a clearing - a huge number of regions, all different type management: someone gets into debt, someone shrinks.
Accordingly, it is clear that the situation is very different. Therefore, it cannot be said that in Russia there is a total crisis of everything and everything: it is not so. The situation is differentiated.
Here is a picture of the last deficit in 2015. Where are the risks sitting? In an area where there is a high deficit and a high debt-to-earnings ratio. This is already more than half of the regions. We'll see what's next. While the situation is somehow collapsing. But the problem is that it cannot be destroyed indefinitely. One of the ways to resolve is big inflation. You know, inflation always devalues debt - we'll see. While the problems are serious, but not explosive. In manual mode, the Ministry of Finance somehow resolves them.
See how diverse the income situation is. They are different. Income tax is very good in some regions. Because the costs are in rubles, if this is export production, and the profit is in foreign currency; then you're doing pretty well.
See what happens to spending. I won't comment, just showing you how different things are. And someone has a disaster.
And the situation is also very different in terms of costs. Regions cut costs, but not all. In general, in Russia, to be honest, federalism is real. We always thought - vertical, vertical, but as soon as you start counting money and watching how the regions behave, you begin to see that everyone is getting out as best they can. And the feds are behaving differently too.
Look here: the level of subsidization of the regions - so that you understand how different they are. Here is Moscow - almost none. There Khanty, Yamal. And this is our wonderful North Caucasus. And the last - Crimea, in 2015. Somewhere in the middle - the North Caucasus: this is how it turns out, everything is different.
Why is it important to look at the regions? Because you somehow look vertically, very politicized, what is in the Kremlin. This is important, but the essential life of people primarily takes place in the regions. Look at the share of expenditures for social purposes in all expenditures of the regional budgets. For some, this has long been under 80%, while others live quietly, calmly. The Tyumen region is rich. Sakhalin is also very rich. And Chukotka, which received a very good deal of transfers this year. But she decided that why should she spend on people, and she spent it on infrastructure.
Therefore, the country is different, but the bulk shows that the burden of social spending is very high. When your situation is unstable, expenses are greater than income, what begins is what begins - the cutting of expenses.
Look at what we have in the social network: so far there is data for January-October, but I just transfer it to you in rubles without taking into account inflation. Spending on culture - minus 43 regions, education - 41 and more.
See how different the situation is? The country is made up of very different vectors, the country must be understood and known. I would warn you against a hasty, one-dimensional feeling that everything is disgusting, or everything is wonderful, or nothing changes - everything is different, and this must be understood. There are common problems, but in general, the policy of the regional authorities is quite diverse, it is somehow trying to adapt. Another thing is how it will adapt on the eve of the elections: it’s not good at all to cut spending on social protection, but it’s possible for education, and for healthcare too, there are some schemes there; therefore, the Russians will have to adapt to the deterioration.
Now about the real economy. How is the Russian crisis going? I would like to understand how long it will be. Here is the industrial dynamics for you, here is the dynamics of the manufacturing industry: you fell, did push-ups and lie down. I have the latest data for December. What flies in the form of investments - rested, again began to fall. If we take the second group - construction - look at the decline: it began to fall very strongly in November-December, so now it is already at the level of a low base. And, finally, the hardest thing: real incomes - they jump, jump, now the base effect is back in December.
Now look at consumption and wages. Wages are already at 10%, and consumption has not subsided yet. We thought that was it, we were already tensed up - nothing like that: the next stage of the fall. Do you know why? This is also a base effect. Who was in Moscow in November-December 2014 - what did the capital and its environs do? I bought everything I could, and here the base effect worked.
Now look how our economy finished the year in 2015-2014. Everything is moderate: GDP - 4%, industry - 3%, processing - 5%, agriculture in the pros, import substitution effects work, but the euro-ruble-dollar effect works no less, it has become very expensive to buy many things.
What fell in Russia? In Russia, exports fell in value terms, but not in volumes, we exported more oil, but here I didn’t even have enough column - 38%, imports fell. We are a country that compresses consumption in everything, including imports; we fence ourselves off because we are victorious, and not just because we have banned imports. Now the situation, which, for example, I am very afraid of: this is the situation of autarky, an impoverished country. Look, investments - 8%, growing, construction at the end of the year was also - 8-10%, that's the worst thing, for the year retail - 10%, wages - 10%, income - 4%. And there were no problems with unemployment until 2015, it even decreased by 6% and grew by 7% for the whole of 2015. Do you know what Russian unemployment is at the end of 2015? Well, who understands, its level in Spain, but in the same Britain - 5.8%, the normal level is 5%, to make it clear, in Spain it is over 20% - this is our crisis.
