Demographic problems in the world. Demographic situation in developed and developing countries
College of Law, Economics and Management
ESSAY
by geography
on the topic: Demographic situation in economically developed countries
Performed
1st year student
groups - G1 / 2
E. V. Sadkovskaya
Krasnodar 2010
Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………...3
Chapter 1. Demographic situation in the modern world ………………...4
Chapter 2. Demographic situation in the economically developed countries Oh
2.1. Demographic crisis ……………………………………………….8
2.1.2. Economically developed countries ………………………………… .10
2.1.2. Russia…………………………………………………………………..11
2.2. The main demographic processes
2.2.1. Natural population growth……………………………… .12
2.2.2. Net migration……………………………………………………..12
2.2.3. Total population growth…………………………………………12
2.3. Age and sex structure of the population ……………………………12
2.4. Major demographic trends
2.4.1. Decrease in fertility rates …………………………… 13
2.4.2. Population aging in developed countries …………………………… .14
2.4.3. Growth in immigration to developed countries …………………………… 16
Chapter 3. Demographic policy of developed countries
3.1. Experience in implementing demographic policy
3.1.1. France…………………………………………………………………19
3.1.2. Sweden ……………………………………………………………… .21
3.1.3. Belgium ……………………………………………………………… .22
3.1.4. Austria ………………………………………………………………… .22
3.1.5. Italy ……………………………………………………………… ..22
3.1.6. European Union …………………………………………………………… .23
3.1.7. USA ………………………………………………………………… ..24
3.2. General results of demographic policy ………………………26
Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………..32
Bibliographic list of used literature ………………33
Introduction
The planet's population is constantly increasing. The fastest growing population continues to be in the 50 least developed countries. Currently, 95% of the world's population growth occurs in the less developed regions, and only 5% in the more developed ones. And if the global fertility situation continues to evolve according to today's scenario, by 2050 the population of the more developed countries as a whole will decrease by an average of 1 million people annually, and thus the population of developing countries will increase by an average of 35 million annually. 22 million of which will be in the least developed countries.
The demographic situation in economically developed countries is difficult - the majority is experiencing a demographic crisis, which can entail many negative consequences in the economic and social spheres life. Resolving demographic problems is now the primary task for the governments of economically developed countries.
This work is devoted to this very topical topic. The aim of the work is to analyze the demographic situation in economically developed countries.
The main tasks of the work:
Characterization of the demographic situation in the world as a whole, highlighting the place of developed countries in the ongoing demographic processes;
Clarification of the features of the demographic situation in economically developed countries: consideration of the demographic crisis, the main demographic indicators, the observed trends in changing the current situation.
Determination of the main directions of the demographic policy pursued in these countries in order to improve the demographic situation.
The work itself is structured in accordance with the tasks set: the material is presented in three main chapters.
When writing the work, material from various information sources was used: scientific and educational literature, periodicals, resources of the global Internet network - links are available in the text of the work.
Chapter 1. Demographic situation in the modern world
In 1988, the National Geographic Society of the United States published a map of the world called Earth in Danger. The number one danger on this map is population pressure. The fact is that since the middle of the 20th century there has been an unprecedented growth in the world's population. Homo sapiens - Homo sapiens as a species of living beings, the pinnacle of the creation of life forms on Earth - has existed on the planet for about 100 thousand years, but only about 8 thousand years ago there were about 10 million people on Earth. The number of earthlings increased very slowly, while they lived by hunting and gathering, led the way of life of nomads. But with the transition to sedentary agriculture, to new forms of production, especially industrial production, the number of people began to increase rapidly and by the middle of the 18th century it was about 800 million. Then came a period of increasing acceleration of population growth on Earth. Around 1820, the number of earthlings reached 1 billion. In 1927 this figure doubled. The third billion was recorded in 1959, the fourth after 15 years, in 1974, and just 13 years later, on July 11, 1987, the UN declared the “birthday of the 5 billionth person”. The sixth billion entered the planet in 2000 ( see maps 1, 2).
Map 1. Population of the countries of the world, mid-1990s
Map 2. Time of population doubling
The current demographic situation is a global problem. And above all because the rapid population growth is taking place in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Thus, the world's population increased daily in the 90s to 254 thousand people. Less than 13 thousand of this number accounted for industrialized countries, the remaining 241 thousand - for developing countries ( see fig. 1). 60% of this number was in Asia, 20% in Africa and 10% in Latin America.
Rice. 1. Structure of world population growth in 2006,%
(based on site materialshttp:// www. demoscope. ru)
At the same time, these countries, due to their economic, social and cultural backwardness, are least able to provide their population doubling every 20-30 years with food, as well as other material benefits, to give at least an elementary education to the younger generation and to provide work for the population of working age. In addition, the rapid growth of the population is accompanied by its own specific problems, one of which is the change in its age structure: the proportion of children under 15 has increased over the past three decades in most developing countries to 40-50% of their population. As a result, the so-called economic burden of the disabled population on the able-bodied population has grown significantly, which now in these countries is almost 1.5 times higher than the corresponding indicator in industrialized countries. And given the lower overall employment able-bodied population in developing countries and a huge relative agrarian overpopulation in most of them, the working population is actually experiencing an even more significant economic overload.
As the experience of a number of countries shows, the decline in population growth rates depends on many factors. These factors include providing the entire population with adequate housing, full employment, and free access to education and health care. The latter is impossible without development. national economy based on industrialization and modernization Agriculture, without the development of enlightenment and education, the solution of social issues. Studies carried out in recent years in a number of countries in Asia and Latin America show that where the level of economic and social development is the lowest, where the majority of the population is illiterate, the birth rate is very high ( see map 3), although many of them carry out policies to regulate the birth rate, and vice versa, there is a decline in it with progressive economic transformations.
Map 3. Total fertility rate (2006)
(based on site materialshttp:// www. sci.aha.ru/map/world )
No less relevant is the direct connection between the growth of the world population and such global problems as the provision of mankind with natural resources and environmental pollution. The rapid growth of the rural population has already led in many of the developing countries to such "pressure" on natural resources (soil, vegetation, wildlife, fresh water, etc.), which in some areas has undermined their ability to naturally regenerate. Now the consumption of various natural resources for industrial production in developing countries on a per capita basis, it is 10-20 times less than in developed countries. Nevertheless, assuming that over time these countries will become economically developed and reach the same level of this indicator as in our time in Western Europe, their demand for raw materials and energy turned out in absolute terms to be about 10 times greater than now all countries of the European Community. If we take into account the growth rates of the population of developing countries, then their potential need for natural resources should have doubled by 2025, and accordingly, environmental pollution by industrial waste could significantly increase.
According to the UN, if the demands corresponding to the modern Western society are satisfied, there will be enough raw materials and energy for only 1 billion people, just for the population of the USA, Western Europe and Japan. Therefore, these countries began to be called the "golden billion". Together, they consume more than half of the energy, 70% of metals, create ¾ of the total mass of waste, of which: the United States consumes about 40% of the world's natural resources, emitting over 60% of all pollution. A significant proportion of waste remains in countries that produce raw materials for the "golden billion".
The rest of the Earth's population is behind the "golden billion". But if it managed to reach the level of the USA in the growth of mineral resources, then the known reserves of oil would be depleted in 7 years, natural gas - in 5 years, coal - in 18 years. There is still hope for new technologies, but all of them are capable of having an effect with a stable population, not doubling every few decades.
Chapter 2. Demographic situation in economically developed countries
2.1. Demographic crisis
2.1.2. Economically developed countries
Economically developed countries of the world have long passed the second phase of the demographic transition and entered its third phase, which is characterized by a decrease in the indicators of natural population growth ( see table 1). Until recently, there were hardly any very significant differences in this respect between them. Recently, however, this group of countries has also begun to experience a fairly strong differentiation, and now this group can also be subdivided into three subgroups.
Table 1. European countries with negative natural population growth
V first subgroup includes countries where a fairly favorable demographic situation still persists, for which at least average fertility and natural growth rates are characteristic, providing expanded reproduction of the population. An example of a country of this kind is the United States, where the reproduction formula (fertility - mortality = natural increase) at the end of the 90s remained at the level of 15 ‰ - 9 ‰ = 6 ‰. Accordingly, the average annual population growth was 0.6%. This subgroup includes Canada, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, Switzerland, where the average annual population growth was at least 0.3-0.5%. With such a rate of growth, a doubling of the population in these countries can be expected in 100-200 years, or even more (in Switzerland - in 250 years).
NS second subgroup it is necessary to include countries in which, in fact, expanded reproduction of the population is no longer ensured. These include mainly European countries, where the total fertility rate dropped to 1.5 in the mid-90s. Some of these countries (for example, Poland) still have a minimal excess of fertility over mortality. Others, of which there are many more, have become countries with zero population growth. These are Austria, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Croatia, Ireland.
Finally, third subgroup unites countries with negative natural population growth, or, more simply, with natural population decline (depopulation). The total fertility rate in this group of countries is also extremely low. The number of such countries with "minus" population growth only in 1990-2000. increased from 3 to 15. They are all in Europe.
Demographic IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE DEMOGRAPHIC POLITICS IN THE RANGE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES WORLD France Sweden Belgium Austria ... demographic Swedish politics. The Swedish Government's policy is to create economic independence ...
In the 70-90s, a demographic crisis manifested itself, affecting economically developed countries and countries with economies in transition... This crisis consists in a sharp decrease in population growth rates in both groups of countries and even natural decline (in Russia, Ukraine, Hungary, Germany, Sweden), as well as in demographic aging, reduction or stabilization of the labor force.
Demographic aging (when the share of the population over 60 years old is more than 2% of its total population) is a natural, historically determined process that has irreversible consequences. At the same time, this process poses serious socio-economic problems for society - first of all, an increase in the economic burden on the employed population.
Due to the fact that the noted countries (including Russia) are at the stage of demographic development characteristic of all industrialized countries, a large natural population growth is impossible at the present stage.
In Russia, a decrease in mortality and an increase in the birth rate within the limits in which they are really possible in our country, given the most favorable development of events, can somewhat reduce the natural decline in comparison with the situation in the 90s. (but not overcome it). The only source of population growth, or at least maintaining its non-decreasing number, can only be immigration. With regard to demographic aging, it is expected that in Russia in 2000-2015. the “demographic favored” window will open. During this period, the share of the population of retirement age will practically not change, and at the same time, the share of the population of working age will significantly increase. This period must be used to reduce the mortality rate of the population, especially in the younger and middle ages (this will slow down the old a little), as well as to reform the social protection system and significantly increase the efficiency of the economy.
The economically developed countries of the world, as already noted, have long passed the second phase of the demographic transition and entered its third phase, which is characterized by a decrease in the indicators of natural population growth. Until recently, there were hardly any very significant differences in this respect between them. However, in recent times in this group of countries, a fairly strong differentiation also began to occur, and now it can also be subdivided into three subgroups.
The first subgroup includes countries where a rather favorable demographic situation still persists, for which at least average fertility and natural growth rates are characteristic, ensuring expanded reproduction of the population. An example of a country of this kind is the United States, where the "formula" of reproduction (fertility - mortality = natural increase) in 2005 remained at the level of 14.1% - 8.2% = 5.2%. Accordingly, the average annual population growth was 1%. This subgroup includes Canada, France, the Netherlands, Norway, where the average annual population growth was at least 0.3–0.5%. At this rate of growth, a doubling of the population in these countries can be expected in 100-200 years.
The second subgroup should include countries in which, in fact, expanded reproduction of the population is no longer ensured. These include mainly European countries, for which the total fertility rate back in the mid-1990s. decreased to 1.5. Some of these countries still have a minimal excess of births over deaths. Others, of which there are many more, have become countries with "zero" population growth. This is, for example, Sweden.
Finally, the third subgroup unites countries with negative natural population growth, or, more simply, with natural population decline (depopulation).
Table 40
The total fertility rate in this group of countries is also extremely low. The number of such countries with "minus" population growth only in 1990–2000. increased from 3 to 15. In 2005, there were 15 of them, but the composition changed somewhat (Table 40).
It will not be a mistake to say that the countries of the third (and in fact, the second) subgroup have already entered a period of demographic crisis, which was caused by a complex of interrelated causes. First of all, they include a rapid, and sometimes downright landslide, decline in the birth rate, which leads to a decrease in the proportion of young people in the population. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to by demographers as aging from below. Further, an increase in the average life expectancy of people in conditions of an increasing level of material well-being also led to a faster than expected increase in the proportion of persons of older ("non-reproducing") ages in the population, that is, as they say, to aging from above.
However, it would be wrong to try to explain the current crisis only by demographic reasons. Its emergence was also influenced by many socio-economic, psychological, medico-social, moral factors, which caused, in particular, such a phenomenon as a family crisis. The average family size in the countries of the second and third subgroups has recently decreased to 2.2–3 persons. And it has become much less durable - with the increase in the number of divorces, the widespread practice of cohabitation without registration of marriage, a sharp increase in the number of illegitimate children.
Back in the early 1960s. the number of divorces per 1000 marriages in foreign European countries ranged from 100 to 200, but already at the end of the 1990s. it increased to 200–300. Even more frightening is the data on children born out of wedlock, the proportion of which has increased 5-10 times during the same period. In the UK and France, for example, the proportion of children born out of wedlock exceeds 30%. It is even more in Denmark - 40%. But Sweden, Norway and Iceland were and still are "absolute champions" in this respect, with an indicator above 50%.
All of these causes and factors are combined in different ways in the countries listed in table 40. So, in Germany and Italy, apparently, the influence of demographic factors really prevails. In the post-socialist countries of Central-Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, etc.), the fact that in the 1990s. they had to go through a rather painful stage of reforming the political system and the transition from command-planned to market economy... The same applies to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. And in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the natural deterioration of the demographic situation coincided with the deep political and socio-economic crisis of the 1990s.
As for Russia, in the XX century. with the demographic situation, one might say, she was unlucky. The first phase of the demographic transition ended there by the beginning of the twentieth century, but a real population explosion did not follow. Moreover, over the course of half a century, Russia has experienced three demographic crises: during the First World War and the Civil War, during the years of collectivization of the village and severe famine, and, finally, during the Great Patriotic War. In the 60s - 80s. XX century. the demographic situation in the country as a whole has stabilized, and back in 1989 the "formula" of the natural movement of the population looked like this: 19.6% - 10.6% = 9%. However, in the 1990s. a new, and especially strong, demographic crisis broke out (Table 41).
From the data in table 41 it follows that in the 70s - early 80s. XX century. the demographic situation in Russia was relatively favorable. So, in 1983, 2.5 million children were born in the RSFSR. Then, the beginning of perestroika and the fight against alcohol abuse had a beneficial effect on the birth rate and natural population growth. However, with the onset of the socio-economic crisis of the 1990s. the demographic situation has deteriorated sharply. Since 1992, there has been an absolute population decline in Russia. It can be added that in the RSFSR in 1988 there were 2 more children per woman (in the USSR as a whole - 2.2 children), and by the end of the 1990s. the fertility of women in the country dropped to 1.17 children, while more than two are needed for sustainable population growth. The number of marriages per 1000 inhabitants in 2000 decreased to 6.3 (in 1955 - 12.1), and the number of divorces increased to 4.3 (in 1955 - 0.8). According to available forecasts, the population of Russia will continue to decline in the first decades of the 21st century, when a small generation born in the 1990s will enter adulthood, and the largest generation born in the 50s will leave the working age. ... XX century. As a result, by 2015 the number of inhabitants in Russia may decrease (according to the average variant) to 134 million people.
Table 41
In conclusion, it should be noted that, apparently, both demographic extremes - the explosion and the crisis - have both their advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, some scientists put forward the concept of the demographic optimum, which, if interpreted uniformly for different regions and countries, may not be the same quantitatively.
Economically developed countries
The economically developed countries of the world have long passed the second phase of the demographic transition and entered its third phase, which is characterized by a decrease in the indicators of natural population growth (see Table 1). Until recently, there were hardly any very significant differences in this respect between them. Recently, however, this group of countries has also begun to experience a fairly strong differentiation, and now this group can also be subdivided into three subgroups.
Table 1. European countries with negative natural population growth
The first subgroup includes countries where a rather favorable demographic situation still persists, for which at least average fertility and natural growth rates are characteristic, ensuring expanded reproduction of the population. An example of a country of this kind is the United States, where the reproduction formula (fertility - mortality = natural increase) at the end of the 90s remained at the level of 15 ‰ - 9 ‰ = 6 ‰. Accordingly, the average annual population growth was 0.6%. This subgroup includes Canada, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, Switzerland, where the average annual population growth was at least 0.3-0.5%. At such a rate of growth, a doubling of the population in these countries can be expected in 100-200 years, or even more (in Switzerland - in 250 years).
The second subgroup should include countries in which, in fact, expanded reproduction of the population is no longer ensured. These include mainly European countries, where the total fertility rate dropped to 1.5 in the mid-90s. Some of these countries (for example, Poland) still have a minimal excess of fertility over mortality. Others, of which there are many more, have become countries with zero population growth. These are Austria, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Croatia, Ireland.