Now let's see how it goes around the country. With investments, everything is clear: the country is losing an investor and investments, and not foreign ones - that's all! See how the center, the northwest, the entire Urals and half of the Volga region sank. But the most curious is Siberia.
We were going to turn east; you say - but the Far East is good. I answer: in the Far East, these enchanting pluses are given by regions in which there has never been investment. Amurskaya is a cosmodrome on state money, and in Magadan, when you had nothing ... An apple plus an apple - two apples, in dynamics, how many percent growth? Hundred, here we are watching it. Large regions - look, Khabarovsk Territory, Primorsky Territory, large, real-economic, Yakutia - is everything clear?
If we look at 51 regions, where does the money go? This is about turning east. Here are the data for January-September; There is no third quarter of the year yet. Far East - 7%, North Caucasus - 3%. 0.3% - this is the Crimean Federal District, because its investment does not go through these schemes, and there the money is mainly only for the bridge. The bridge is really actively financed, no problem, if you take in the regional section, do you understand where the money goes? But the reproduction of oil and gas - money always goes to Tyumen, the capital of our country. Tatarstan, the Moscow region, the Krasnodar Territory, even St. Petersburg - look how he moved. Apparently, those who make decisions in Moscow have taken root. And Peter went to the periphery, that is, this is not about the Far East at all, there is no turning to the east in the Russian Federation, it’s enough to whistle about the steam locomotive. There is no investor there. Let's see what will happen next; Nothing yet.
Here is the construction. Look at what happened in 2014 - blue, and look at what happened in January-November 2015. You can relax about the south - this is a burp of the Olympics, they invested a lot, and then for two years in a row it all falls, nothing is being built there anymore, there are no Olympic facilities.
But I draw your attention to the Ural Federal District. Western Siberia is assigned to the Urals, for a moment, the Tyumen region with districts. Understand what the risks are? We do not even reproduce the oil base in Russia as a whole: you see how sad everything is.
Northwest, Crimea - construction is growing, Moscow is still holding on. And Peter, for example, has already crumbled with his construction very thoroughly. Moscow is also holding on because, if you look at the spending structure of its budget, it's killer. Spending on the national economy grew by 24%, while spending on general education- by 10%, they left only at kindergartens. Health care costs - 8%, the authorities are introducing roads, building transitions in the subway; and the Moscow authorities save on social expenses, on human capital.
So what is modern Russia? This is how they consumed in 2014 compared to 2013. Two last months convulsive consumption, shopping, everyone who has little money - buckwheat, who has more - a new gadget, who has even more - the last car from the showcase of a car dealership. I know a man who came to an expert party and said: “Yes! I took the last one from the display! And who had even more money - some fools bought an investment apartment, but now they will deal with it, it was impossible to do this. Some people borrowed and bought a mortgage or something else for the last time. Now in Russia there will be a lot of interesting things, because economically responsible behavior is still unattainable for many Russians. But most importantly - see how everything hit. The whole country was covered by the strongest drop in income. I had a meeting with an American expert, he said: “Such a fall - will people protest?” The answer from my side was purely Russian: “Right now!”.
People will shrink and adapt because the drop in income was not as strong. Fall on regions - 6-8%. There is simply no need to believe the data on the wonderful Republic of Ingushetia, it makes no sense to count incomes there, you simply won’t count anything.
But the bottom line is that it seems that consumption has been squeezed at a faster rate than the decline in income. This is our everything, this is our Russian way, our entire history of the twentieth century taught us this for sure: if something breaks down, save as much as you can - you will survive. Save as much as you can - which is what the country is doing now. And no protests. Discontent is growing, irritation is growing, everything is true, but the answer to this is super simple: “What did you want? Enemies are all around, and oil has fallen.” And this answer is perceived, people understand. Life is like a zebra: black, white. Well, a black streak has come - and they will adapt.
Now for the industry: the pink one is manufacturing, and the blue one is all. See how everything is different? 34 regions have just fallen, well, there will be 41. Everything is different, there are growing regions, so this is not about a total industrial crisis - it's about something else.
What will happen next? There are understandable risks: these are risks associated with the fact that the Russian industry is very dependent on the import of components, and they have all risen in price. In our country, intermediate imports in certain sectors, even in the food industry, can reach 40%.