Finally, the third subgroup unites countries with negative natural population growth, or, more simply, with natural population decline (depopulation). The total fertility rate in this group of countries is also extremely low. The number of such countries with "minus" population growth only in 1990-2000. increased from 3 to 15. They are all in Europe.
It will not be a mistake to say that the countries of the third (and in fact, the second) subgroup have already entered a period of demographic crisis, which was caused by a complex of interrelated causes. First of all, they include a rapid, and sometimes downright landslide decline in the birth rate, which leads to a decrease in the proportion of young people in the population. Demographers call this phenomenon aging from below. Further, an increase in the average life expectancy of people in conditions of an increasing level of material well-being also led to a faster than expected increase in the proportion of persons of older ("non-reproducing") age in the population, that is, as they say, to aging from above.
However, it would be wrong to try to explain the current crisis only by demographic reasons. Its emergence was also influenced by many socio-economic, psychological, medico-social, moral factors, which caused, in particular, such a phenomenon as a family crisis. The average family size in countries of the second and third subgroups has recently decreased to 2.2-3 people. And it has become much less durable - with the increase in the number of divorces, the widespread practice of cohabitation without marriage, a sharp increase in the number of illegitimate children.
If at the beginning of the 60s the number of divorces per 1000 marriages in the countries of foreign Europe ranged from 100 to 200, then at the end of the 90s it increased to 200-300. Even more egregious data on children born out of wedlock, whose share has increased 5-10 times during the same time. In the UK and France, for example, the proportion of children born out of wedlock exceeds 30%. It is even higher in Denmark - 40%. But Sweden, Norway and Iceland have been and remain the "absolute champions" in this respect, with over 50%.
All of these causes and factors are combined in different ways in the countries listed in Table 2. So, in Germany and Italy, apparently, the influence of demographic factors really prevails. In the post-socialist countries of Central-Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, etc.), it was affected by the fact that in the 90s they had to go through a rather painful stage of reforming the political system and the transition from a command-planned to a market economy. The same applies to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. And in the CIS countries (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus), the natural deterioration of the demographic situation coincided with the deep political and socio-economic crisis of the 90s.
Performed
1st year student
groups - G1 / 2
E. V. Sadkovskaya
Krasnodar 2010
Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………...3
………………...4
2.1. Demographic crisis ……………………………………………….8
2.1.2. Economically developed countries ………………………………… .10
2.1.2. Russia ……………………………………………………………… ..11
2.2.1. Natural population growth ……………………………… .12
2.2.2. Net migration ………………………………………………… ..12
2.2.3. Total population growth ………………………………………… 12
……………………………12
2.4.1. Decrease in fertility rates …………………………… 1 3
2.4.2. Population aging in developed countries …………………………… .1 4
2.4.3. Growth in immigration to developed countries …………………………… 16
3.1.1. France………………………………………………………………… 19
3.1.2. Sweden ……………………………………………………………… .2 1
3.1.3. Belgium ……………………………………………………………… .22
3.1.4. Austria ………………………………………………………………… .22
3.1.5. Italy ……………………………………………………………… ..22
3.1.6. European Union …………………………………………………………… .23
3.1.7. USA ………………………………………………………………… ..24
………………………26
Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………..32
Bibliographic list of used literature ………………33
Introduction
The planet's population is constantly increasing. The fastest growing population continues to be in the 50 least developed countries. Currently, 95% of the world's population growth occurs in the less developed regions, and only 5% in the more developed ones. And if the global fertility situation continues to evolve according to today's scenario, by 2050 the population of the more developed countries as a whole will decrease by an average of 1 million people annually, and thus the population of developing countries will increase by an average of 35 million annually. 22 million of which will be in the least developed countries.
The demographic situation in economically developed countries is difficult - the majority is experiencing a demographic crisis, which can entail many negative consequences in the economic and social spheres of life. Resolving demographic problems is now the primary task for the governments of economically developed countries.
This work is devoted to this very topical topic. The aim of the work is to analyze the demographic situation in economically developed countries.
The main tasks of the work:
1) Characteristics of the demographic situation in the world as a whole, highlighting the place of developed countries in the ongoing demographic processes;
2) Clarification of the features of the demographic situation in economically developed countries: consideration of the demographic crisis, the main demographic indicators, the observed trends in changing the current situation.
3) Determination of the main directions of demographic policy pursued in these countries in order to improve the demographic situation.
The work itself is structured in accordance with the tasks set: the material is presented in three main chapters.
When writing the work, material from various information sources was used: scientific and educational literature, periodicals, resources of the global Internet network - links are available in the text of the work.
Chapter 1. Demographic situation in the modern world
In 1988, the National Geographic Society of the United States published a map of the world called Earth in Danger. The number one danger on this map is population pressure. The fact is that since the middle of the 20th century there has been an unprecedented growth in the world's population. Homosapiens - Homo sapiens as a species of living beings, the pinnacle of the creation of life forms on Earth - exists on the planet for about 100 thousand years, but only about 8 thousand years ago there were about 10 million people on Earth. The number of earthlings increased very slowly, while they lived by hunting and gathering, led the way of life of nomads. But with the transition to sedentary agriculture, to new forms of production, especially industrial production, the number of people began to increase rapidly and by the middle of the 18th century it was about 800 million. Then came a period of increasing acceleration of population growth on Earth. Around 1820, the number of earthlings reached 1 billion. In 1927 this figure doubled. The third billion was recorded in 1959, the fourth after 15 years, in 1974, and just 13 years later, on July 11, 1987, the UN declared the “birthday of the 5 billionth person”. The sixth billion entered the planet in 2000 ( see maps 1, 2).
Map 1. Population of the countries of the world, mid-1990s
Map 2. Time of population doubling
The current demographic situation is a global problem. And above all because the rapid population growth is taking place in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Thus, the world's population increased daily in the 90s to 254 thousand people. Less than 13 thousand of this number accounted for industrialized countries, the remaining 241 thousand - for developing countries ( see fig. 1). 60% of this number was in Asia, 20% in Africa and 10% in Latin America.
Rice. 1. Structure of world population growth in 2006,%
(based on site materials http :// www . demoscope . ru )
At the same time, these countries, due to their economic, social and cultural backwardness, are least able to provide their population doubling every 20-30 years with food, as well as other material benefits, to give at least an elementary education to the younger generation and to provide work for the population of working age. In addition, the rapid growth of the population is accompanied by its own specific problems, one of which is the change in its age structure: the proportion of children under 15 has increased over the past three decades in most developing countries to 40-50% of their population. As a result, the so-called economic burden of the disabled population on the able-bodied population has grown significantly, which now in these countries is almost 1.5 times higher than the corresponding indicator in industrialized countries. And given the lower overall employment of the working-age population in developing countries and the huge relative agrarian overpopulation in most of them, the working-class population is actually experiencing an even more significant economic overload.
As the experience of a number of countries shows, the decline in population growth rates depends on many factors. These factors include providing the entire population with adequate housing, full employment, and free access to education and health care. The latter is impossible without the development of the national economy on the basis of industrialization and modernization of agriculture, without the development of enlightenment and education, and the solution of social issues. Studies carried out in recent years in a number of countries in Asia and Latin America show that where the level of economic and social development is the lowest, where the majority of the population is illiterate, the birth rate is very high ( see map 3), although many of them carry out policies to regulate the birth rate, and vice versa, there is a decline in it with progressive economic transformations.
Map 3. Total fertility rate (2006)
(based on site materials http :// www . sci.aha.ru/map/world )
No less relevant is the direct connection between the growth of the world population and such global problems as the provision of mankind with natural resources and environmental pollution. The rapid growth of the rural population has already led in many of the developing countries to such "pressure" on natural resources (soil, vegetation, wildlife, fresh water, etc.), which in some areas has undermined their ability to naturally regenerate. Today, the consumption of various natural resources for industrial production in developing countries per capita is 10-20 times less than in developed countries. However, assuming that over time these countries will become economically developed and reach the same level this indicator, as in our time in Western Europe, their demand for raw materials and energy turned out to be in absolute terms about 10 times higher than now in all countries of the European Community. If we take into account the growth rates of the population of developing countries, then their potential need for natural resources should have doubled by 2025, and accordingly, environmental pollution by industrial waste could significantly increase.