Even in the agricultural sector, we import seed material, we import some growth accelerators, and so on. You will laugh - we import a genetic egg, our poultry farms work on an imported genetic egg. And a lot of seeds are imported.
About the industry - well, what can you say? Automotive industry - 70% of the cost will be for imported parts and components, so this is a problem, how it will go - I do not understand; have to follow. Because, in principle, you cannot raise the price of your products in accordance with the fall of the ruble, because there is already a ceiling of effective demand: you will not sell it. The industry is struggling to adapt, but there will be a squeeze. In general, I believe that in 2016, most likely, the contraction will accelerate, but it is still very difficult to understand in which sectors.
The second is loans. This is a big problem - they are very expensive. But this problem can also be circumvented. For example, in 2015, the Russian military-industrial complex, our military-industrial complex, the defense industry complex was directly financed from the federal budget without any stupid bank loans. Advance payment gave - forward and with a song! Came around and solved the problem. Now the key “chip” is how effective demand will continue to fall both in the economy of enterprises and among the population. Therefore, who will definitely remain “in the pros” for the time being is the export resource industries. Our raw material export component will increase during this crisis, the flux will grow. Because, no matter how prices fall, there are questions about the ruble related to exports to China. Will the Chinese buy more or, conversely, cut back. No matter how global prices for their products fall, the ruble has more than halved over the past year. Accordingly, costs in rubles, profit in foreign currency - this is an indestructible advantage.
Let's talk about unemployment so that you understand what kind of country we are and what awaits us. We have no unemployment in very many regions. I won't say anything about the North Caucasus - there are just very few jobs there. Exactly the same in wonderful Tuva. In underdeveloped territories, jobs are not created, and the population is arriving. The rest are not so scary.
What dampens? In Russia, the first and main format for reducing costs is not the release of workers, but the reduction of their wages. Business, in general, does not care whether to fire a person or drastically reduce his earnings. Costs are cut in both cases. Here is our main model. So far, the problem is not very strong. In the third quarter (figures for the year are not yet available) of 2015, downtime and part-time work in the region as a whole are quite small, although it is clear that Kaluga is worse than Tver, Ivanovo. And here is the second format - holidays without saving the content. They are not mixed in statistics. Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk, Perm Territory - problems are also growing there, but there are still opportunities to increase part-time employment. Everyone was sent on vacation. Now AvtoVAZ has gone on vacation for a couple of weeks.
Part-time work week - it's all with a drop in wages. And it is still possible to do so. The question is to what? to the essential. I always thought it was such an industrial tool. In industry, people were sent on vacation, and they sit at home, eat potatoes. But when I found out that 15% of us work part-time in the hotel and restaurant sector… That is, this trend moved to the service sector. You do not want to lose staff, but there is no client, so you save as much as you can. We are very well trained in such schemes and transfer them to other sectors of the economy.
The second damper is our age structure. Those who were 15 in 2011 are now about 19. A few more years and they will enter the labor market. See the difference? Is this difference clear? Population at certain ages. These guys have already entered the labor market. A very small generation enters the labor market, and it will remain so for the rest of this decade and beyond. During a crisis, the pressure on the labor market from young people is reduced. The summer of 2016 will be critical for me. I will try to see if the university graduates managed to find a job. More or less succeeded last year.
But look who is leaving the labor market. These are those who are 55-60 years old. Look how big this generation is. They themselves are not eager to leave, they would still work. But it is easy to fire them - they are pensioners. And you see what's the difference? This is the second damper. The first is part-time employment, and the second is the demographic situation in Russia. And this picture will last at least another 5-6 years. It will alleviate unemployment.
I show you what we will have in working age. This is not my forecast - this is Rosstat. Look at the decline in the working-age population: we will have minus 10 million people.
There are three scenarios here. Unrealistic - it will be so if the balance of migration (profit minus loss) will be plus 600 thousand per year. And this is the middle, according to Rosstat, plus 400 thousand, and this is the worst option - plus 200 thousand. Then we will have minus 12%.
So, according to the results of 2015, the net migration balance in Russia will be about 240,000, which is already much closer to this scenario. If now there was some the economic growth I would advise everyone to go to Russia and look for a job. But in a crisis, this is salvation, and the labor market is not under pressure.
It is also important to understand what the Russian labor market is. Here it is all structured. Here is the unemployment registered in general form. Here are large and medium-sized enterprises and organizations, I drew them in millions. The number of employees is reduced every year. The Russian "krupnyak" and medium-sized enterprises are pushing people out, optimizing. These are small businesses and legal entities. This is an IP, that is, private traders. But this is no longer 17-18 million. I gave you the figure for 2012; no more precise data are available at present. This is already under 20 million people. Already under a quarter Russian market labor is informally employed. What does it mean? People are somehow interrupted. The same truckers, some of them are also informals. They sit in the shade and do not pay taxes. Why did they arise so much about this road? They fix you when you pass. And this damper also reduces pressure. Squeezed out from somewhere - went into informal employment. And this will also mitigate pressure, including political. People are looking for something. Who sells mushrooms and berries, who else does something, who is engaged in carting. The Russians are spinning as best they can.
And finally, what to expect in this crisis? This crisis will be different not only in duration. It is really long, it is not for a year, not for two. We don't know how long, but it's long. And in terms of speed, it is much slower than the previous ones. I have named budgets, investments, consumption reduction.
But it is also geographically different. We are accustomed to consider a recession in industrial production, an increase in unemployment - and that's it, a catastrophe. Yes, it will show up somewhere. There are enterprises that are already feeling bad. First, machine-building regions. The worst situation now is in the automotive industry and car building. These are often more modernized industries, but there is no demand - last year demand fell, so another quarter of the fall in the automotive industry, and 40-45% remained in car building, more than half of production fell.
We used to say: "Yes, it will be a depressed machine-building region." Now I would add that, perhaps, the manufacturing industry of the Far East as a whole will have problems. There is not so much of it there, but what goes, goes very much on budget money. Even what seems to be private. Sollers, together with Toyota, assemble cars at the facilities of the Far East Machine Building Plant. The locals do not buy them, and the federal budget pays a special subsidy for the transportation of these cars from the Far East beyond Baikal, closer to Western Siberia for someone to take. Locals believe that this is not something that should be taken. Gadgets twisted Russian knobs. But, nevertheless, this crisis decline in industrial production will increase. Unemployment risks will increase, but more or less slowly.
But we have the tools and we have the experience. During the crisis of 2009-2010, active measures to support employment proved to be quite normal. They are not so expensive - the increase in these measures was about 50 billion rubles. To make it clear to you how much is spent annually on the Crimean bridge: there is an annual estimate of 50 billion rubles. And for the same 50 billion throughout the country to deploy active support for employment is a penny. You get an unfortunate 4-5 thousand, but it's something. This has been worked out instrumentally, and the population knows how to survive. Therefore, it is clear that it will be worse, but I do not feel any explosions here yet. Moreover, I hasten to add that in the south this crisis is actually passing more easily. But as for the Far East, unlike in 2009, I would not say this, and even more so about Siberia.
Will there be political trials? If there are sharp strong layoffs, then yes, but they will be short-term. But there are no fools. All these schemes are debugged. Dismissed in the real sector very carefully, little by little. The tail of the dog is cut off neatly. Therefore, there are no mass protests. I don't feel like there will be many. Well, they will poke somewhere, they will add it somewhere. But it is unlikely to be something massive.
We agreed that this crisis is long-term. And for the first time this crisis will truly affect all the largest agglomerations. Not only Moscow, like the crisis of 1998, when the banking sector died and problems began, but not everyone either.
The main problem was with the currency. See what's happening. I showed you the sector of market services - in consumption alone, in retail - minus 13% month on month, and retail and all trade is one in four employed in Moscow, in wholesale and retail. Every fourth! Construction flies capitally. Thank God, guest worker employment can be regulated there. They are widely represented in construction and retail..
If we are talking about what they will continue to fall, - a decrease in income and effective demand. January 2016 has not been cancelled. Do you remember how the course flew in January 2016? The second round of the currency crisis. What's happening? Compression of the sector of market services. This is the main type of employment in the Russian Federation for large and largest cities - the sector of market and public services. There is a felling, cost reduction.
Children's question: where are the most schools? Where are the most hospitals? Where are the most clinics? In large and major cities. It's just that their concentration is higher there. Accordingly, when you have two types of compression superimposed - both market services and budget services, what is called public goods, and you do not have structural tools. Do you think that for 4 thousand someone will go to fight in big city? No.