According to the UN, if the demands corresponding to the modern Western society are satisfied, there will be enough raw materials and energy for only 1 billion people, just for the population of the USA, Western Europe and Japan. Therefore, these countries began to be called the "golden billion". Together, they consume more than half of the energy, 70% of metals, create ¾ of the total mass of waste, of which: the United States consumes about 40% of the world's natural resources, emitting over 60% of all pollution. A significant proportion of waste remains in countries that produce raw materials for the "golden billion".
The rest of the Earth's population is behind the "golden billion". But if it managed to reach the level of the USA in the growth of mineral resources, then the known reserves of oil would be depleted in 7 years, natural gas - in 5 years, coal - in 18 years. There is still hope for new technologies, but all of them are capable of having an effect with a stable population, not doubling every few decades.
Chapter 2. Demographic situation in economically developed countries
2.1. Demographic crisis
2.1.2. Economically developed countries
Economically developed countries of the world have long passed the second phase of the demographic transition and entered its third phase, which is characterized by a decrease in the indicators of natural population growth ( see table 1). Until recently, there were hardly any very significant differences in this respect between them. Recently, however, this group of countries has also begun to experience a fairly strong differentiation, and now this group can also be subdivided into three subgroups.
Table 1. European countries with negative natural population growth
V first subgroup includes countries where a fairly favorable demographic situation still persists, for which at least average fertility and natural growth rates are characteristic, providing expanded reproduction of the population. An example of a country of this kind is the United States, where the reproduction formula (fertility - mortality = natural increase) at the end of the 90s remained at the level of 15 ‰ - 9 ‰ = 6 ‰. Accordingly, the average annual population growth was 0.6%. This subgroup includes Canada, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, Switzerland, where the average annual population growth was at least 0.3-0.5%. With such a rate of growth, a doubling of the population in these countries can be expected in 100-200 years, or even more (in Switzerland - in 250 years).
NS second subgroup it is necessary to include countries in which, in fact, expanded reproduction of the population is no longer ensured. These include mainly European countries, where the total fertility rate dropped to 1.5 in the mid-90s. Some of these countries (for example, Poland) still have a minimal excess of fertility over mortality. Others, of which there are many more, have become countries with zero population growth. These are Austria, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Croatia, Ireland.
Finally, third subgroup unites countries with negative natural population growth, or, more simply, with natural population decline (depopulation). The total fertility rate in this group of countries is also extremely low. The number of such countries with "minus" population growth only in 1990-2000. increased from 3 to 15. They are all in Europe.
It will not be a mistake to say that the countries of the third (and in fact, the second) subgroup have already entered a period of demographic crisis, which was caused by a complex of interrelated causes. First of all, they include a rapid, and sometimes downright landslide decline in the birth rate, which leads to a decrease in the proportion of young people in the population. Demographers call this phenomenon aging from below. Further, an increase in the average life expectancy of people in conditions of an increasing level of material well-being also led to a faster than expected increase in the proportion of persons of older ("non-reproducing") age in the population, that is, as they say, to aging from above.
However, it would be wrong to try to explain the current crisis only by demographic reasons. Its emergence was also influenced by many socio-economic, psychological, medico-social, moral factors, which caused, in particular, such a phenomenon as a family crisis. The average family size in the countries of the second and third subgroups has recently decreased to 2.2-3 people. And it has become much less durable - with the increase in the number of divorces, the widespread practice of cohabitation without marriage, a sharp increase in the number of illegitimate children.
If at the beginning of the 60s the number of divorces per 1000 marriages in the countries of foreign Europe ranged from 100 to 200, then at the end of the 90s it increased to 200-300. Even more egregious data on children born out of wedlock, whose share has increased 5-10 times during the same time. In the UK and France, for example, the proportion of children born out of wedlock exceeds 30%. It is even higher in Denmark - 40%. But Sweden, Norway and Iceland were and still are the "absolute champions" in this respect, with over 50%.
All these reasons and factors in the countries listed in Table 2, are combined in different ways. So, in Germany and Italy, apparently, the influence of demographic factors really prevails. In the post-socialist countries of Central-Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, etc.), it was affected by the fact that in the 90s they had to go through a rather painful stage of reforming the political system and the transition from a command-planned to a market economy. The same applies to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. And in the CIS countries (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus), the natural deterioration of the demographic situation coincided with the deep political and socio-economic crisis of the 90s.
2.1.2. Russia
As for Russia, in the twentieth century. with the demographic situation, one might say, she was unlucky. The first phase of the demographic transition ended there by the beginning of the twentieth century, but a real population explosion did not follow. Moreover, over the course of half a century, Russia has experienced three demographic crises: during the First World War and the Civil War, during the years of collectivization of the village and severe famine, and, finally, during the Great Patriotic War. In the 60-80s, the demographic situation in the country as a whole stabilized. However, in the 90s, a new, and especially strong, demographic crisis broke out ( see table 2).
Table 2. Population dynamics and natural movement in Russia
From data table 2 it follows that in the 70s and early 80s the demographic situation in Russia was relatively favorable. Thus, in 1983, 2.5 million children were born in the RSFSR. Then, the beginning of perestroika and the fight against alcohol abuse had a beneficial effect on the birth rate and natural population growth. However, with the onset of the socio-economic crisis of the 90s, the demographic situation deteriorated sharply. Since 1992, there has been an absolute population decline in Russia. It can be added that in the RSFSR in 1988 there were 2 more children per woman (in the USSR as a whole - 2.2 children), and by the end of the 90s, the fertility of women in the country decreased to 1.24 children, while for sustainable population growth needs more than two. According to available forecasts, the population of Russia will continue to decline in the first decades of the 21st century, when a small generation born in the 90s will enter adulthood, and the largest generation born in the 50s will leave the working age. As a result, by 2015 the number of residents in Russia may decrease to 138 million people.
Apparently, both demographic extremes - the explosion and the crisis - have both their advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, some scientists put forward the concept of the demographic optimum, which, if interpreted uniformly for different regions and countries, can be quantitatively different.
2.2. Main demographic processes
Traditionally, when considering the structure of the population and the dynamics of its development, the indicators of population growth and the sex and age structure are taken into account. The population growth rate depends on natural population growth (the difference between the birth rate and the death rate) and the net migration rate (the difference between immigration and emigration rates). The general population growth rate shows the annual changes in population per 1000 people, which allows comparing countries with different population sizes.
2.2.1. Natural population growth
As a result of the sharp decline in the number of births compared with the number of deaths in all developed countries, which began in the 1970s, the overall rate of natural population growth has also decreased. On average, in the EU member states, this ratio fell from 5.7 in 1970 to 1.7 in 2001, and in the rest - from 6.7 in 1970 to 1.6 in 2001, that is, the number of deaths exceeds today number of births. Among the EU member states, Ireland had the highest rates, where the population growth rate in 2001 was 7.3 per 1000 people. This ratio was also high in France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands - 4 per 1000 people.
Further examination of countries by region reveals similarities between different countries in terms of natural population growth. In the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), there has been a natural population decline since the mid-1990s. Likewise, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have either already faced the threat of natural population decline (in the case of Poland and Slovakia), or have been experiencing a decline in natural growth rates for a long time. For example, in Hungary, the rate of natural increase has been gradually declining since the early 1980s, reaching 3.4 in 2002. The Mediterranean countries - Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain - experienced a sharp decline in natural population growth rates; the average overall indicator for these countries, which stood at 9.2 in 1970, fell to 0.5 in 2001 (the lower limit was reached in 1998 at 0.1 per 1000 people).
2.2.2. Net migration
Trends in net indicators migrations are not so obvious, since the inflow of the population to one developed (European) country may be accompanied by an outflow from another, and migration largely depends on wars and political instability. In general, all countries throughout the 1990s experienced annual population growth due to immigration, which significantly exceeded emigration. In 2001, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain set the record for net immigration of 5 per 1,000 people. On the other hand, the population of candidate countries declined in the 1900s due to external migration; this is especially noticeable in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the Baltics. For example, in the early 1990s, the outflow of the population from Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Romania was 17 per 1000 people.
2.2.3. Total population growth
Summing up the coefficients of natural population growth and net migration, one can obtain the coefficient of general population growth. In general, in the 1990s, in developed countries, the overall population growth was positive, and where there was a decline in natural growth, this process was made up for by immigration. In 2001, Ireland and Luxembourg had the highest overall growth rates at 11 per 1000 people. On the other hand, in the 1990s, most of the candidate countries experienced a decline in overall population growth, which, in the case of many countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics, was exacerbated by population outflows.
2.3. Age and sex structure of the population
There is a relationship between the structure of the population and the number of births and deaths. The age and sex composition of the population is determined not only by the level of fertility, mortality and migration in the past, but also largely determines the level of fertility, mortality and migration in the future.