And yet, the tool is there. And you know this instrument very well, as, probably, you lived or were in Russia not so long ago. This is a more economically active population. These are people with higher human capital, people who are more adaptive. They will start to stir and look for something else. What is happening in Moscow. But this is a significant reduction in your salary and status expectations. You find by losing salaries and status.
It is unlikely that there will be a large increase in unemployment. But people will start taking the worst jobs. What does it mean? In large cities, a quasi-middle class was formed. Half of the Russian middle class is officials and their families. But the non-bureaucratic part, which is more educated, which earns better - it has changed its way of life. She already somehow behaves differently, she knows how to go somewhere to rest, she consumes paid medical services and even paid education, and even abroad. And now she's starting to have a hard time. Either you shrink - you just won't buy a TV once every five years, but you will buy it once every eight. If you are completely below, you will buy a kilogram less buckwheat and two pairs less shoes.
You are used to a new, "modern" type of consumption, but it is no longer available to you. And this survival strategy dominates in Russia. People reduce not just salary claims. People are transforming their way of life, which was a tool of modernization, towards a tool of survival, simple and gloomy. Change of lifestyle from developing to survival. For those who can, who are competitive, migration is noticeably developing. This is especially noticeable in the IT sphere, and not only. I know the situation in IT a little better - people there are quite actively leaving.
And again, my question is about political protest. Will big cities be unhappy? Moscow University won't be fired entirely, right? And even the entire GUM-TSUM will not be fired. Doctors left when they cut down the number of those actively employed in hospitals - 300-400 people left; no one supported them, because the public sector is dependent. You left - tomorrow you will be removed. And suddenly it turns out that the urban environment, which two or three years ago gave a request for modernity, for transformation, in this crisis begins to behave, most likely, in exactly the same way as average industrial cities behave. The only difference is that people have a much wider range of opportunities for adaptation. But the key "trick" is the same - adaptation takes place at the household level, without the use of collective action. This loan passes according to the standard Russian model of survival at all levels.
What does it mean? If we used to think that our everything is advanced large-city Russia, every fifth Russian lives there. Now 21%. Another 11% are cities with a population of half a million or more. There is also a rural periphery where more potatoes will be planted. Urban-type settlements are about the same, if they are not beyond the Arctic Circle. Industrial Russia is a Russia that will demand protection and care from the state, and the state will meet it halfway, because here is the key electorate. But the Russia of large cities, as we thought, would develop, modernize and try to change the political design of the system.
My feeling during this crisis is exactly the opposite. Apparently, the advanced and educated population of large cities is ready to give requests for changing the system when it is “in the pros”, when it develops, when it has a drive. And then it says: "Yes, we want it differently." But when everything falls, everything shrinks, our Soviet instinct is restored - to survive in small groups. Friends, relatives, bonding support for absolutely small groups.
Such a sad thing I told you. What does it mean? This means that in the next five to seven years, with a very high probability, there will be social degradation. Not only in terms of spending on education, health care - don't go to a fortuneteller here, everything is clear here. What scares me the most is that confinement in burrows, a sense of self-reliance, "household Juche" will also worsen the social environment. It is clear that not for everyone; there will always be sprouts. But we are starting to slow down very much in the process that I really hoped for - in the process of social integration in advanced environments. It will be much more difficult for him now. Those who are connected with mercy and charity complain very much. It has become much more difficult. But still, this process cannot be stopped, we have entered a pause, we have even entered a rollback. There is nothing linear, progressive. This process must be experienced. When it ends, I don't know. But socially we slow down. And if we take the entire society of the country, then we are in for a certain period of degradation. You have to be ready for this. Sorry for such a sad ending. Note that I did not use the word “politics”: I tried to talk about processes in society and the economy. I'm not a political scientist, the question is not for me. But here is the “substrate” that is being formed, I tried to describe to you.
Question from the floor:
Why depreciation national currency does not lead to increased investment in export-oriented sectors? No foreign direct investment, not even domestic investment. I'm not talking about the oil and gas industry, but about the real industry.
Natalya Zubarevich:
Direct foreign investment last year amounted to 10% of previous years, that is, they fell 10 times. The risks of investing are off scale, so there are few real violent ones, including among investors. Do not want.
With domestic investment, not everything is so simple. Big oil and gas business continues to invest in existing fields to maintain production volumes, but slows down all new projects that will pay off in the long term. And they invest in current ones, because they need cash flow. They don't invest in processing and stuff for the simple reason that no one can calculate the economy correctly. You don’t understand, if you have an export picture, how much is the cost, and how much is the profit. If you deliver inside the country, then what is the effective demand? In the conditions of uncertainty in business (and in Russia there is a very high uncertainty), there is a rule of "good". Here they fit.