At present, two main features can be distinguished in the sex and age structure of the population of economically developed countries. First, the number of men between the ages of 25 and 39 exceeds the number of women of the same age, which is likely to reflect the pattern of immigration, since, as a rule, able-bodied men of reproductive age are immigrants. Second, as of 1999, women of childbearing age between 25 and 44 had higher fertility rates than women from developing countries.
The age distribution of the population is largely determined by fertility, but it is also influenced by migration and mortality. The more able-bodied youth in the age structure of the population, the easier the task of providing for the elderly. Trends towards an increase in the number of the elderly population appeared in the 1970s, in the early 1980s they gave way to a decline, and in the mid-1980s they resumed with renewed vigor. Therefore, the share of older people (over 65) in the age structure of the population of countries is steadily increasing. The exceptions are Ireland (where the proportion of older people has been declining throughout the 1990s), Sweden (which had the largest number of older people between 1977 and 2000), Austria, Denmark and the United Kingdom (where rates have not changed significantly since the mid-1980s). ).
2.4. Major demographic trends
2.4.1. Declining fertility rates
Typically, the main demographic trends are associated with fertility and international migration. The structure and dynamics of the population depends on the decisions made by individuals and households. Fertility rates are influenced by social decisions about marriage, divorce, cohabitation and economic forces- financial instability, as well as the level of education of women and their employment.
The data show that in all European countries, with the exception of Ireland and Sweden, fertility rates have fallen and are now below replacement levels, at 1.5 children per woman. This trend inevitably leads to a natural population decline, especially among young groups. The decline in fertility was due to a number of factors (the decision to marry, the decision to have a child, the woman's decision to get a higher education, the woman's decision to start working, the desired standard of living and family structure).
One of the important components considered in the study of fertility patterns is marriage. Recently, however, in many countries, marriage is increasingly being replaced by cohabitation, and the divorce rate is constantly growing. Since the early 1980s, in most countries, the average age at first marriage for women has gradually increased. If in 1980 it was 23 years old, then in 1995 it was already 26 years old. The growth was especially noticeable in the Scandinavian countries: in 2001 in Sweden - 30 years, in Denmark - 29 years, in Finland - 28 years. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that cohabitation is increasingly becoming an alternative to marriage. In the candidate countries, the average age at marriage has also increased, but overall it is slightly lower than in the member countries: if in the 1980s it was 23, then in 2001 it was 25 years. The pursuit of higher education also forces women to postpone the decision to marry. In 2000, the share of women among university graduates in countries was more than 6%. In addition, after graduating from higher education, women tend to give preference to work, rather than creating a family.
The age of a woman's first childbirth is largely determined by the age of marriage or cohabitation, the desire to obtain a higher education, a job and an appropriate income, as well as the desired standard of living and family structure. Since the late 1970s, the average age at birth of the first child in European countries has gradually increased: if in the early 1980s it was 25 years, then in 2000 it was 27 years.
2.4.2. Aging populations in developed countries
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has published a report on aging and employment policy. The main idea of the report is that the population of developed countries is rapidly aging, as a result, demographic processes threaten to turn into an economic crisis.
Population aging is already dramatically affecting all areas of everyday life, and this will continue to be so. Experts predict that this process will affect economic growth, savings, investment and consumption, labor markets, pensions, taxation, etc. Thus, over the next three decades, an aging population will lead to an annual decline in the growth rate of the world economy from 2.5 percent to 1.7 percent per year. The labor market will face a labor shortage, and the payment of pensions will become a serious burden on public finances, OECD experts say. This issue will be most acute in countries with high quality standards of health care and nutrition. Europe will suffer the most. Calculations show that in developed industrial countries by 2050 there will be 7 pensioners for every 10 active workers. Recall that in 2000 this ratio was 10 to 4. In Europe, the ratio will fall to 1 to 1, which will overburden state budgets and systems social insurance... As a result, GDP growth in OECD countries will be 30 percent lower than in 1970-2000.
The OECD proposes to stop encouraging premature retirement, despite the fact that many wealthy European countries have set a fairly high retirement age - 65 on average (the exception is France, where you can retire at 62). However, experts note that in fact, residents of these states, using the developed social security system, quit their jobs long before officially the deadline... Thus, the real retirement age in Germany, the Netherlands and Spain is 61, in Italy and Finland - 60, in Belgium, Austria and Luxembourg - 59 years.
Therefore, the OECD is calling for radical reforms of the labor market, pension and social insurance systems to encourage residents to work longer.
According to experts, it is necessary to be equal to the Americans. According to an OECD study in 19 developed countries, the most hardworking are Americans, who work 34.5 hours a week, with hours worked up 20 percent from 1970 to 2002. Europeans, on the other hand, work 28 hours a week, while the number of hours worked is decreasing. In France, for example, this time has decreased by 24 percent since 1970, which means that the average Frenchman works only 611 hours a year. Germany, France, Japan and the United Kingdom were the leaders in reducing working hours.
I would like to note that the problem of aging concerns not only developed countries. According to the UN Population Fund, in 1950 the category of elderly people was 8 percent, in 2000 - 10 percent, by 2050 it will reach 21 percent. The Foundation's experts say that in about 50 years, for the first time in human history, there will be more elderly people on the planet than children under 15 years of age. Today, every tenth inhabitant of the planet belongs to the age group over 60, and by 2050, one in five will belong to this group. It is expected that by this time the number of those over 80 will have increased 5 times.
So far, the problem, which is so acute for Europe, is less noticeable in Russia. The average Russian works about 800 hours a year. In 2002, there were two employees for every pensioner. But according to the forecast of the World Bank, if the retirement age is not raised in our country, then in 2050 there will be 93 pensioners per 100 workers. Economists have long recommended raising the bar to 65.
Working longer is, of course, good, but one should not forget that Russia, with its living conditions, is still very far behind developed countries. According to experts, the average life expectancy in European countries, including other developed countries, in 2000 was 77 years, and by 2050 it will be 83 years. Already today, life expectancy, for example in Japan, namely, they are considered world champions in life expectancy, on average reaches 82 years. Russia is far from such achievements, our life expectancy is 65-68 years. So if you raise the pension threshold and not improve living conditions, then you may not live to see retirement.
2.4.3. Growth in immigration to developed countries
The structure and dynamics of the population is also influenced by migration, which is determined by micro-level decisions of individuals and households. Immigration to a country increases its population, while emigration decreases it. Net migration is positive when the influx of immigrants exceeds the outflow of emigrants, and negative when the opposite is true. At the same time, it is important to understand that the problem of migration is complex, multifaceted and always associated with a clear definition of the status of migrants and the adoption of migration measures.
The picture of international migration is much more complex. In general, in most countries, net immigration is small, but in some countries there is a significant inflow or outflow of population from time to time. One of the factors capable of causing unexpected changes in migration trends may be the enlargement of the European Union that took place in May 2004. It is much more difficult to predict the development of migration trends and their consequences for the structure of the population, but it is obvious that they largely depend on political decisions.
Estimates of the results of migration exchange between the main regions of the world show that since the 1960s, more developed regions have increased their population due to emigration from less developed regions of the world, becoming net recipients of migrants ( see table 3). Moreover, net migration to more developed countries increased steadily between 1960 and 2000. In 1990-2000, the developed countries of the world received 2.5 million migrants annually, and half of them - 1.3 million people - went to North America. In 2000-2006, the amount of net migration to the developed regions of the world remained almost unchanged, but was redistributed even more in favor of North America, which began to receive 1.5 million international migrants annually. In 2007-2010. net migration to developed countries will be about 2.3 million people per year, including 1.3 - North America.
The contribution of international migration to population growth in the most developed regions of the world has become increasingly important against the background of declining fertility rates. In 2007-2050, the migration increase in the population of developed countries will amount to 103 million people, which will more than cover the natural population decline as a result of the excess of the number of deaths over the number of births, which is predicted during this period - 74 million people.
Between 2007 and 2010, net migration will more than double natural population growth (births minus deaths) in eight countries - Belgium, Hong Kong SAR, Spain, Canada, Luxembourg, Singapore, Sweden and Switzerland. In another eight countries and territories - Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Channel Islands - migration compensates for the excess of deaths over births. 33 out of 45 developed countries are net recipients of migrants. This group includes such countries of traditional immigration as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA, most of the countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe, as well as Russian Federation and Japan.
Table 3. Average annual migration increase (decrease) of the population of groups of countries with different levels of development and largest regions of the world, 1950-2050, the average version of the forecast of the conversion of 2006, thousand people
1950-1960 | 1960-1970 | 1970-1980 | 1980-1990 | 1990-2000 | 2000-2010 | 2010-2020 | 2020-2030 | 2030-2040 | 2040-2050 | |
More developed | -3 | 556 | 1 088 | 1 530 | 2 493 | 2 902 | 2 268 | 2 269 | 2 272 | 2 272 |
Less developed | 3 | -556 | -1 088 | -1 530 | -2 493 | -2 902 | -2 268 | -2 269 | -2 272 | -2 272 |
least developed | -104 | -148 | -447 | -788 | -37 | -29 | -277 | -373 | -375 | -375 |
the rest are less developed | 108 | -409 | -641 | -742 | -2 456 | -2 873 | -1 991 | -1 896 | -1 897 | -1 897 |
Africa | -125 | -242 | -289 | -267 | -310 | -416 | -377 | -395 | -393 | -393 |
Asia | 194 | -22 | -377 | -451 | -1 340 | -1 311 | -1 210 | -1 221 | -1 222 | -1 222 |
Europe | -489 | -31 | 288 | 441 | 1 051 | 1 271 | 799 | 805 | 808 | 808 |
Latin America | -68 | -293 | -415 | -781 | -775 | -1 108 | -616 | -590 | -595 | -595 |
North America | 403 | 479 | 748 | 972 | 1 277 | 1 453 | 1 305 | 1 300 | 1 300 | 1 300 |
Oceania | 85 | 109 | 44 | 86 | 96 | 111 | 99 | 101 | 102 | 102 |
The trend of movement of migrants from less developed to more developed countries of the world will prevail until the middle of this century, however, migration flows between developing countries will be significant. A large number of migrants are attracted by countries such as Hong Kong (SAR of China), Israel, Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates. The largest concentration of refugees from Iraq is concentrated in Jordan and Syria. Many African countries host significant numbers of refugees from neighboring countries.
Based on the 2005-2050 average, the main net recipients of international migrants are projected to be the United States of America (1.1 million people per year), Canada (200 thousand people per year), Germany (150), Italy (139), Great Britain (130), Spain (123) and Australia (100 thousand people a year). The countries with the highest rates of net emigration, according to forecasts, will be China (-329 thousand people per year), Mexico (-306), India (-241), the Philippines (-180), Pakistan (-167) and Indonesia (-164) ).
So, despite significant cultural, social, political and economic differences between European countries, demographic trends are quite similar. At the same time, there are certain differences in the degree of changes: there is either a tendency towards a reduction in the natural increase in the population, or towards its natural decline. The decline in natural population growth is due to a number of demographic factors. In general, despite the differences in the degree and duration of changes, similar microlevel trends underlie such development:
· Raising the age of first marriage;
· Raising the age of birth of the first child;
· Increase in divorce rates;
· The drop in fertility rates below the level of population reproduction;
· An increase in the number of elderly people.
Since changes in natural population growth are slow, the future population structure and potential problems are relatively easy to predict. But this is precisely why it is very difficult to influence this development with political decisions.
Chapter 3. Demographic policy of developed countries
3.1. Experience in implementing demographic policy
A certain standard of demographic policy is France, the first European country to face depopulation of the population and has developed a system of measures to overcome it and increase the population.
The dynamics of the population of France is as follows: 1801 - 28.3 million people, 1901 - 40.7 million people, 2002 - 59.8 million people.
At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, a sharp decline in the natural population growth and birth rate in France began, which was explained by the desire of numerous petty-bourgeois strata (France is a rentier state) to limit the number of children in the family. Despite the constant decline in mortality, the rate of decline in fertility was higher. Participation in two world wars in the 20th century, the global crisis of the 30s led to depopulation: in 1914-1919 the country's population decreased by 3 million people, in 1939-1945 - by another 1.2 million.
An active demographic policy aimed at increasing the birth rate has been carried out in France since the early 1920s. Moreover, until 1967, the sale of contraceptives was prohibited, until 1975, abortion was prohibited.
In 1946, a broad system was put into practice in France cash payments and tax incentives families, aimed at encouraging the birth of the first, second and especially the third child (pro-natalist policy). As a result, among the countries of Western Europe in the mid-1980s, France had one of the highest total fertility rates (the average number of children per woman) - 1.8 - 1.9. The population increased by 0.3 - 0.4% annually.
The narrowed reproduction regime prompted the government to stimulate the migration of foreign workers and take measures to increase the birth rate. From the 60s of the XIX century to the 30s of the XX century, the migration increase in the population of France amounted to 3.2 million people, which provided 3/4 of the total increase in the number of inhabitants. In 1931, there were 2.7 million foreigners in France and 0.4 million naturalized. In 1931, foreign workers accounted for over 40% of miners, 1/3 of metallurgists, 1/4 of builders and 1/3 of agricultural workers.
In the second half of the 20th century, in 1946-1974, the population of France increased by 12.1 million people, including 8.5 million people - due to natural population growth, by 2.4 million people - due to immigration and by 1.2 million people - due to the repatriation of the French from the former colonies.
Modern measures of the demographic policy of France have a significant impact on the financial situation of families with children.
Basic child support is awarded to all persons living in France and having at least two children, regardless of nationality, for their children under the age of 20 living in the country. The amount of the allowance is differentiated depending on the number of children: for two children - 107 euros per month, for three - 244, for four - 382, for five - 519, for six - 656 euros. A supplement of EUR 137 is paid for each additional child. There are allowances for children over 11 years old - 30 euros and over 16 years old - 54 euros. This supplement is not paid for the first child to families with two children. Family income does not affect the amount of this benefit.
The following additional benefits are paid depending on the family's income:
o allowance for each child under three years of age depending on income from four months of pregnancy in the amount of 154 euros;
o single parent allowance € 502 per month plus a supplement for each child € 167 per month;
o Allowance for the new school year for children from 6 to 18 years old who study in the amount of 67 euros;
o family supplement for families or single parents with low incomes with 3 three or more children aged 3 three to 21 years in the amount of 139 euros per month.
In addition, there are also educational allowances for disabled children (107 euros per month), housing allowances for families with children.
Allowances are also paid for the care of a child under 6 living at home. The amount of the benefit depends on the family's income. Maximum size the allowance is 1,500 euros per quarter for families whose annual income does not exceed 33,658 euros, and whose children are 3 years old. Benefits for children from 3 to 6 years old do not exceed 500 euros per quarter. Benefits are also paid to families hiring nannies for children under 6 years of age.
Parental attendance allowances are paid to parents who are forced to terminate or reduce their presence at work due to a serious illness of a child. The amount of the benefit depends on the remaining income. There are allowances for single parents. Orphans receive a monthly allowance of 100 euros.
In recent years, they have also introduced lump-sum benefits for the birth of a child in the amount of 260% of the base salary for the first and 717% for each subsequent child, and maternity leave was paid in the amount of 90% of earnings.
The country's population growth in recent years is due to a generous demographic policy; family benefits are paid to everyone, including immigrants.
By international standards Sweden is the most equal country. The Nordic gender policy model is equality, equity, equal rights and opportunities, equal access to power. These principles are implemented in the demographic policy of Sweden.
The policy of the Government of Sweden is aimed at creating economic independence for women in marriage - every woman has real earning opportunities.
According to Swedish experts, the protection of women's labor rights in employment is the most problematic area of the policy of ensuring equal rights and opportunities. Most of the appeals to the legal service of the Ombudsman for Equality in the Labor Market concern the protection of the rights of pregnant women in employment and in case of contract dismissal. Almost all conflicts are resolved in the interests of women.
The required number of places in preschool institutions for working parents is provided. Working parents have the right to parental leave until the child reaches the age of one year (from January 1, 2002 - for 13 months, including 2 months only the father of the child can take advantage of, which is provided for the purpose of attracting the father to raising children with early age). An allowance of 800 SEK per month ($ 80) is paid for each child under 18 years old, for students in universities - a scholarship of 2000 SEK and a concessional loan of 5000 SEK per month in installments for 20 years.
In Belgium, the state implements a wide range of measures in the framework of demographic policy: payment of benefits, tax cuts, subsidies for housing and education of children, etc. The allowance increases depending on the age of the child - at the age of 14 it is three times more than for a child under four years of age. If the child is studying, then the allowance is paid until the age of 25.
In Austria, when determining the amount of benefits and benefits, the number of children in the family is at the forefront, rather than the income of the family. Family assistance is provided from public funds. Compensation fund the family, which has been delegated all the authority to issue family benefits, is financed from funds received from entrepreneurs. Other sources are the government and provincial governments, which provide funds from tax revenues. Provinces contribute to the Family Compensation Fund in proportion to the number of residents. The fund is administered by the Ministry of Family, Youth and Consumer Protection. Benefits for children are issued if they are studying up to 27 years of age.