Question from the floor:
How over-credited is the Russian economy?
Natalya Zubarevich:
The government has minimal debt. Business and bank loans were high, which is why December 2014 happened, when there were more than 500 billion dollars, now 300-odd. They lead a very careful policy. First of all, these are loan repayments. And 2015 was already not so difficult in terms of the intensity of returns compared to December 2014, which then brought down the dollar due to the fact that Rosneft borrowed a lot. Yes, they are, but payments on them have ceased to be critical for companies. Banks are still uncomfortable because they can't borrow. Here it affects. And the volume of loans to companies and banks has become much more moderate.
Question from the floor:
Good Western economists say that in the near future the main global problem will be a strong fall in China. If this happens, how much will it affect?
Natalya Zubarevich:
Firstly, this will definitely affect the coal miners, because more than half of the Trans-Siberian Railway's load is coal exports to China. So it will also affect railway, because the deceleration of the economy is a decrease in demand for a resource. Metallurgists no longer have a Chinese metal exporter. It used to be imported, but now not so much. For example, the same Evraz factories in Kemerovo, working in the East, it will be more difficult for them. Demand for non-ferrous metals will fall. This is the problem of Norilsk Nickel, the Krasnoyarsk Territory and Murmansk region. The copper workers have the same Norilsk Nickel, Sverdlovsk region- the same export copper industry.
It will be worse for all Russian exporters. And how will Rosneft behave, which pledged oil sales to China for 20 years in advance ... She gets her money ... How to politely say ... They are hedged. But this will come back to haunt the entire Russian export sector. We are not talking about individual product groups, but about a general decline in demand. But, frankly, 6% growth ... so I live like that! Although we do not really believe these figures.
Question from the floor:
Does the policy of exporting capital provide any real advantages for solving internal Russian situations?
Natalya Zubarevich:
I am not a macroeconomist, but I remember the figure. Last year it was an outflow of 150 billion. But do not forget that these were also debt payments. This year they expect 50 billion, significantly less. Because there are fewer payments on the debt, and they began to pull out, apparently, also less. Everything we could already. The main thing is that there is a very important component - it is debt payments.
Therefore, there is an outflow of capital, but there are also returns, and re-registration, deoffshorization, and the bringing of people from top management teams to Russia.
Question from the floor:
A question about the banking sector….
Natalya Zubarevich:
Not a banker, I won't even comment. I know that all the people who are closer to this sector say that the sector is weak, that there are a lot of problems. But while the state supports the largest ones, And the rest ... You can see for yourself, every week two or three banks are under reorganization. It is believed that three hundred is enough for them, but there were more than a thousand. Well, there are fewer and fewer schools. This is politics.
Question from the floor:
How long can the Reserve Fund last and what will happen when it runs out?
Natalya Zubarevich:
And how will you steer, and how devaluation will go. I tried to show you that if you drop - or drop not on purpose - the ruble against the dollar, then your ruble revenues in the budget grow.
Yes, every ruble is worth less. But formally, you can cover the budget deficit with an increased amount of rubles, at least in part.
The second is how you will cut expenses. I showed you that even under the article “national security” minus 2% for January-October, our people have already begun to cut down. I believe that next year they will cut it the other way around. Because there will be no such growth. Let's forget about the social sphere.
Thirdly, whom will you cut off from the mother's breast in terms of large companies that were subsidized? Russian Railways did not give large subsidies this year, but what was it like under Yakunin? Half the development program for the development of the Far East, more than 600 billion rubles on request. Do you know how much Russian Railways accounted for there? Three hundred fourty. Whoever is big in Russia has great lobbying opportunities. Because everything is flexible.
For example, I repeat on every corner that the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation is pursuing a very balanced and accurate policy. Another thing is that it is not able to break a stronger resource when it is on top ... As part of their policy, they are trying their best. central bank, I believe, too, although I am not a macroeconomist. But the economic bloc of the government is trying to balance the situation. Therefore, talk about the fact that the reserve fund is being eaten by the end of 2016 is just talk.
A lot will depend on spending policy and exchange rate policy. Therefore, do not rush to bury. I will tell you as a person who has lived in Russia all his conscious life: for some reason my inner voice tells me (perhaps he is mistaken, but he has been for many years) that, in any case, the Fund national welfare to the presidential elections will exist. Because I don't know the power that goes to the polls without a stash. And there are no fools in Russia. It's just some other mind. But there are no fools. Therefore, do not rush.