In Italy, one of the goals of demographic policy is to improve the status of women and take care of the family. Family benefits are paid based on income. The amount of the allowance is inversely proportional to the family's income and is directly proportional to the number of family members. In total, there are three thresholds for the annual family income in absolute terms. No benefit is paid for income exceeding € 41,721. Students receive an allowance up to the age of 25.
A certain consensus has been reached between the member states of the European Union on principled approaches to state support families with children.
In the 1989 Conclusion of the Council of Ministers Responsible for Family Policy, adopted in 1989, the European Commission defined the situation at the time: “In the member states, a variety of approaches are applied to the institution of the family. The perception of the state in relation to the family also differs. At the same time, with the help of various measures carried out in the framework of different directions - social security, tax policy, family law and others - state bodies in all member countries are concerned with the living conditions of families. Family policy means a combination of these measures. " In this interpretation, family policy is interpreted as broadly as possible and, in fact, includes demographic and population policy.
It should be noted that family benefits are one of the forms of family policy implemented in the EU countries. Tax credits are widely used in countries where benefits are less applicable. For example, in Iceland, basic child support is provided as a tax deduction and is administered by the tax office. The deduction amount is firm and does not depend on income for children under 7 years of age.
In most EU countries, benefits for families with children are paid from the budget and are not linked to social insurance. The condition for the provision of child support is the fact that the child and parents live in the country. However, in Germany, for example, to receive child support, it is sufficient that one of the parents pays taxes in that country.
The amount of the benefit in most EU countries depends on the age of the child. At the same time, only in Denmark the amount of the benefit decreases with the age of the child. In other countries, it is increasing. In addition, in many countries there are additional benefits for young children.
The amount of the allowance is also differentiated depending on the order of birth of the child. At the same time, only in the UK for the first child the allowance is higher (103 euros) than for the next (69 euros). In other cases, the amount of the benefit increases as the order of birth increases. A special occasion is France, where the basic allowance for the first child is not paid. Right to child allowance in most countries is not related to family income.
At present, in the European Union, in connection with the actual cessation of population growth and the aging of the population and labor resources, there has been an increased interest in developing new approaches to demographic policy.
The recently released European Commission report has intensified the demographic policy debate for a united Europe and proposed immigration as the main way to tackle the problem.
The report indicates that the total fertility rate in Europe was 1.48 children per woman in 2003, while to maintain the population it must be at least 2.1. The number of retirees is growing steadily. According to the forecast, by 2030, the EU countries are likely to be home to 35 million people over 80, which is twice as many as today, and there will be 18 million fewer children. In general, from 2025 to 2030 the EU's population will decline from 469 million to 468 million people (excluding migrants). (For comparison: the US population, on the contrary, will increase by 25.6% over the same period, with population explosion in the States is caused by the influx of migrants from Latin America.).
The report indicates that the demographic decline could have serious consequences for living standards and intergenerational relations.
The demographic policy in the United States is expressed the least clearly, at the same time, conditions have been created for a significant immigration population growth, as well as measures of tax support for families with children and various regional and corporate family policy programs are being applied.
Perhaps this is due to the fact that the demographic situation in the United States today looks more favorable than in the rest of the developed countries of the world.
This is explained by the country's dominant position in the world, attractiveness for migrants and the possibilities of their selective selection in the interests of the country.
The favorable demographic situation in the United States is a significant advantage that will be realized by American society not only now, but also in the coming decades.
The 90s of the last century were record-breaking migration growth population, which amounted to 10 million people. The bulk of immigrants are people of working and childbearing age. 2/3 of migrants are from Asia and Latin America with large families.
As a result of migration infusions in the past 20 years, the birth rate in the United States has been growing and the United States is leading in this indicator among the industrially developed countries, providing expanded reproduction of the population. Here, the problem of aging of the population is less acute than in Europe.
The entry of young families into the country from abroad made it possible to partially neutralize the negative impact on the birth rate of the crisis of the American family, which is manifested in the reduction in the proportion and number of complete families, the growth of single-parent families and non-family households. So, from the early 70s to the early 80s, the number of non-family households increased by 1.5 times, and single people - by 69%. Since the 1980s, these processes have been proceeding more smoothly.
Under these conditions, the United States can afford not to force the adoption of new family legislation and not to take special measures to increase the birth rate.
The absence of an official doctrine of demographic and family policy in the United States is impossible to understand without considering the broader context of social policy.
The ideology of US social policy that has formed over the past decades consists of the following principles:
o liberal individualism as the highest value;
o work ethic as a basic element of the value system;
o trust in market mechanisms, which alone are capable of leading society to growth and prosperity;
o freedom of the family as a private institution, refusal of state interference in family affairs;
o prevalence of Puritanism and Protestant movements and the predominance of a volunteer approach in social security, rather than state obligations;
o the influence of social Darwinism, which proclaims that the survival of the fittest is the natural order of things and public intervention in this process is counterproductive;
o some justification for racism;
o lack of provision on social responsibility at the federal level (as opposed to state governments).
And the most important thing is that an open immigration policy nullifies the need for a pro-natal demographic policy.
As a result, social policy in the United States is reduced, to a large extent, to social support for the most needy.
Until the 1930s, social support was provided at the community and volunteer levels. In 1935, the Social Security Act was passed, guaranteeing the right to social protection to those most in need. Basically, it consisted in the provision of services and payments in kind.
Currently, material support is implemented through a system of tax incentives and loans: standard tax deductions, child tax credits, childcare tax credits, and other disabled people, adoption loans.
The provision of tax credits is believed to increase incentives to work because wage becomes additional source income. At the same time, obtaining loans requires a deep understanding of the tax system and therefore is not easily accessible to those in greatest need. In addition, tax credits can be obtained once a year - at the end of the tax period, not when they are needed.
In the United States alone, in 1993, mandatory unpaid maternity leave of up to 12 weeks was introduced in enterprises with more than 50 people and with at least 1250 hours of work experience in the previous year. At this time, only the workplace is saved.
Currently, US social security is heavily dependent on benefits provided by businesses. Usually, large firms have family support programs that include family leave, flexible work schedules and part-time work, payment for preschool institutions, etc.
3.2. General results of demographic policy
Population aging and its consequences cannot be prevented through immigration. The research literature has extensively debated the question of whether immigration can fill the gap in the working-age population. Despite the diversity of points of view, all researchers agree that such a policy cannot be feasible or acceptable in the long term.
It would take a record number of immigrants to fill the labor gap. In addition, in the current socio-political situation, when economically developed countries are trying to limit immigration, such a number of immigrants would be simply unacceptable. But even if such a significant number of labor immigrants were allowed to work in these countries, the problem of population aging would hardly be solved. Rather, slowing the aging of the population from it in the short term would be a simple postponement of the problem in the long term. The same immigrants themselves would grow old, thereby creating imbalances in the age structure of the population. By 2050, the inflow of migrants would be 59-99% of general population... Such a high level of migration has not been observed in the past in any of the countries or regions reviewed. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that such an influx could occur in the foreseeable future. Thus, it comes on whether immigration can be used to effectively slow down population aging, rather than prevent it.
But the problem of filling the shortage of the able-bodied population with the help of immigration is far from being solved. Important questions remain unanswered. For example, since the early 1980s, there have been major differences between American and European immigration policies. The US policy was more open to the immigration of skilled labor compared to the relatively closed policy of European countries. Over the same period, productivity in the US has grown significantly compared to that in the EU. Therefore, it is important to establish the existence of a relationship between greater openness in American politics and higher economic growth.
Government policies can slow the decline in fertility rates. Government policies can affect fertility. But this conclusion requires a number of important reservations, namely:
· There is no single policy that can be recommended to improve fertility;
· The effectiveness of such a policy is greatly influenced by the political, social and economic context;
· It takes a long time for the consequences of such a policy to become visible.
The influence of government policy is always limited, since it can only slow down the decline in fertility rates, but not stop it or bring these indicators at least to the level of population reproduction.
This conclusion is supported by specific studies. Today, France has the second highest fertility rates in Europe and one of the most mature family policies. To some, France's relatively high fertility rates may seem surprising, since France was the first country in Europe to experience a fertility decline that caused deep concern among the population and government. But thanks to the adoption of family legislation, the state managed to significantly increase the birth rate.