Question from the floor:
You have mentioned several times that expenditures in education have decreased by 5% from year to year, but, on the other hand, in the same diagram that shows the age structure of the population, the same thing can be, if you dig deep, in healthcare. Is all this logical? And not so scary?
Natalya Zubarevich:
Universities are being consolidated. Quietly die private universities, which simply do not have an influx of students. Are there Muscovites here? Who knows the geography of Moscow? Does everyone know the Yugo-Zapadnaya metro station? Fine. On the one hand - the Institute of Fine Chemical Technology, further to the Moscow Ring Road, on the other hand - MIREA - the Institute of Radio Engineering, Automation, in short, computer science. And they have just been united according to the logic of the southwest. There will be a single structure with a single accounting department and administrative apparatus. But somehow they cross radio electronics and fine chemistry. And the bottom line is that when you work smart, it's one format. And when you purely mechanically cut costs - 10% reduction in spending on universities, that's it! Estimate what will remain less reduced compared to the general norm? Management apparatus, I assure you. In Russia, there is simply no other way. So, on the one hand, yes, you are right. I agree with you. On the other hand, it all depends on how you operationalize the process. The answer is dumb.
Reply from the audience:
We expect, of course, that it will be stupid ...
Natalya Zubarevich:
I see examples. Although, knowing the system of higher education from the inside and working in it, I can honestly tell you that not only have we not reached the limits of pruning, but we still have to walk for miles across these deserts. I have samples where the average age in the department is 70 years old. I agree, therefore I do not blame, but I warn that the risks of stupid operationalization of the process are high.
Maxim Dbar:
Tell me, in your opinion, are there any regions that can go through this crisis more or less painlessly, or will it be fairly even?
Natalya Zubarevich:
From the point of view of people, their consumption, their life, I do not know such regions. From the point of view of the industry - yes, of course, I showed differentiation. In terms of investment, the process is getting worse. Most likely, it will not be 51%, but more. Such a creeping infection. Even with an increase in the rate of decline. From the point of view of the labor market, I still believe that the population of large cities, even having lost their salary money, will find an alternative, but in smaller places ... Well, get used to it, or what? Tire service in the yard...
Maxim Dbar:
And if there is nothing to mount?
Natalya Zubarevich:
It's also true, but when you don't change the car, the tires get worse and worse. Here is a tire fitting for you, here is a prospect for you. Repair everything will increase. Novodel will be reduced.
Look, I lived through the 90s. Let me reassure you and say that somehow get out. I remember when we crossed that threshold in 1992, my wage at Moscow State University was 5 dollars a month - this is to make you feel the formats. True, the food did not cost so much, it was cheaper.
And the second option is how people have adapted. They ran like horses. They worked wherever possible. People are incredibly flexible.
Now remember the bad. Then no one bothered to work in a bunch of places, earn extra money wherever I can. My husband was also spinning. We've lived through it all. Now a much less flexible system has been built, where there are too many prohibitions. You start spinning, and the tax office, the prosecutor's office and so on will hit you in the nose.
Our country will be able to get through this crisis more smoothly if the authorities nevertheless ease the bans. But for some reason it seems to me that the prohibitive inertia is already in such a rage that a rollback will be felt as a loss of face. And now our government does not allow the loss of face. And that would be the most stupid thing she could do. Because it's time to roll back. When you put pressure on the political, all this is systematically combined with the pressure on economic freedoms. Somehow it doesn’t work, like Lee Kuan Yew: “Politicians - stand, be silent, be afraid. Everything is possible with the economy.” Our government has other balances: to drag and not let go. But these are big risks. Let's see, everything is possible. In Russia, never say "never" at all.
Maxim Dbar:
And how do you see the way out of the crisis in a situation where the government is obviously not ready for institutional reforms, and on the other hand, the population is not ready for political protest?
Natalya Zubarevich:
It's absolutely perfect. The population will be very aggressive, very dissatisfied, but aggression will be expressed in smashing dishes in the kitchen, children, periodically - wives, and barking at a neighbor on the bus who moved you with something. And even more fun - a nearby car on the road that you cut, or she cut you off. They will run with a bat regularly on Russian highways. But this is not a political process.