Unlike France, Spain currently has the second lowest fertility in the EU, behind only Italy, and has no clear demographic policy. However, a generation earlier (in 1971) Spain ranked second among European countries with the highest fertility. The sharp decline in the birth rate is associated with the rejection of the family policy pursued by the Franco regime (prohibiting contraception, encouraging large families), and the transition to a democratic regime with a passive demographic policy.
In Poland and the GDR, after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, there was a decline in the birth rate. The GDR has repeatedly adopted various packages of family policy aimed at increasing the birth rate. At the same time, the 1986 program was not as effective as the 1972 program. The economic incentives of East German policy in 1976 had a direct impact on fertility growth: the fertility rate rose from 1.54 in 1975 to 1.94 in 1980. However, in the long term, the impact of this policy has been less visible.
In Poland, the success of family policy in the 1970s gave way to a short-lived decline in the birth rate in the mid-1980s. In the late 1980s, the decline in the birth rate resumed, and in the 1990s, with the onset of economic transformations accompanied by changes in social and economic policy, it has reached catastrophic proportions.
In turn, the decline in the birth rate and subsequent changes may be associated not so much with policy changes as with the socio-economic situation. For example, in Spain, low fertility rates were attributed, inter alia, to high unemployment among people under 30, high housing costs and the propensity of young people to live with their parents longer than in other European countries. Thus, indirect policies that stimulate economic growth can reduce unemployment and increase cash income. To a certain extent, the increase in the birth rate can also be facilitated by the adoption of a program to build more affordable housing for young families.
In most countries, demographic policies affecting fertility tend to be geared towards other goals. For example, in Sweden, the challenge for family and full-time policies is primarily to enable couples to combine parenting with work. Therefore, it would be a mistake to consider the main goal of policy, for example, the provision of parental leave, is to increase the birth rate. Within the framework of this policy, such a task is, of course, of secondary importance.
In addition, any policy to increase fertility rates must be affordable. Raising fertility to reproduction rates (from 1.69 children per woman in 1988) would require a sevenfold increase in family benefits from C $ 289 to C $ 1,982 a year, according to a Canadian Population Policy Survey, a rate not very different from family benefits. in some European countries. In this case, one of the possible solutions may be to turn to the French experience of the “third child policy”. The French government pays such attention to her because it believes that influencing the total number of children (the decision to have more children) is easier than the decision to have children at all (the decision to have the first child). Since at present in Europe most couples strive to have at least one child and often postpone the birth of a second and subsequent children due to economic uncertainty, the use of the French experience can be very effective in developing a common European policy to increase fertility. It is important to understand the causal relationship between policy decisions and changes in fertility-related behavior, but the data required to do this is often incomplete, especially when it comes to policy choices.
No policy works by itself. No political intervention by itself can completely overcome low fertility in all situations. To be sure, with some policy instruments, governments have sometimes been able to slow down fertility declines. For example, over the past decades, France has made some progress by focusing on the “third child policy”. But it is hardly justifiable to associate these successes with a single political mechanism. Rather, it is about creating a social, economic and political environment conducive to having more children. And such an environment can only be created by combining a range of different policy measures aimed at achieving this goal.
Sweden overcame the decline in fertility by resorting to several policy instruments. Parental leave policies in the 1980s allowed many women to raise children and keep their jobs at the same time. But neither child welfare nor extended parental leave alone led to an increase in fertility in the late 1980s. It seems that it was the combination of these policies with policies aimed at ensuring gender equality in pay that played an important role in creating families and improving the quality of life.
In the former GDR, the rise in fertility was influenced by the 1976 family policy package, which included the provision of long-term maternity leave, paid vacations when combining work and study, interest-free loans to newlyweds, high monthly benefits per child and quality medical care. And again, when creating families, the decisive role was played not by a single measure, but by the whole range of measures. However, a package of similar policy measures adopted in 1986 did not have the desired effect.
Finally, there is no one-size-fits-all recipe for a policy of increasing fertility: what worked in one country may well not work in another. Studies show that in some countries there is a correlation between the size of social transfers to families and the level of fertility, while in others there is no such correlation, although it should be emphasized that this does not in itself imply a causal relationship. Therefore, family policy is a necessary but insufficient component of demographic policy aimed at increasing the birth rate.
Despite the fact that many different kinds of demographic events were carried out in the countries reviewed, there is no evidence that they were in any way coordinated or aimed solely at increasing the birth rate. However, if the EU wants to prevent rather than mitigate the consequences of an aging population and a decline in human capital in the next generation, it will have to turn to demographic policy.
Political, economic and social contexts. Typically, the same policy measures lead to different demographic outcomes due to the complex and fluid political, economic and social contexts in which they are implemented. Best examples here serve the GDR, Poland and Spain. The decline in fertility in the former GDR after German reunification cannot be attributed to specific policies; rather, it is associated with a change in the social environment. Women facing difficult personal economic situations will not immediately have children. Likewise, the transition to a free market economy in Poland caused a change in the economic environment, deprived families of the incentive to have children, and instilled Western values in wide sections of society. In Spain, a sharp decline in the birth rate was associated with democratic rule that followed the fall of the Franco regime.
France is prudently concerned that declining birthrates threaten its economy. Therefore, French demographic policy interferes more in the lives of families than the policies of other European countries.
In Sweden, the economic context has had a significant impact on fertility. Women's income is directly related to childbearing. Policies that encourage women to work can help economic growth but it will ultimately lead to lower fertility if not accompanied by appropriate family policies that allow women to combine childbearing and raising children with work.
The results of demographic policy do not appear immediately. Policy implementation is slow. This process can be divided into five main stages:
1. reaching political agreement;
2. transformation of consent into policy;
3. implementation of the policy;
4. behavioral change at the micro level as a result of this policy;
5. Achievement (direct or indirect) of the goal of the policy.
Thus, direct or indirect public policy aimed at overcoming the decline in the birth rate requires many years of effort and, as a rule, turns out to be unattractive for politicians. While some policy measures (such as banning, restricting or freeing abortion) can have dramatic impact in the short term, they usually have only a short-term effect. Election cycles and demographic policy cycles do not coincide, and therefore politicians have no immediate incentives to pursue such a policy. They usually tend to favor policies that are not time consuming.
One way to mitigate the adverse effects of low fertility and an aging population is to increase human capital by creating an environment in which women and older people benefit from working rather than doing household chores or retirement. However, full employment policies that encourage women to work can have a negative impact on fertility if women choose a career over the family. At the same time, these consequences can be avoided: the example of Sweden shows that the combination of full employment policies with sound family policies can have a beneficial effect on fertility. In the 1970s and 1980s, thanks to the policies of the Swedish government, the adverse effects of women's participation in the labor force were minimized, the birth rate in the country increased and the employment of women increased. But the Swedish example also shows that such a balance is fragile because it depends entirely on a favorable economic environment.
Thus, migration and fertility policies are unlikely to halt population aging, although they can slow it down.
Conclusion
Today, almost all economically developed countries are experiencing a prolonged decline in fertility and, consequently, an aging population. Fertility rates in most of them are below the level of population replacement (2.1 children per married couple), which leads to a reduction in natural population growth, and in some cases - to natural decline. At the same time, the share of economically and socially inactive elderly people continues to grow in the structure of the population, and the number of working-age population in relation to the entire population is decreasing. In addition, immigration, which could potentially make up for the decline in the working-age population, remains low in most developed countries.
Such demographic trends can lead to devastating consequences for the economy: a decrease in the share of the working-age population leads to a decrease in human capital and, therefore, can lead to a decrease in productivity; the pension and social insurance systems may become too burdensome; caring for a growing older population can fall entirely on the shoulders of households; the growth of the elderly population requires a significant increase in health care costs.
Population aging, driven by low fertility and increased life expectancy, is likely to force governments in developed economies to overhaul social security systems. Differences in the social, economic and political structure of these countries are reflected in differences in demographic structure. Concerns about these trends have sparked a heated debate about what policies can help overcome them, or at least mitigate the negative impact. During these debates, three main approaches were discussed:
1.Promoting marriage / cohabitation and childbearing through government measures aimed at changing the income structure of couples who decide to create sustainable alliances and have children;
2. encouraging immigration of the working-age population from other countries;
3.Social policy reform: for example, increasing the statutory retirement age or encouraging female employment, which gives pension system long-term sustainability.
However, the relationship between politics and demography is still not fully understood, and it is often very difficult to find out the real causes of demographic changes, and sometimes even impossible task.
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- What tasks will be in ct?
- A beginner's guide to accountants: where to start learning accounting?
- A beginner's guide to accountants: where to start learning accounting?