We will get out of this crisis, no doubt, because political and economic cycles are finite, and there is no other way in this world. We will emerge from it into something new, it is not yet clear what. With by far the worst human capital - and this is a medical fact, nothing can be done about it. With an even older population, much less drive compared to the late 80s when we had the urge to try to do things ourselves; these are all costs that we have acquired. But, nevertheless, such people will be. Someone life will force.
Don't discount the wonderful gender factor. Do you know what happened when everything crashed in the early 90s? This is my generation, I remember it well. Men - laboratory managers, shop managers, serious and established people, senior researchers - lay down on the bottom, on the sofa, began to look at the ceiling and think about the meaning of life. Women mastered the profession of a realtor, began to walk with sums and galloped into a new life, because children need to be fed. Here, no one canceled the children. We adapt. Well, let's get rough. Makeup will be ruined. We will grow old, but we will survive. And maybe the youngsters will return if the situation changes. Never say never".
The current economic crisis is slow and protracted, like a swamp from which it is very difficult to get out. How are the Russian regions experiencing a long depression, and what could be the further development of the situation? Will there be demand for decentralization? Answered these questions Natalya Zubarevich in his lecture "Depression in the regional dimension". We have collected the main theses of her speech.
Joint lecture by the Yegor Gaidar Foundation and the Open Civic Lecture Hall of the Sakharov Center
How did the crisis start?
According to Natalia Zubarevich, the crisis began in 2013. At the moment when the raw material model of the economy stopped working.
To put it simply, imagine: the price of oil is constantly growing, there is more and more money in the economy, at the same time, institutions are not improving, to put it mildly, there are more and more barriers to business, the security forces want to eat more and more, the state wants to regulate more and more, state corporations are doing more and more inefficient investments. But while the price of oil is rising, the economy is balanced. As soon as the price of oil has risen even to $110 per barrel, and the barriers continue to grow, that's it, the economy stops. We started growing somewhere at the end of 2012.
The crisis began as an internal one, began with stagnation and worsened when external factors were added.
Crimea, sanctions, anti-sanctions influenced the acceleration of inflation, the price of oil is the most important factor. And since 2015, the prices for aluminum, copper, nickel, iron ore, coal - all the main products of our exports - have been falling just as actively.<…>But it was not the situation with Crimea that created this crisis. Crimea aggravated, accelerated degradation.
Who was hit hardest by the crisis?
This crisis hit hardest on those regions that had developed industries, primarily the automotive industry. There is a decline of about 30%. But the most difficult situation is in the industries that provided Russian exports. For example, the production of wagons has more than halved.
Evil tongues say: "Well, now let's look at Uralvagonzavod." Those who don't know say: "There are tanks there." Tanks there at most 20% of the production volume, 80% were wagons, there was a citizen. Now they are not very good. Now they have a big test of patriotism.
Which regions did not feel the crisis?
Three groups of regions became "lucky":
New regions of oil and gas production: Sakhalin, Yakutia, Krasnoyarsk Territory, Nenets Autonomous Okrug.
The agrarian south and the regions of the Central Chernozem region (anti-sanctions cleared the market of competitors, and expensive currency turned Russians to domestic products).
The third lucky beggar of this crisis is completely unique - these are the regions of the military-industrial complex. They grow almost the fastest.
How has the budget structure changed?
- National defense. Expenses increased by 28%.
- Social politics. Growth by 24%. But almost 2/3 of these expenses are transfers to the pension fund.
- General government spending (spending on apparatus and bureaucracy). Growth by 19%.
The scariest word I've learned to say is: this crisis is long. We do not understand what growth drivers are.
What is happening with the regions?
When you're in deficit for the third year in a row, you're in debt. How is the behavior of the regions changing? Very simply - they start desperately saving.<…>For a year or two they tried to save on the national economy - this is support Agriculture, road construction, transport. Shrink, shrink, shrink. And yet, there are no resources.
Among the results of 2015, Natalya Zubarevich highlights the increase in utility bills:
This means that we will receive payments from much big numbers. Get ready. This is the general trend.
Why are there no protests?
Natalya Zubarevich believes that there are no protest movements, because Russians do not have a linear relationship between the dynamics of the economy and the sociocultural perception of people. People adapt to difficult conditions and shrink their budgets.
And now the whole country is quietly and peacefully moving in a mode of downward adaptation. As you know, it leads to degradation. For me now this is the most hellish risk- degradation.
Photo: RIA Novosti / Sergey Chernykh